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Abstract 
This thesis consists of five chapters. In the first chapter I provide the introduction to the 
three essays examined in this thesis. In the second chapter I examine the impact of 
securitization on U.S. bank holding companies’ (hereafter BHCs) credit risk, credit risk 
taking, profitability, and capital level between 2001 and 2013. I also study the effect of the 
credit enhancements and liquidity provision on BHCs’ performance between 2001 and 2013. 
Since securitization is an endogenous decision, I use the treatment-effects model to control 
for the selection bias and observe a positive relationship between securitization and credit 
risk. I also find that securitization decreases BHCs’ profitability, but that securitization 
increases BHCs’ capital levels. Although it is possible that relatively risk-averse BHCs may 
consciously increase their capital buffer by retaining earnings, for example, I do not exclude 
the possibility that BHCs engaged in regulatory capital arbitrage to increase their capital 
level. Nevertheless, I find that use of securitization for capital regulatory purposes is 
mitigated by the risk-retention mechanism, i.e. credit enhancements and liquidity 
provision—banks had to keep the required capital for their extended guarantees. However, 
as was uncovered during the financial crisis, these credit and liquidity risk-reducing tools 
were not sufficient to prevent the recent turmoil in the securitization markets.  
The third chapter analyzes information opacity and systemic risk for the U.S. BHCs in 
the context of the asset-backed commercial paper (hereafter ABCP) between 2001:Q2 and 
2012:Q4. Banks which set up costly ABCP conduits might have benefited from the 
regulatory capital relief and from providing financing alternatives to their clients. However, 
they faced costs in terms of the increase in information opacity through the provision of 
ABCP guarantees to BHCs’ own and third-party sponsored ABCP conduits. Furthermore, I 
observe that higher information asymmetry about BHCs’ value is associated with higher 
volatility of returns and also with higher systemic risk.  
In the fourth chapter I examine the proposal to limit bank size, which is known as tackling 
the banks’ incentive to become “too big to fail”, and also how this regulation to curb bank 
size may affect banks’ operating costs. I examine the relationship between the size of BHCs 
and BHCs’ operating costs from 2001:Q2 to 2014:Q1 to evaluate the costs that the newly 
suggested regulations on bank size might bring. I find that rules to limit the size of banks 
could significantly reduce economies of scale. In particular, if large and cost-efficient banks 
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become split into smaller parts, data processing, legal fees, audit and consulting expenses, 
in addition to expenses on premises and automated teller machines (hereafter ATMs) are 
likely to increase. 
I also pay particular interest to legal fees and litigation settlement; I find evidence that 
larger banks, but not necessarily systemically more risky banks, face litigation charges more 
frequently. I do not find evidence that larger banks face a lower probability of being fined. 
This suggests that another phenomenon known as “too big to jail” may not be true, if the 
assumption is that the misconduct detection is perfect. I do, however, observe that penalties 
had little effect on BHCs’ profitability, and that some of the largest banks continuously face 
litigation charges. In turn, this could possibly imply that benefits from wrongdoing 
outweighed the costs. 
The fifth chapter summarizes major findings and concludes. 
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Chapter 1! 
Introduction 
1.1! Introduction 
The 2007–2009 global financial crisis is viewed as the most severe since the Great 
Depression. Many large financial institutions were on the brink of collapse as a result of 
excessive exposure to securitized assets. 
To stabilize the financial system, the U.S. Treasury Department launched a bailout 
program called the Troubled Asset Relief Program (hereafter TARP). Its purpose was to bail 
out the troubled financial institutions. The U.S. Treasury had to purchase assets and equity 
from financial firms to strengthen the financial sector and prevent avoidable foreclosures.1 
TARP programs included several programs of which the largest was the Capital Purchase 
Program (hereafter CPP) targeted at banking organizations. As part of the CPP, the Treasury 
invested approximately $245 billion in over 700 banking institutions. Of these banking 
organizations, 32 were among the biggest banks in the U.S. in the fourth quarter of 2011. 
This gave rise to a widespread public dissatisfaction with the fact that taxpayers’ money had 
to be used to save the “too big to fail”2 banks.  
Another TARP program, called the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(hereafter TALF), created jointly by the Fed and the Treasury in 2009, provided eligible 
borrowers with three-year and five-year non-recourse loans, collateralized by asset-backed 
securities (hereafter ABS). Under TALF facilities, around $71 billion in loans were provided 
to troubled financial firms. The Treasury committed to provide the Federal Reserve up to 
$20 billion under TARP in credit protection for the TALF. In July 2010, this amount was 
reduced to $4.3 billion, and in June 2012 was subsequently reduced again to $1.4 billion. 
The outstanding amount of TALF loans fell from $24.7 billion at the start of 2011 to$5.3 
billion as of June 20, 2012. As of the end of March 2012, all loans were performing as 
scheduled (FSOC, 2012). Just like CPP, TALF has also generated widespread public debate, 
                                                
1 American International Group (AIG), General Motors, Chrysler, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also received 
capital injections in the form of preferred and common stocks (Barth, Prabha, and Swagel , 2012). 
2 This term is used to denote financial firms that would substantially damage the financial system and the rest 
of the economy should they go bankrupt. 
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with regards to the regulation of banking activities and the moral hazard problem of “too big 
to fail” banks.3 
The “laissez-faire” approach toward regulation of investment banks has widely been 
believed to be a contributor to the depth of the recent economic downturn. Following the 
events of August 2007, supervisors have suggested various regulations to limit the scope of 
banking activities. For example, capital regulations have been revised and increased in the 
Basel III Accords. The U.S. has also passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act and 
Consumer Protection Act that included the “Volcker Rule”4 which was designed to limit 
U.S. banks’ exposure to hedge funds and private equity vehicles. In addition, following the 
unpopularity of TARP and to address the issues and prevent the possible activation of 
programs like TARP in the future, policy regulators have produced the new orderly 
liquidation authority in Title II of the Dodd–Frank Act. This involves making bondholders 
and other creditors more prone to incur losses if a financial institution fails, as opposed to 
making taxpayers incur the losses if government steps in to save the failing banks. Title II 
does not eliminate the possibility for the deployment of government funds to save some 
firms. However it gives extra protection to taxpayers in the event of a possible failure of a 
large financial institution because bondholders will be first to incur losses. This has been 
welcomed by the public; however, the Dodd–Frank Act sparked much discussion, especially 
from the regulated financial institutions. Many banks argued that it would have significant 
adverse consequences for corporations, investors, financial markets and the U.S. economy 
(Lester and Bovenzi, 2010). 
The major financial innovations that contributed to the recent crisis and the changes in 
the regulations of bank activities after 2007 have motivated the compilation of this thesis. In 
particular, this thesis focuses on the securitization activities of the big banks, which were 
made possible with the passing of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (hereafter GLBA). In 1999, 
GLBA removed business operation restrictions on all types of banking and financial 
institutions. Banks could loan and securitize, innovate, make swaps and reinsure, hedge and 
guarantee and become closely interconnected. Financial innovation such as securitization 
                                                
3 The CPP is now closed. The Treasury has reported that as of June 2012 all the repayments along with 
interest, dividends and other income exceeded the original disbursement. Moreover, Treasury estimates that 
the total gain to taxpayers from the $245 billion disbursed under all bank support programs under TARP will 
ultimately exceed $20 billion (FSOC, 2012). 
4 The Volcker rule prohibits insured depository institutions and any company affiliated with an insured 
depository institution from engaging in proprietary trading and from acquiring or retaining ownership 
interests in a hedge fund or private equity fund. These prohibitions are subject to a number of statutory 
exemptions and restrictions. 
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increased the interconnection between the financial firms and made it more challenging to 
determine where credit risk ultimately lies. August 2007 began with the seizure in the 
banking system precipitated by BNP Paribas announcing that it was ceasing activity in three 
hedge funds that specialised in US mortgage debt. This was the moment when banks realized 
that the derivatives on their balance sheets were worth significantly less than banks had 
previously imagined.  
In the second chapter of this thesis, I explore whether current U.S. BHCs’ exposure to 
securitized assets had an adverse impact on their risk, profitability and returns. 
In addition, sophisticated and complex securitization programs are also thought to have 
increasingly compromised the financial transparency of banks, resulting in a highly opaque 
banking sector and an erosion of trust in the financial sector as a whole. To put differently, 
apart from discussing motivations and consequences of asset securitization, I focus on the 
benefits and costs benefits of securitization structures. In particular, I examine the opacity5 
in the banking industry and analyze how information opacity was affected by the banks’ 
exposure, via various guarantees, to asset-backed commercial paper (hereafter ABCP). 
ABCP, which is at the epicenter of discussion in my third chapter, is different from ABS.6 
ABCP programs provide corporations with alternatives to direct debit issuance and term 
ABS. The main difference is that ABCP is generally issued with maturities of under three 
months unlike ABS, which are longer term. ABCP conduits issued high levels of debt with 
practically no equity and yet they managed to obtain the highest ratings from the ratings 
agencies due to the credit and liquidity back-up lines provided by the agents extending the 
guarantees (BlackRock, 2013). 
Then, in the third chapter I describe the basic structure of ABCP conduits and their 
connection with sponsoring financial institutions through guarantees. Standard & Poor’s 
(2003) defined structured finance as “a type of financing in which the credit quality of the 
                                                
5 I define bank opacity as the extent to which financial accounting information creates uncertainty about 
intrinsic value (Bushman and Williams 2013). The proxy for information opacity is the bid–ask spread. 
Based on the microstructure theory, it is rational to expect that if investors find it difficult to assess the value 
or riskiness of firms, this will be reflected in the bid–ask spread (Kyle, 1985). My results will bear direct 
policy implications, i.e. given that increased financial disclosure lessens information opacity, this will lead to 
less ambiguity about the true value of the financial institution. 
6 Typically, ABCP conduits benefit from two-tiered enhancement (liquidity and credit enhancements) 
whereas an ABS has typically one level of credit enhancement. This gives some protection for the repayment 
of principal and interest if the maturing ABCP cannot be rolled over in the market. In addition, an ABS 
usually has exposure to a single sector (e.g. mortgages, student loans, automobile or industrial loans), while 
most ABCP conduits have diversified portfolios of assets (BlackRock, 2013). Over the past years, the cost of 
providing liquidity support has risen due to the increased capital requirements and regulatory scrutiny. 
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debt is assumed to be based on a direct guarantee from a creditworthy entity or on the credit 
quality of the debtor’s assets, with or without credit enhancement, rather than on the 
financial strength of the debtor itself.” The definition summarizes well why guarantees are 
important and their role during the recent economic downturn. 
As for the existing empirical evidence on ABCP conduits, Acharya et al. (2013) show 
that banks that set up ABCP conduits suffered significant losses because conduits could not 
be rolled over to maturing ABCP. This raises the need for evaluation of benefits and losses 
to banks from setting up these conduits. 
Acharya et al. (2013) assess the benefits to banks by quantifying how much profit 
conduits yielded to banks. Assuming a risk weight of 100 percent for underlying assets, 
banks could avoid capital requirements of around 8 percent by setting up conduits relative 
to on-balance sheet financing. Assuming that banks could finance short-term debt at close 
to the riskless rate, which is consistent with the rates paid on ABCP before the start of the 
financial crisis, and taking an equity beta of one and a market risk premium of 5 percent, 
banks could reduce the cost of capital by 40 basis points by setting up conduits relative to 
on-balance sheet financing. Assuming that conduits have no costs, and that revenues are 
equal to profits, banks were earning (prior to a run on the ABCP market) a carry of about 
ten basis points on conduit assets.Comparing the costs and benefits of conduits, it seems 
clear that conduits would not have been profitable if banks had been required to hold equity 
against assets in their conduits, to the same extent as for assets on their balance sheets. In 
fact, banks would have made a loss (negative carry) of 30 basis points on each dollar 
invested, had they kept these assets on their balance sheets. However, given that banks were 
not required to hold equity to the same extent as for assets on their balance sheets, they could 
earn a profit of ten basis points. Conduits were thus a relatively low-return activity but 
offered a way for some banks to attract money market savings and effectively increase bank 
size without increasing regulatory capital.7 
                                                
7 In 2003 the Financial Accounting Standard Board required banks to consolidate all SPV in which they were 
the main beneficiary. However, in 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal 
Reserve (Fed) and The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), The Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS)  announced that ABCP conduits were exempt from this directive. In practice, however, the credit and 
liquidity guarantees provided the same protection because the definition of the asset default was such that 
ABCP always matures before assets are declared in default and thus liquidity protection was enough for 
ABCP buyers to feel safe and invest in ABCP. This resulted in the rapid growth of ABCP after 2004. Gilliam 
(2005) notes that regulatory charges for conduit assets were 90 percent lower than regulatory charges for on-
balance sheet financing. 
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The shadow-banking environment facilitated the structure and evolution of the ABCP 
market. The profits shown above explain well why ABCP has grown in popularity over time. 
For example, ABCP was only about 6 percent of the total commercial paper market in 1990, 
but by mid-2007 it accounted for about 60 percent of the total market, or approximately $1.2 
trillion (Figure 1.1).  
Figure 1-1 - Asset-backed Commercial Paper Outstanding 
 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US) retrieved from Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis; September 30, 2016. 
Note: The above graph shows the asset-backed commercial paper outstanding. The asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) market collapse occurred on August 9, 2007  
It is important to note that shadow banking was perceived as stable and non-risky because 
of the guarantees provided from the private sector. Operations of many shadow banking 
vehicles and activities are interlinked with traditional banking via credit enhancements, 
liquidity back-up lines, implicit support to SPVs, and so forth. However, once the solvency 
of the put providers (e.g. banks and insurance companies) was questioned, shadow banking 
underwent a major collapse, partly because credit ratings, risk managers and investors 
themselves underestimated the tail risks in the private sector guarantees. The run on the 
shadow banking system began on 9th August 2007, when BNP Paribas suspended the 
calculation of the net asset value of its three mortgage-backed securities funds (Kasperczyk 
and Schnabl, 2013). 
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This led to the freezing of the market. Many large ABCPs which had recourse to their 
sponsors had to be taken back onto banks’ balance sheets. The high opacity of these 
structures meant that banks themselves were not sure who and when would be affected by 
these events. 
Events reached momentum after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on 17th September, 
2008. The Federal Reserve had to step in and directly repurchase ABCP from the market to 
prevent catastrophic consequences. There has been no single conduit declaring bankruptcy 
throughout this recent economic downturn (Acharya et al., 2010). 
Once the crisis had begun, many economists stated that it had been unavoidable, that 
many warning signals had been received, and that many people in the industry saw this 
collapse coming (Rajan, 2005). In contrast to Rajan (2005), IMF (2015) stated that crisis 
came as total a surprise. In turn, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) concluded 
that the recent financial crisis was avoidable. Thus, it is of great interest to explore whether 
investors took into account that the banks that provided guarantees to these conduits might 
run into difficulties and whether they anticipated that given the adverse state of the economy, 
the government would step in and help BHCs to fulfill their commitments. 
Existing literature on bank opacity and market microstructure is not conclusive on 
whether or not off-balance sheet activities increase bank opacity. 
Acharya et al. (2010) show that in the period preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
there was no relationship between exposure to ABCP and stock returns. This may suggest 
that investors were ignorant about the exposure of their bank to ABCP. Thus, it is reasonable 
to assume that the same may be true for the guarantees. Acharya et al. (2010) mention that 
the credit guarantees directly affect the ability of the conduits to issue ABCP after the 
financial crisis, i.e. conduits that have weaker guarantees could see diminished ability to 
issue ABCP. Regarding the investors, Acharya et al. (2013) examine the risk transfer from 
the perspective of the investor buying ABCP. The focus in Chapter 3 is purely on the 
investors of the BHCs who extended the guarantees but did not necessarily themselves 
sponsor ABCP to address the issue of information opacity. 
Acharya et al. (2013) show however that commercial banks with higher exposure to 
ABCP conduits, in terms of the ratio of total ABCP outstanding to bank equity, had a larger 
decline in stock returns around the beginning of the financial crisis, i.e. 9th August 2007. 
Acharya et al. (2010) focus on the total amount of ABCP; but I am interested in ABCP 
guarantees. In contrast to their study, I examine how credit and liquidity guarantees impacted 
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the stock price of the banks that extended this protection before and after the crisis. In 
addition, I differentiate between the guarantees to own versus third-party conduits, based on 
the supposition that third-party assets might be more opaque. It is possible that credit 
guarantees were ignored, not only by investors, but also by bank managers who did not keep 
pace with financial engineering (Acharya et al., 2013; Allen, et al. 2009) or were simply due 
to moral hazard arising from the presence of government guarantees.  
To be more precise, I examine whether investors in the banks had taken into account that 
some banks extended protection to their ABCP conduits and to the third-party ABCP 
conduits. The fact that BHCs extended protection and thus in fact held all the risk on-balance 
might show a negative effect of credit guarantees on BHCs’ stock returns and higher returns 
volatility, if investors were aware of the risk BHCs were exposed to and took that into 
account when buying the shares of these BHCs. However, if investors were not aware of the 
risk posed or they believed that banks were in a good enough condition to extend protection 
if called upon or if they believed that no matter what happened, banks would receive help 
from the government, I should not observe any effect.8 
In addition, I also study guarantees and systemic risk.9 I examine whether guarantees to 
ABCP increased systemic risk, as, recently, many critiques have stated that it was primarily 
guarantees that banks provided, which made the banking industry more interconnected and 
more fragile. Thus while, it is intuitive that guarantees increased systemic risk, to the best of 
the author’s knowledge no study has previously looked at the effect of guarantees to ABCP 
conduits on systemic risk. 
Subsequently, in the third essay, I explore the reasons for banks to grow in size.10 It is 
rational to expect that economies of scale may be the reason why banks may want to become 
large to save on operating costs. Alternatively, it might be the case that banks may want to 
grow in size because they anticipate that regulatory authorities is more likely to treat large 
                                                
8 Regarding the expectation of the government intervention, the U.S. government’s long-standing policy of 
“constructive ambiguity” (Freixas 1999; Mishkin 1999) is designed to encourage this type of uncertainty, i.e. 
that investors do not expect the government to actually implement “too big to fail” policies, as there is no 
formal obligation to do so. 
9 I measure systemic risk as marginal expected shortfall (MES) and systemic risk (SRISK). The metrics I use 
for systemic risk have the advantage that they are used by regulators for monitoring financial stability and 
that their properties have been extensively discussed in the recent literature (e.g. Adrian and Brunnermeier , 
2012). 
10 As for the size of the banks, it is worth noting that the assets of the 50 biggest banks (7 of them were U.S. 
banks) were nearly equal to world GPD in the fourth quarter of 2011. The 30 biggest world banks’ assets 
exceed three-fourths of world GDP (Barth et al., 2012). 
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banks more favourably and save them if necessary, since their collapse can have 
disproportionately large effect on the economy. It is also possible, that banks want to become 
large so that they are “too big to jail”11, that is regulators may want to go light on some of 
the biggest banks. 
The following findings emerge from the three essays: 
•! Securitization increased bank credit risk and reduced bank profitability after the 
financial crisis. However, it increased bank capital adequacy. In particular, 
securitization increased capital level only before and during the crisis and decreased 
capital level after the financial crisis. These results are consistent with the fact that the 
regulatory loopholes were eliminated, and that banks stopped retaining their earnings 
to increase capital buffers. 
•! Banks that provided credit and liquidity enhancement to their own ABCP conduits and 
conduits sponsored by other banks had higher information opacity than BHCs which 
had no exposure to ABCP programmes. Exposure to ABCP conduits increased 
information opacity only after the crisis but exerted no effect before the crisis. 
•! Analysis also revealed that exposure to conduits had significant effect on the volatility 
of returns, while bank opacity significantly increased systemic risk. 
•! Significant economies of scale were observed as BHC grew in size between 2001:Q2 
and 2014:Q4.  
•! Size in turn was positively correlated with the probability of facing litigation charges, 
i.e. larger banks were more often involved in litigation settlements.   
                                                
11 The political power of large banks and risks of economic impact from major prosecutions has led to use of 
the term "too big to jail", usually when referring to the leaders  of “too big to fail” financial institutions. “Too 
big to jail” can be used, for instance,  in the context of the Department of Justice (DoJ) who applied unequal 
justice to the very large banks and did not prosecute the bank managers. 
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Chapter 2! 
The Effects of Securitization On U.S. Bank Holding 
Companies’ Performance 
“Securitization is one of the major financial innovations to have occurred over 
recent decades”. 
Alan Greenspan (1998) 
2.1! Introduction 
The lethal cocktail of fundamental and structural weaknesses in the U.S. economy and a 
new generation of regulators and their policies, including innovative liquidity injection tools, 
sophisticated derivatives markets and different hazardous incentive structures of financial 
firms contributed to the current economic downturn.12 Asset-backed finance, commonly 
referred to as securitization, is regarded as one of the main culprits of the recent financial 
crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009). Although it is the U.S. that is perceived to be the largest market 
for the securitization activities, securitization programs have also become widespread in 
Europe. They have also been important in Asia and Latin America (Gyntelberg and 
Remolona, 2005; Scatigna and Tovar, 2007) 13. 
 Existing literature provides mixed evidence on how securitization affects bank 
performance. Although it has been documented that securitization affects banks’ insolvency 
risk, leverage, credit risk, profitability and capital level, researchers provide different 
conclusions regarding the direction of the effect and the channels through which 
securitization activities affect bank performance measures. While some academics find that 
securitization has a positive effect on banks’ financial health (e.g. Cebonoyan and Strahan, 
2004; Jiangli and Pritsker 2008; Shin, 2009; Panetta and Pozzolo, 2010), others (Dionne and 
Harchaoui, 2003; DeMarzo, 2005; Di Cesare, 2009;  Casu et al., 2011) provide evidence that 
securitization actually has a negative or no impact on banks’ performance. The difference in 
the effect of securitization on banks’ performance usually stems from how much risk is 
                                                
 12 For the genesis of the current crisis, Allen et al. (2009) and Diamond and Rajan (2009) provide a synopsis 
of the current economic downturn and conjectures about causes and remedies. 
13 Global securitization programmes differ significantly in terms of the legal, tax, and accounting 
requirements of the seller’s country.  
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transferred from the banks to outside investors, as well as how a securitizing banks in the 
data samples reinvest their proceeds from the securitized assets. 
This thesis attempts to fill the gap in the asset-backed finance literature, and analyze the 
effect of securitization on BHCs’ performance measures before and after the crisis. In 
particular, it examines empirically the effects of securitization on BHCs’ credit risk, their 
credit risk taking, profitability and capital levels over from 2001:Q2 to 2012:Q4. I also 
examine the credit and liquidity enhancements to BHCs’ own and to third-party 
securitizations, and what role they played in BHCs’ securitizations. This is important as it 
may have a direct implication on the ongoing discussion on how to redesign the risk retention 
mechanism, i.e. how to better align banks’ incentives in lending and securitization. 
I analyze the relationship between securitization and BHCs’ credit risk, profitability and 
capital level using the treatment effect model. I choose this model in order to address the 
endogeneity problem that is persistent in many similar studies on the effects of securitization 
on banks’ performance. In addition, I focus on banks’ exposure to securitization via their 
extended credit enhancements and liquidity lines. To the best of my knowledge, the only 
study that examines the relationship between securitization, credit risk taking and credit 
enhancements is Casu et al. (2013). They find that credit enhancements reduce credit risk. I, 
however, depart from their study and analyze in greater detail how credit enhancements and 
liquidity provision, extended to the BHCs’ own and third parties’ sponsored conduits 
affected BHCs’ profitability and capital level. I explore the effect of securitization on BHCs’ 
credit risk, credit risk taking, profitability and capital level, as well as how the credit and 
liquidity enhancements affected the BHCs’ performance over time, i.e. before, during and 
after the crisis. 
This analysis is of paramount importance, with wider policy implications. For instance, 
as reflected in the recently introduced banking regulations, the Dodd–Frank Act requires 
sponsors to disclose to investors all the representations and warranties given to rating 
agencies, as well as fulfilled and unfulfilled repurchase requests, aggregated by the 
originator, in order to allow investors to identify originators with underwriting deficiencies.  
Finally, I also examine the relationship between banks’ performance measures and 
securitizing of different asset classes to get a deeper insight into which asset classes exerted 
the most effect on BHC’s credit risk, credit risk taking, profitability and capital level. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide the background on 
securitization. Then I review the relevant literature on securitization and the risk retention 
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mechanism. Subsequently, I describe the data selection and sample specification. Then I 
proceed to the empirical specification and results of the empirical analysis. Next, I proceed 
to the robustness tests. Finally, I discuss the findings and conclude. 
2.2! Background 
Securitization is a financial operation by which a bank14 transforms illiquid assets or 
rights to flow of income payments into a fixed-income instrument that is homogeneous, 
standardized, liquid and suitable for sale to the third parties. The special feature of the 
securitization is that it reduces irregular flows in payments of the underlying cash flow and 
transforms the underlying cash flows into stable payments. This transformation of illiquid 
claims into marketable securities is made through a remote bankruptcy SPV15 that has 
ownership rights to the instrument, but is by law separate from the originating firm. 
Essentially, assets are sold to the SPV. The SPV pays for these assets by issuing bonds, notes 
or short-term commercial paper. The originating bank usually continues to act as a servicing 
agent in the securitization program. It will continue to collect receivables on behalf of the 
SPV in exchange for a fee. These fees have been one of the major reasons why banks 
engaged in securitization on such a scale prior to the recent financial crisis, along with other 
often mentioned motives such as the need to obtain new sources of funding, to transfer credit 
risk, to find new profit opportunities and to comply with the regulatory capital rules. 
The vast majority of existing studies on European banks (e.g. Martin-Oliver and Saurina, 
2007; Agostino and Mazzucca, 2008), for example, conclude that the main driver of 
securitizing banks in Europe was the need to obtain liquidity. In the U.S., however, 
securitization was primarily a means for financial institutions to comply with regulatory 
capital requirements (Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Acharya et al., 2010). As for the range of 
assets that can be securitized, these typically include: mortgage loans, credit card 
receivables, auto loans, commercial and industrial loans, home equity loans, and other 
innovative developments including the securitization of commodity risk and catastrophe risk 
(de Vries, 2008). 
The advent of securitization also gave rise to new theories about a banking model, known 
as the “originate-to-distribute” (hereafter OTD) model, where banks were originating their 
                                                
14 Although the are significant differences between a BHC and a bank (e.g. banks take deposits and make 
loans to consumers and corporations; BHCs own or control these banks, and also own other businesses), I 
use these two terms interchangeably. 
15 A special-purpose vehicle, or SPV is a subsidiary of a company formed by a company for a particular 
project or task which is bankruptcy remote from the main organization. 
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loans with the intention to sell them off. The OTD model gradually replaced (but did not 
eliminate) the traditional “buy and hold” (hereafter BH) model. In a traditional BH model, a 
bank would extend a loan to a borrower and hold the loan on their balance sheet until 
maturity, while monitoring the borrower’s performance along the way. However, with the 
liberalization and deregulation of the financial sector in the U.S. in the early 1980s, the 
traditional banking model became less profitable (Edwards and Mishkin, 1995). 
Securitization appeared at the same time, suggesting that banks switched from on-balance 
sheet financing to off-balance sheet financing due to the decline in profitability (Cardone-
Riportella et al., 2010; Panetta and Pozzolo, 2010; Gorton and Metrick, 2011). 
OTD has contributed to the following: two main roles of banks, i.e. liquidity 
transformation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and delegated monitoring (Diamond, 1984), 
have lost their significance. This is not surprising: since securitizing banks are no longer the 
primary holders of illiquid assets, they have fewer incentives to monitor their borrowers (see 
e.g. Pennacchi, 1988; Loutskina and Strahan, 2007). To overcome this problem of 
informational asymmetry, several risk retention mechanisms have been designed for and 
adopted by banks. 
Theoretical studies on the credit risk transfer mechanisms, optimal retention mechanism 
and informational asymmetries have found the following. DeMarzo (2005) notes that by 
pooling assets, then tranching them into different risk categories and retaining interest in the 
equity tranche, banks can signal the quality of the sold loan portfolio and optimality of the 
debt contract. Hence, such risk retention is a result of the signaling equilibrium where 
securitizing banks, in an attempt to signal the value of assets, retain poorer quality assets on 
their balance sheets (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; Instefjord, 2005). In the same vein, Kiff 
and Kisser (2010) argue that equity tranche retention is the best instrument to incentivize 
loan screening. 
In contrast, Fender and Mitchell (2009) suggest that it is the mezzanine tranche retention 
that is the optimal tool to align bank incentives. They model a principal–agent problem, 
where a loan’s originating institution extends loans to borrowers and has the option to screen 
its borrowers at a cost, in order to increase its expected return. They show that mezzanine 
tranche retention may ensure more diligent screening than both equity and vertical slice 
retention (i.e. retaining equal amounts of each tranche in the securitization structure). They 
note that mezzanine tranche retention may be better than equity tranche retention because if 
banks are forced to retain equity tranche and know that there will not be any residual left, 
there is no incentive for them to screen loans at all in the first place. This is especially true 
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in a recessionary economy, because it is more likely that in a bad state of the economy equity 
tranches would be completely wiped out. Thus, in bad times, the benefits of screening are 
virtually non-existent, and so banks have little incentive, if any, to extend good loans. 
As for risk retention, if the level of risk retention is designed to signal the commitment of 
the bank to its own securitization activities, then I would expect to observe that the retained 
interests should decrease credit risk. If, on the contrary, it is designed to reflect the risk of 
the underlying assets, and the level of retained risk closely mimics the expected loss, this 
may result in an increase in banks’ credit risk. That is, the effect of retained interest on credit 
risk is ambiguous ex ante. Moreover, there is no unilateral consensus in the literature on how 
to overcome asymmetric information problems pertinent to the securitization markets. 
2.3! Literature Review 
There are three main strands in the securitization literature related to this thesis. The first 
strand contains theoretical studies on the economic benefits of securitization. The second 
strand examines empirically the effects of securitization on banks’ performance. The third 
strand analyzes the optimal design of the risk retention mechanism. 
2.3.1! Economic benefits of securitization 
One of the main reasons why banks securitize is because securitization allows them to 
manage their risk exposure; it provides them with the option to transfer credit risk and 
diversify their funds. For example, banks that have a relatively high proportion of risky loans 
on their balance sheets may decide to securitize more in order to reduce their credit risk 
(Cumming, 1987; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2009) and to reduce expected losses (Wagner and 
Marsh, 2006). Certainly, the degree by which a bank can reduce its credit risk can vary. For 
example, a bank may decide to retain some portion of the securitized assets instead of selling 
all their assets, and may choose only to remove the first losses or the so-called equity tranche 
from the SPV. This way it secures a sufficient degree of credit improvement for subsequent 
tranches and limits the credit risk transfer to the final investors. 
Other benefits from asset securitization discussed in prior studies include diversification 
of funding alternatives, immediate access to capital for expansion purposes, ability to focus 
on competitive advantages and the ability to manage earnings. For instance, securitization 
allows banks to recognize accounting gains when the market value of their loans exceeds 
their book values (James, 1988; DeMarzo, 2005; Karaoglu, 2005). They can also redeploy 
funds obtained from their sold loans toward more profitable investments (Greenspan, 2004; 
Schuermann, 2004). In addition, banks may securitize their loans to benefit from the 
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intermediation profit (Duffie, 2008). Lockwood et al. (1996) also report that the cash inflows 
from the issued asset-backed securities (hereafter ABS) could be used to retire existing debt 
which in turn reduces banks’ interest expenses, increases their reported earnings, and 
increases stockholders’ equity. As for the reported earnings, Karaoglu (2005) finds that 
banks choose which loans to securitize and thus they bias the estimated fair values of retained 
interest. Karaoglu (2005) and Pavel and Phillis (1987) find that banks that securitize or sell 
loans have higher loan concentrations and, therefore, greater needs for asset diversification 
than non-securitizing banks. In addition, these studies find that banks are more likely to 
securitize loans if they have a competitive advantage in originating loans. 
Dechow and Shakespear (2009) show that managers tend to time their securitizations to 
maximize the window dressing benefits offered by securitization accounting rules. They find 
that securitizations are more often reported in the last few days of each month and the last 
few days of the quarter. In turn, Loutskina and Strahan (2009) note that another feature of 
the securitized assets is that these are more liquid than other assets, which renders banks 
more immune to liquidity shocks. Consequently, it enhances banks’ financial stability. 
With respect to the motivation to obtain immediate access to capital, Karaoglu (2005) 
finds that banks that sell or securitize loans have higher growth expectations and greater 
liquidity needs, compared to banks that do not engage in securitization. Wagner (2007) 
however reports that increased liquidity of a bank increases banking instability. This is in 
contrast to the commonly accepted view that higher asset liquidity directly benefits stability, 
by encouraging banks to reduce the risks on their balance sheets and by facilitating the 
liquidation of assets in an adverse state of events. Thus, it also makes financial crises less 
costly for banks. Banks may have an incentive to take on more new risks and thereby offset 
the positive direct effect on stability. This evidence is in line with the results of Instefjord 
(2005) who notes that when a bank has access to a wider selection of instruments to manage 
risks, it is likely to engage in excessive risk taking. Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010) analyze 
the sample of Spanish securitizing banks over the time period 2000–2007 and also find that 
securitization may make banks actually less risk averse to the prospect of an own crisis 
situation. The rationale is that they can more easily liquidate parts of their balance sheet 
through securitization operations. 
2.3.2! Securitization and bank performance 
Prior to the recent global financial crisis, securitization was seen as a tool that enabled 
more sophisticated banks to disperse risk or to pass credit risk to institutions with far less 
leverage. This led to an overall improvement of bank financial stability (Duffie, 2008). In 
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addition, Altunbas et al. (2009) and Loutskina and Strahan (2009) find that securitization 
increases banks’ lending ability. However, they also found that by making illiquid loans 
more liquid, securitization could enhance, ceteris paribus, banks’ risk taking (Ambrose et 
al., 2005) and increase their credit risk. 
Securitization does not necessarily lead to credit risk diversification, but it could actually 
promote the retention of risky loans on banks’ balance sheets (Instefjord, 2005; Chiesa, 
2008). For example, Purnanandam (2009) compares performance of loans that had 
originated with U.S. banks and were to be retained with loans that had originated but were 
to be sold between 2006 and 2008. He shows that banks that were extensively securitizing 
during the pre-crisis period had originated loans of inferior quality. After the crisis erupted, 
banks that were “stuck” with these loans on their balance sheets had significantly higher 
charge-offs and higher borrower default rates. These findings are consistent with evidence 
in Mian and Sufi (2009), Keys et al. (2007) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) who find that in 
the last decade, U.S. banks securitized their worst mortgage loans. Similarly, Cerrato et al. 
(2012), who studied U.K. banks from 2000 to 2008, report that banks that issued more ABS 
before the crisis, suffered more defaults after the financial crisis. These results are also 
consistent with Di Cesare (2009), who shows that Italian banks that securitized before the 
crisis, experienced a higher increase in their default probability during the crisis, however, 
they contradict evidence in Ambrose et al. (2004), Dionne and Harchaoui (2003), Aggarwal 
et al. (2001) and Nadauld and Sherlund (2013) who suggest that banks retained more risky 
assets on their balance sheets, while securitizing their less risky assets.  
Regarding bank’s insolvency risk, Casu et al. (2013) who examine the relationship 
between banks’ retained interests in securitizations and insolvency risk for 197 U.S. BHCs 
from 2001 to 2007 find that the provision of credit enhancements significantly increases 
bank insolvency risk. In particular, retained interests increase the insolvency risk for “large” 
securitizations while having a risk-reducing effect for “small” and/or first-time 
securitizations. In addition, they find that the most subordinated (first-loss) position has the 
largest impact on banks’ Z-score16. This finding aligns well with evidence from Franke and 
                                                
16The Z-score is an indicator of a bank’s probability of insolvency in the sense that it estimates the number of 
standard deviations that the bank’s profits have to fall below its expected value before its equity becomes 
negative. It combines banks’ buffers (capital and profits) with the risks they face (measured by the standard 
deviation of returns). That is, a Z-score is calculated as Z = (ROA + E/A)/σ(ROA), where ROA is return on 
assets, E/A denotes the equity to asset ratio, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of return on assets. I used a 
3-quarter rolling time window to calculate the volatility of returns in the denominator of the Z-score (Stiroh 
and Rumble, 2006; Hesse and Čihák, 2007). A higher Z-score indicates that a bank is more stable, where the 
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Krahnen (2005), who show that systematic risk by the banks in their sample, measured by 
the banks’ equity beta, increases because securitizing banks retain the equity tranche, i.e. the 
largest part of the risk remains within the banks. Franke and Krahnen (2005) analyze 73 
securitization announcements of 27 banks in Europe between 1999 and 2002. Their results 
suggest that banks’ systematic risk increases due to securitization transactions because banks 
invested their newly obtained funds to invest in riskier projects. They attribute such a finding 
to the possibility of tranching the securities. That is, a post-event increasing beta should 
result from the fact that the first-loss piece exhibits a higher probability of failure than less 
risky senior tranches being transferred to external investors. Hänsel and Krahnen (2007) 
confirm previous findings, showing that the credit risk transfer activity enhances the 
systematic risk (equity beta) of the issuing bank and that overall credit securitization 
increases banks’ risk appetite. 
As far as the relationship between securitization and banks’ profitability is concerned, the 
impact of securitization on banks’ profitability is not clear either. Securitization provides a 
larger investment set and allows banks to improve their profitability (Jiangli and Pritsker, 
2008). Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) in their analysis of U.S. BHCs find that securitizing banks 
that are active tend to have lower insolvency risk and higher profitability than banks not 
active in the securitization market. It is also possible that increased competition in the 
underlying credit market may have led to lower spreads, and thus reduce banks’ profitability 
(Instejford, 2005). 
Earnings management is another motivation for securitizing financial assets has often 
been presented in the literature; however, the evidence how securitization affects earnings 
or profitability is mixed. Consistent with the view that securitizations are used to manipulate 
earnings, Dechow and Shakespear (2009) find that some financial firms tend to report 
significant securitization gains when income is low. Dechow and Shakespear (2009) find 
that the reporting of gains or losses from securitization transactions appears to be influenced 
by financial reporting incentives, such as exceeding analyst forecasts. Karaoglu (2005) finds 
that securitization gains are negatively related to the change in earnings before securitization 
effects. In turn, Udhe and Michalak (2010) who study securitization and systematic risk in 
the European banking sector over the period 1997–2007 find that securitization has a 
positive impact on leverage and return volatility, and a negative effect on profitability. 
                                                
value of the Z-score depends positively on the bank’s profitability and capital ratio and negatively on the 
variability of the bank’s profits (Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
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As for the effect of securitization on capital levels, it is intuitive to expect that 
securitization should increase banks’ regulatory capital levels, because banks are not 
required to hold extra capital for securitized assets. They have to hold extra capital only for 
the part of securitization for which they provide liquidity or credit enhancements. In other 
words, in order to meet both of the economic capital requirements banks could alter the 
numerator, for instance by retaining earnings and issuing equity, or they could change the 
denominator, by cutting back assets and reducing lending, or shifting toward less risky 
assets. Securitization offered a third option: to decrease regulatory and market capital 
requirements. However, it is challenging to prove that banks engaged in securitization 
mainly to comply with the regulatory Basel II rules, because banks may have consciously 
chosen to hold an extra capital buffer. In fact, prior literature recognizes the ability to obtain 
off-balance sheet treatment through sale accounting as one of the motivations for financial 
asset securitizations (Ambrose et al., 2004; Minton et al., 2004). However, many studies 
report (e.g Shin, 2009) that securitization allows banks to avoid regulatory capital 
requirements and lower their credit standards, which adds negatively to their financial 
stability. 
Overall, studies find mixed evidence on the hypothesis that financial institutions’ decision 
to securitize is motivated by the desire to minimize regulatory capital. This has been among 
the primary motivations for the analysis in this chapter.   
2.3.3! Securitization and risk retention 
The cost of credit enhancements is the largest expense in structuring the ABS following 
the coupon rate paid to investors. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2002) 
defines credit enhancement as “a contractual arrangement in which the bank retains or 
assumes a securitization exposure and, in substance, provides some degree of added 
protection to other parties to the transaction”. While accounting rules17 require securitized 
                                                
17 Under SFAS 140, securitization can be accounted for either as sales or secured borrowings. For a transfer 
of financial assets to a special purpose entity (SPE) to qualify for sale accounting treatment, it must meet the 
following criteria: (1) the assets must be isolated from the transferor and its creditors even in bankruptcy; (2) 
the SPE has the right to pledge or exchange the assets; (3) the transferor does not maintain effective control 
over the assets through certain forms of continuing involvement. If the securitization receives sale accounting 
treatment, then the transferor: (1) removes the assets from its balance sheet; (2) records cash proceeds in the 
amount received and recognizes any non-cash proceeds in the securitized assets at fair value; (3) recognizes 
retained asset- backed securities at the book value of the securitized assets times the fair value of the retained 
securities divided by the fair value of the securitized assets; (4) recognizes retained contractual interests other 
than asset-backed securities (e.g., servicing assets and recourse liabilities) at fair value; (5) records a gain or 
loss on sale to balance the journal entry. If the securitization is accounted for as a sale and additional 
conditions are satisfied the issuer does not have to consolidate the assets and liabilities held by its SPEs. If 
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loans to be sold without recourse,18 originators retain credit risk exposure through internal 
(structural or cash flow driven) or external (e.g. third-party guarantee) risk retention 
mechanisms. That is, banks may retain risk through extending warranties, liquidity facilities, 
early amortization provisions, tranches cover or excess spreads. 
It is worth emphasizing that ABS issued by banks are not a legal obligation of the 
originating bank, however, banks often provide credit or liquidity enhancement to ABS for 
reputational reasons. Guarantees also improve the credit rating of the security, and 
consequently, its marketability (Chen et al., 2008).19 Hence, additional credit enhancements 
may be provided to ensure that securities issues by the SPV are AAA rated. Rating agencies 
typically required the seller’s interest component to be around 4 to 12 percent of the 
receivables for the ABS to receive AAA ratings, as noted in the “Report to the Congress on 
Risk Retention” (BGFR, 2010).20 
                                                
the transfer is accounted for as secured borrowing, the financial assets remain on the balance sheet and the 
issuer recognizes a liability for the proceeds from this transfer (see Gorton and Souleles, 2005). 
18 In other words, the sale of the assets by the originating bank to the SPV may be re-characterized as a 
secured loan. In this case, the assets would not be removed from the originator’s balance sheet r and the 
transfer would be enforceable for failure (Walker, 2014). In fact, the economic substance of many 
securitizations is a secured borrowing because originators retain most if not all the risks associated with 
transferred assets (Ryan, 2002). Niu and Richardson (2006) find evidence that a debt-to-equity ratio of 5.9 
reported in their study using sale accounting would increase to 10.2, had the transferors accounted for the 
transfers as secured borrowing. In the same vein, Landsman et al. (2011) find that the market views asset 
securitizations with low retained interest as sales, whereas with high retained interest as secured borrowing. 
In general, the off-balance sheet treatment was easier to achieve under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) than under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) rules, which are used in 
Europe. In 2010, however, changes to U.S. accounting rules related to SPE reduced the ability of transactions 
to obtain off-balance sheet status. 
19 Chen et al. (2008) state that the two most important types of such ABS are credit enhancing interest-only 
strips (CEI) and subordinated ABS (SUB). CEI have considerably more concentrated risk than SUB, all else 
being equal. CEI are a type of ABS that receive the difference, if positive, between the interest rate paid on 
the securitized loans and the weighted-average interest rate paid on the other ABS, referred to as the excess 
spread. Though referred to only as credit enhancing, these strips typically concentrate all of the risks of the 
securitized loans, particularly prepayment risk, since if the loans prepay the excess spread disappears. 
Because CEI have no right to the principal payments on the securitized financial loans, they usually have 
very small value compared to their risks. Contractual interests that bear first risk of loss are similar to 
derivatives in having relatively small value and concentrated risk compared to the securitized assets. In 
addition, Chen et al. (2008) find that risk retention by banks varies by type of securitization and is relatively 
low in the case of mortgages, while relatively high for revolving loans such as credit loans. 
20 Also in March 2001, the Fed allowed BHCs to include credit ratings in calculating regulatory capital for 
holding the securities. Before 2001, capital charges were generally determined by asset type rather than credit 
quality. For instance, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) guaranteed by a government agency (e.g. Fannie 
Mae) carried a 20 percent risk-weighting in which case the capital charge was 20 percent of 8 percent, i.e. 1,6 
percent, in contrast to 8 percent for corporate loans, whereas non-agency MBS which were perceived to have 
similar risk, had a higher capital charge. Thus, after 2001:Q2, a regulatory capital charge was determined 
based on the securities’ credit ratings. AAA and AA securities carried 20 percent risk-weighting, A-rated 
securities have 50 percent risk-weighting, BBB-rated and BB-rated securities have 100 percent risk 
weighting, respectively. In other words, poor credit quality securitized assets became more expensive as they 
required more capital charges. It is also worth mentioning that some BHCs could still use their own Value-at-
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Gorton and Souleles (2005) also find that market prices of ABS securities reflect the 
originator’s ability to provide recourse. In practice, however, banks have little choice over 
the amount and type of contractual retained interests that they provide because those are 
usually determined by credit rating agencies and underwriters (Casu et al., 2013). In 
summary, the purpose of risk retention is to create information-insensitive and liquid 
securities (Dang et al., 2012), which are defined as securities that are immune to adverse 
selection in the trading process (i.e., the value of which does not depend on insider 
information). 
2.4! Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.4.1! The data and sample  
The key source of financial data on U.S. BHCs is the FR 9YC Consolidated Report of 
Condition and Income, completed quarterly by BHCs21. The data has since 1986 been 
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. It is by far the most comprehensive 
database for the analysis of BHCs. Following previous research, I have used this data for 
BHCs rather than the Call Reports submitted by commercial banks, because risk and capital 
management are typically exercised at the highest level of the financial group (Casu et al., 
2013). However, the results could be generalized and extended to commercial banks for the 
following reason. As noted by Mandel et al. (2012), while BHCs control a large number of 
non-bank subsidiaries, most assets are generally held in a small number (between one and 
five) of domestic commercial banks. For example, the largest BHC by total assets, JPMorgan 
Chase, controls 3,391 subsidiaries, of which 2,940 are domestically domiciled, and only four 
are domestic commercial banks. However, these banks and their subsidiaries do hold 86 
percent of the firm’s total assets. The share of total assets held within the BHC’s banking 
subsidiaries varies significantly across firms. For smaller BHCs, this fraction is close to 100 
percent. For MetLife, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, which engage in relatively little 
traditional lending and deposit taking, banking subsidiaries contain a strikingly small 
                                                
Risk (VaR) models to calculate capital requirements on their trading book. BHCs which were subject to the 
market risk capital guidelines could use their VaR model to calculate their capital requirements, as long as 
their consolidated trading activity (defined as trading assets and liabilities for the previous quarter) equals 10 
percent or more of BHCs assets for the previous quarter or is $1 billion or more (Erel et al., 2012). 
21 BHCs are companies that own or control one or more commercial banks. A majority (around 84 percent) 
of commercial banks are part of the BHC structure. This includes the bank and any non-bank subsidiaries 
such as broker-dealers, investment companies or insurance companies. As of the end of 2011, there were 
4,743 top tier BHCs in the United States (excluding Puerto Rico), with aggregate assets of about $17.4 
trillion. Aggregate pretax income in 2011 totalled $148 billion, an increase of 26 percent from 2010 (FSOC 
Annual Report, 2012). 
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fraction of the firm’s assets (3.2 percent, 11.2 percent and 10.5 percent, respectively). For 
the other largest BHCs, which have considerable retail banking operations but also engage 
in securities dealing and underwriting, insurance, etc., the fraction of bank assets falls 
between these two extremes, varying between 69 percent and 93 percent of firm assets 
among the four largest firms. Authors also note that these estimates of commercial banking 
assets are calculated by summing total assets, as reported in the Call Reports of each 
commercial banking subsidiary. From a consolidated BHC perspective, this calculation will 
overstate commercial bank assets in cases where there are related party exposures among 
commercial banks within the same BHC (since these should in principle be “netted out” 
from a consolidated perspective).  
However, Mandel et al. (2012) report that such an overstatement should be small in 
practice. In addition, securitization may involve a couple of subsidiaries of BHCs which may 
affect the capital and liquidity planning of the whole group (Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001; 
Thomas and Wang, 2004). The FR Y-9C data provides consolidated BHCs financial data 
that encompasses balance sheet data, income sheets, a schedule of off-balance sheet items, 
with the detailed information on banks securitization activities. My main variables, i.e. 
securitized loans and retained interests by type of interest and type of loan, are collected 
from schedule HC-S, Servicing, Securitization and Asset Sale Activities of these FR Y-9C 
reports. Schedule HC-S was first provided in FR Y-9C reports in the second quarter of 2001, 
which determined the starting point in my sample. From June 2001, U.S. banks have been 
required to provide detailed information on their securitization activities in the regulatory 
forms. Specifically, banks are required to report the following items on the securitization 
schedule: (i) securitized assets, as an outstanding principal balance of assets sold and 
securitized with servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit 
enhancements; (ii) maximum credit exposure arising from recourse or other seller-provided 
credit enhancements22, provided to the reported securitization structures in the form of (a) 
credit-enhancing interest-only strips; (b) subordinated securities and other residual interests; 
(c) standby letters of credit and other enhancements; (iii) unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to securitization structures; (iv) past due amounts, charge-offs, and recoveries on 
the securitized assets; (v) seller’s interests in the form of securities and loans; (vi) past due 
amounts, charge-offs, and recoveries in seller’s interest. Schedule HC-S instructions define 
these strips as an on-balance-sheet asset that, in form or in substance represents the 
                                                
22 Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) provide a more general discussion of enhancements. 
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contractual right to receive some or all of the interest due on the transferred assets and 
exposes the bank to credit risk that exceeds its pro-rata share claim on the underlying assets 
whether through subordination provisions or other credit-enhancing techniques. Elsewhere, 
the HC-S instructions note that the field for credit-enhancing, interest-only strips can include 
excess spread accounts. Excess spread is the monthly revenue remaining on a securitization 
after all payments to investors, servicing fees, and charge-offs. As such, excess spread—a 
measure of how profitable the securitization is—provides assurance to investors in the deal 
that they will be paid as promised. Excess spread accounts are the first line of defense against 
losses to investors, as the accounts must be exhausted before even the most subordinated 
investors incur losses. 
The second class of enhancements, subordinated securities and other residual interest, is 
a standard-form credit enhancement. By holding a subordinated or junior claim, the bank 
that securitized the assets is in the position of being a first-loss bearer, thereby providing 
protection to more senior claimants. In that sense, subordination basically serves as a buffer 
or collateral. However, in the asymmetric information context, holding a subordinate claim 
gives the bank the stake that can motivate it to screen the loans carefully before it securitizes 
them and to continue monitoring the loans after it securitizes them.      The bank’s willingness 
to keep some risk may serve as a signal that it has screened loans adequately and plans to 
monitor diligently. 
The third class of enhancements, i.e. standby letters of credit, obligates the bank to 
provide funding to a securitization structure to ensure that investors receive timely payment 
on the issued securities (for example, by smoothing timing differences in the receipt of 
interest and principal payments) or to ensure that investors receive payment in the event of 
market disruptions. The facility counts as an enhancement, if and only if advances through 
the facility are subordinate to other claims on the cash flow from the securitized assets. 
Although not technically classified as an enhancement, a fourth item on Schedule HC-S that 
I consider, comprises of unused commitments to provide liquidity. Unused commitments 
represent the undrawn balance on previous commitments. 
The schedule also provides information on: (i) maximum amount of credit exposure 
arising from credit enhancements provided by the reporting institution to other institutions’ 
securitization structures (an aggregate measure of credit enhancements including standby 
letters of credit, purchased subordinated securities, and other enhancements); (ii) reporting 
institution’s unused commitments to provide liquidity to other institutions’ securitization 
structures. 
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Credit-enhancing interest-only strips receive no principal and typically are subservient to 
subordinated ABS, and so they are riskier than subordinated ABS, all else being equal (Chen 
et al., 2008). For example, any amount unpaid to the subordinated ABS holders must be 
compensated in subsequent years before any amount can accrue to the benefit of the credit-
enhancing interest-only strip. To put it another way, credit-enhancing interest-only strips are 
a type of ABS that receives the difference, if positive, between the interest rate paid on the 
securitized loans and the weighted-average interest rate paid on the other ABS, referred to 
as the excess spread. Thus, credit-enhancing interest-only strips have some of the character 
of residual interest. Credit-enhancing interest-only strips have no right to the principal 
payments on the securitized financial loans; as a result, they usually have very small value 
compared to their risks. Although referred to only as credit-enhancing, these strips typically 
concentrate all of the risks of the securitized loans, particularly prepayment risk, since if the 
loans prepay then the excess spread disappears (Chen et al., 2008). Credit-enhancing 
interest-only strips are reported from the second quarter of 2001; subordinated securities and 
standby letters of credit are reported from the first quarter of 2003. Sellers’ interest is 
reported only for home equity line, credit card, and commercial and industrial loan 
securitizations. 
For reporting, the data on securitization activities are broken down into seven categories 
according to the underlying assets: (i) 1–4 family residential loans; (ii) home equity lines; 
(iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) commercial and 
industrial loans; (vii) all other loans, all leases, and all other assets. 
My quarterly panel data is significantly larger compared to previous studies. In addition, 
the time horizon allows me to focus on the relationship between securitization and banks' 
exposures before, during and after the 2007–2009 crisis. I draw upon Baele et al. (2011) and 
Casu et al. (2013) to choose the control variables for my regressions (definitions of the 
variables are provided in Appendix 1). 
When constructing the dataset, I follow Casu et al. (2013). I exclude BHCs with negative, 
missing or zero values for total assets, deposits, loans and securitization activities in any 
quarter (330 observations are dropped). I also delete observations where loans to assets ratios 
exceed 100 percent (17 observations are dropped) and where capital is missing or negative 
(1013 observations are dropped). Subsequently, I define BHC as a securitizer if it securitizes 
in any of the quarters within the sample period. This selection procedure leaves me with 342 
securitizing BHCs and 2,682 non-securitizing BHCs from 2001:Q2–2013:Q2.  
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In March 2006, the minimum reporting size for BHCs was raised from $150 million to 
$500 million. This significantly skews the sample. To overcome this problem, I delete all 
observations that do not reach the minimum reporting threshold over the sample period. This 
ensures that banks that began reporting prior to 2006 continued reporting after the threshold 
was raised from $150 million to $500 million in 2006. I adjust the threshold of $500 million 
for price level per quarter with base March, 2006. This method of deleting the observations 
ensures that these are not deleted randomly, but helps to preserve all the observations of the 
BHCs that once having started reporting continue to do so even after a temporary drop in 
their total assets. This procedure drops around 50 observations per quarter from 2001 to 
2006. Final data sample consists of 1,718 BHCs, of which 299 securitize their loans. 
Finally, to prevent outliers from driving the results, I winsorize all variables at 1 percent, 
a standard procedure used in similar studies. Detailed information on the FR 9-YC item 
codes used in this study and information how I calculated all the variables is included in 
Appendix 1. 
2.5! Summary statistics 
My final sample consists of observations for 48 quarters. The summary statistics are 
provided in Table 2.1 and the comparison table of the securitizing versus non-securitizing 
BHCs is provided in Table 2.2, along with lowest, mean and highest values, and differences 
in mean values along with their statistical significance. 
The most striking difference between securitizers and non- securitizers is the size 
measured by BHC’s total assets (Table 2.2). Securitizing BHCs are about 21 times larger 
than non-securitizing BHCs. This is consistent with the previous research which finds that 
larger banks tend to securitize more often (Hänsel and Bannier, 2007; Martin-Oliver and 
Saurina, 2007; Uzun and Webb, 2007; Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008; Minton et al., 2005). 
Further, non-securitizing BHCs tend to hold about 5.3 percentage points more of liquid 
assets than securitizing BHCs, which is consistent with findings in Karaoglu (2005). This is 
also well aligned with the evidence in Loutskina (2011), that securitizing BHCs usually have 
better access to external sources of liquidity than non-securitizing BHCs. Loans to total 
assets ratio is 3.3 percentage points lower for securitizing BHCs than for non-securitizing 
BHCs.  
Univariate comparisons also reveal that the leverage ratio is 3.3 percentage points higher 
for securitizing BHCs than for non-securitizing BHCs. This is consistent with prior research 
(e.g. Pavel and Phillis, 1987). As for capital levels, bank capital is 3.7 percentage points 
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higher for non-securitizing BHCs than for securitizing BHCs, and the difference is 
statistically significant. This is consistent with the findings in Cebenonyan and Strahan 
(2004) who note that securitizing banks tend to have lower capital levels. Nonetheless, in 
my sample, both groups have capital levels well above the regulatory capital requirements. 
This is interesting especially in the view of the argument that banks securitized primarily to 
benefit from the regulatory capital arbitrage. 
As for the profitability, securitizing banks tend to be approximately 20 percentage points 
more profitable than non-securitizing banks. Charge-off ratios are higher for securitizing 
banks (15 percentage points), while credit risk measured as non-performing loans (NPL) the 
total assets ratio is higher for non-securitizing banks (5 percentage points). The former aligns 
well with evidence provided in Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) and Keys et al. (2007), who report 
that securitizing banks have less of an incentive to monitor their loans. 
As far as the risk-weighted assets to total assets (hereafter RWATA) ratio is concerned, 
securitizing banks have a higher RWATA than non-securitizing banks. It may seem intuitive 
to expect such a finding because banks that have a higher RWATA will want to securitize 
more to offload their risk; however, the difference is not statistically significant. 
As for the loan composition, real estate loans constitute the largest share of the loan 
portfolio for both securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs (68 percentage points and 73  
percentage points of the loan portfolio, respectively), and the difference is statistically 
significant. This is followed by commercial loans (15 percentage points and 16 percentage 
points for non-securitizing BHCs and for securitizing BHCs, respectively). This may be 
intuitive when one considers the fact that real estate loans are usually safer than commercial 
loans; thus securitizing banks hold more commercial loans and fewer real estate loans as 
compared to the non-securitizing BHCs. Univariate analysis also indicate that securitizing 
BHCs have 38 percentage points higher consumer loans, 6 percentage points more 
commercial loans and 49 percentage points more other loans than non-securitizing BHCs, 
although commercial loans are considered to be riskier than real estate loans; again, this may 
seem intuitive. As for other loans, however, the statistics are not very intuitive, because 
“other” loans include both loans to financial institutions, agricultural loans, and other 
different types of loans with different risk levels. Thus, for such types of loans, the riskiness 
is difficult to evaluate because these loans are presented in FR-9YC forms in aggregate form. 
As for the income composition, interest income is the major source of revenue for both 
securitizing BHCs (around 70 percentage points) and non-securitizing BHCs (around 79 
percentage points). In addition, securitizers have 11 percentage points lower deposit ratios 
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than non-securitizers. Loan to deposit ratio is 16 times higher for securitizers than for non-
securitizers, which may be intuitive, given that securitizers tend to lend more on average, 
especially when they plan to securitize their loans afterwards. The difference is significant 
both statistically and in terms of its economics magnitude. As far as the trading assets ratio 
is concerned, securitizing BHCs have a 13 times higher trading ratio than non-securitizing 
BHCs. 
As for the securitization activities, the summary statistics show the following. The 
securitization-to-total-assets ratio is around 6 percent. This ratio varies significantly between 
BHCs, from 0 up to 842 percent. This variation is mainly driven by mortgage securitization. 
Mortgage securitization accounts for the greatest share of securitized assets (around 4 
percent of total assets), followed by credit card securitization (0.5 percent), and automobiles 
(0.1 percent). Credit enhancements to total assets is about 1.6 percent, of which subordinated 
securities account for around 0.5 percent of credit exposure; standby letters of credit 
constitute 0.7 percent; credit enhancement interest-only strips ratio is around 0.4 percent, 
and the liquidity provision ratio is around 0.16 percent. As for the exposure arising from 
providing credit liquidity and liquidity enhancements to third-party securitizations, this 
constitutes around 0.02 percent and 0.01 percent of total assets, respectively. Securitizers 
provide more both credit enhancements and liquidity provision to third-party securitizations 
than non-securitizing banks. 
Finally, the descriptive statistics for the 299 BHCs that have non-zero securitization 
values for all types of securitization activities show the following. 216 BHCs engage in 
mortgage securitizations, 39 BHCs engage in home equity securitizations, 45 BHCs handle 
credit card securitizations, 50 BHCs participate in automobile securitizations, 47 BHCs 
engage in commercial and 105 BHCs perform other loans securitizations. I find that credit 
enhancements are most often provided to mortgage securitizations, followed by other loans 
securitizations, home equity, commercial, auto and credit card securitizations. 
As for the distribution of credit exposure across the three forms of retained interest 
(credit-enhancing interest-only strip (hereafter CEI) ratio, subordinated security (hereafter 
SUB) ratio and standby letter of credit (hereafter SLC) ratio, it differs significantly across 
different securitizations. I find that SUBs are the most widely used form of credit 
enhancements. As for the liquidity provision, it varies between 0.2 percent for credit card 
securitization to 2.9 percent for other loans. The seller’s interest is largest in non-zero credit 
card loans securitization activities at around 13 percent, followed by home equity loans 
securitizations (9.3 percent) and declines to 1.4 percent for mortgage loans securitizations, 
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consistent with Chen et al. (2008) who find that SUB ABS are provided on average four 
times more often than CEI for different classes of loan securitizations. To provide the 
magnitude of the credit enhancements in dollar terms, I observe that they trended upwards 
from about $25 million in 2001:Q2 to around $70 million in 2009:Q1 (in percentage terms 
around 2–3 percent per securitized asset). Then, in the following quarter, total enhancements 
increased almost twice as much, mainly because of the rise in the enhancements on credit 
cards (to around $164 million or around 6 percent per securitized asset). 
Finally, univariate comparisons in show that charge-offs to securitization ratios are 0.4 
percent for non-zero mortgage securitizations, 0.7 percent for non-zero values in other loans, 
0.8 percent for non-zero commercial loans securitizations, 1 percent for auto securitizations, 
1.1 percent for home equity loans securitizations, and around 2 percent for credit card 
securitizations. 
To conclude, securitizing banks are significantly larger and hold fewer liquid assets but 
they have more diversified loan portfolios. They are also more risky and more profitable, 
earning a higher share of revenue from non-interest income compared to non-securitizers. 
2.6! Methodology and Empirical Strategy 
2.6.1! Treatment effect model 
In contrast to previous studies, which estimated a linear model in a pooled sample, I 
employ a treatment effects model to account for the selection bias, because existing evidence 
suggests that banks do not securitize randomly. For example, if a BHC that has more non-
performing loans is more inclined to securitize, the OLS estimates could overestimate the 
effect of a securitization decision on the non-performing loans. The treatment effect model 
that I use is similar to Heckman’s sample selection model, which I discuss here. 
Heckman’s sample selection model was a pioneering approach for correcting selection 
biases (Guo and Fraser, 2010) in the last three decades. The logic behind Heckman’s sample 
selection model is to estimate the probability of a participant to be in the sample, and 
subsequently use that information for estimating the outcome of interest. In the sample of 
this chapter, Guo and Fraser (2010) note that a treatment effect model is better suited 
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compared to the standard Heckman selection model.23 The estimation procedure may be 
summarized as follows. 
I specify two equations: a selection equation and an outcome equation. Participation in 
the sample is determined by some observed variables that determine the selection plus an 
error term that includes all unobserved selection factors. In predicting the selection 
condition, the binary dummy variable that indicates whether participants have self!selected 
themselves into the sample is treated as an endogenous latent variable, and its expected value 
is estimated based on both observed and unobserved factors (Morgan and Winship, 2007). 
Then, the error term from the selection equation, which is treated as a true omitted variable, 
referred to as the unobserved heterogeneity, which determines the selection bias (Guo and 
Fraser, 2010), is used to estimate the outcome equation in the second stage. 
This procedure is Heckman’s lambda method for correcting selection bias, where the 
inverse Mill’s ratio is estimated in the selection equation, based on the probability of 
choosing the treatment, including all unobserved characteristics. Including the inverse Mill’s 
ratio in estimating the outcome equation of interest, an omitted variable is taken into account, 
which essentially removes variance in the error term that is because of the selection. This 
ensures that errors of the selection equation and the outcome equation no longer correlate 
(Wooldridge, 2002). 
The selection (2.1) and outcome (2.2) equations are the following: 
wi* = ƴZi+ ui                        (2.1) 
wi= 1 if wi*>0 or wi =0 if wi*≤0 
Yi = βXi +δwi+ εi                 (2.2) 
where wi*and Yi are the dependent variables, and Zi and Xi are vectors of independent 
variables, wi represents the treatment indicator and u and ε are error terms. Substituting the 
selection into the outcome equation leads to two regressions for two separate regimes 
(treated banks (2.3) and non-treated banks (2.4)). 
Yi,t= βXi,t-1 + δ(ƴZi,t-1 + ui,t) + εi,t  (2.3) 
Yi,t= βXi,t-1 + εi,t                                          (2.4) 
                                                
23 The treatment effect model differs from the sample selection model in two aspects: (1) a dummy variable 
indicating the treatment condition wi (i.e., wi = 1 if participant i is in the treatment condition, and wi = 0 
otherwise) is directly entered into the regression equation and (2) the outcome variable yi of the regression 
equation is observed for both wi = 1 and wi = 0. 
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That is, wi is the endogenous variable that indicates whether a bank securitizes or not (the 
treatment indicator). The difference from the standard Heckman model is that the first stage 
outcome variable Yi is observed for all banks in the sample. Therefore, it is not in the “non-
observability” of this continuous variable where the selection takes place. Furthermore, in 
the treatment effect model, the treatment dummy is directly included into the outcome 
equation. 
Following Casu et al. (2013), I lag all control variables by one-quarter (except for the 
securitization dummy) to additionally address the problem of reverse causality in my 
estimations. Next, I address serial correlation in securitization at the bank level by clustering 
standard errors at the bank level (Michalak and Uhde, 2013), since some of the banks in my 
sample continuously securitize over the entire sample period, while others do not. I also use 
time dummies to account for business-cycle effects in my sample. 
Subsequently, I have to use at least one additional control variable to identify the selection 
equation. Thus, following Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), I include an additional 
variable “fad”, which stands for the popularity or enthusiasm for banks to securitize their 
loans,  into the selection equation. I borrow fad variable from the study on deposit insurance 
and banking crises by Detragiache and Demirgüç-Kunt (2002). They use a multivariate logit 
model, where they try to purge the endogenous component of the deposit insurance variable 
in the first stage. For the two-stage logit model to be properly identified there has to be at 
least one variable that is correlated with the probability of adopting an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme, but is uncorrelated with the country’s probability of experiencing a crisis. 
Detragiache and Demirgüç-Kunt (2002) hypothesize that, when deciding whether to 
implement deposit insurance, policymakers are influenced by choices made by policymakers 
in other countries. As explicit depositor protection becomes more widespread, it becomes a 
sort of “universal practice” or a “fad”, and countries become more prone to adopting it. To 
capture this “fad” element in the deposit insurance adoption decision, they use the proportion 
of countries in the sample, which have already adopted explicit deposit insurance. In a 
similar fashion, I use “fad” as a percentage of banks within the same size (in terms of assets) 
decile that engage in securitization activities. “Fad” captures the popularity of securitization 
and is similar to the contagion effect. That is, it takes into the account the fact that banks 
may feel under pressure to securitize, when other banks of similar size engage in 
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securitization. Such herding behavior is common in practices of financial institutions24. It is 
a well-documented fact in banking literature that banks compete on the variety of services 
provided and may mimic each other’s behavior. I observe, inter alia, that the percentage of 
securitizing banks increases with size. That is, while only 3 percent of the banks in the first 
size decile securitize, the percentage of securitizing banks increases to more than 50 percent 
for the largest banks. 
I improve upon the existing studies on securitization activities by using a treatment effect 
model. Thereby, I address the problem of the selection bias that plagues a number of existing 
studies and therefore raises doubts about the validity of their results. Although some more 
sophisticated models (e.g. Kyriazidou (2001) or Semykina and Wooldridge (2005; 2010) 
proposed conditional maximum likelihood (CML) estimation procedure) 
may handle sample selection bias better that the treatment effect model, this does not 
mean that it was applied incorrectly for the estimation purposes of this chapter (e.g. Affinito 
and Tagliaferri (2010) use similar methodology in their robustness checks). 
2.6.2! Dependent variables 
My dependent variables are the following: credit risk, credit risk taking, profitability and 
capital level. Following previous studies, I proxy credit risk by RWATA25 and the non-
performing loans (hereafter NPL) ratio, calculated as the ratio of loans that are past due 90 
days or more or that are non-accrual. I choose to include NPL as a measure of asset quality26 
instead of a charge-off ratio, which is also often employed in similar studies. I also choose 
NPL, because the NPL measure is less likely to be subject to managerial discretion and thus 
                                                
24 The instrument chosen is similar to most "peer effects", however, it seems to suffer from Manski's 
reflection problem. One of the most suitable econometric methodology to cater to all features in this data is 
the Wooldridge suitable conditional maximum likelihood (CML) estimator, which can cater to state 
dependence, unobserved heterogeneity in the form of fixed effects and serves as a correction for sample 
selection bias. However, the methodology of CLM is beyond the scope of this thesis. Consequently, this 
method will not be employed, but it provides an interesting avenue for future research. 
25 Under Basel Accords, banks assets and off-balance sheet activities are divided into four risk categories: 
assets with zero default risk (e.g. Treasury bills); low risk assets 20 percent (e.g. interbank deposits or claims 
conditionally guaranteed by OECD central governments); medium risk 50 percent (e.g. residential 
mortgages) and assets with high default risk (e.g. commercial loans). To calculate risk-weighted assets, the 
bank applies a risk weight wj to each asset of a risk group j on its balance sheet. There are four major risk 
weights: 0 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent and 100 percent. Some assets, such as securitized assets get 
weights between 20 percent and 200 percent depending on credit ratings (Kisin and Manela, 2014). A risk-
weighted asset (RWA) measure is then calculated using relative risk weights per category between 0 and 1: 
RWA=0 x category I+0.2 x category II + 0.5 x category III + 1.0 x category IV. 
26 As noted by Casu et al. (2012), RWATA might be less inefficient in capturing the true credit risk position 
of a bank compared to NPL, which is regarded as an ex-post measure of the credit risk. 
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it is likely to be a better indicator of asset quality (Moyer, 1990; Shrieves and Dahl, 1992). 
Also, charge-offs do not happen immediately, while NPL reflect in 90 days, if problems with 
the payments arise. In turn, credit risk taking is the change in RWATA between the current 
and following quarter.27 As for profitability, it is measured as returns on assets (hereafter 
ROA). I choose ROA rather than return on equity (hereafter ROE) because it is less 
influenced by a bank’s leverage than ROE (Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010). Moreover, since 
charge-offs and ROA are cash flow variables, differences are taken over the year to obtain 
the true quarterly ratio. Thus, these variables are missing for the first two quarters of 2001. 
As for the capital level, the literature has not unilaterally agreed which definition of 
capital ratio should be used.28 I use the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, since this is the 
measure that is used most frequently in similar studies (Casu et al., 2011; Baele et al., 2011). 
2.6.3! Independent variables 
Control variables are chosen based on the variables used in previous studies. In particular, 
I use control variables from Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004), Stiroh (2004a; 2004b; 2006), 
Jiangli et al. (2007), Jiangli and Pristker (2008), Loutskina and Strahan (2009); Baele et al. 
(2011), and Casu et al. (2013). In addition to the securitization dummy, which indicates if a 
bank securitizes in a certain period or not, I include bank’s size (log of total assets). I include 
“size”to capture a possible impact on bank risk taking through a number of channels. For 
instance, Loutskina (2005) notes that only the largest banks in the U.S. have a sufficient 
number of loans to enable access to securitization markets. Also, since setting up SPV is 
costly, only large banks usually undertake securitizations. I expect a positive relation 
between bank size and credit risk, because larger banks are more likely to engage in credit 
risk taking due to implicit government guarantees (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2011; banks 
are “too big to fail” (i.e. banks expect to be bailed out in adverse states of events). As for the 
profitability and capital level, I expect a priori that more profitable and better capitalized 
banks should have fewer incentives to engage in securitization. I also expect that these 
variables will be negatively associated with a bank’s risk. Additionally, I include 
nontraditional income (non-interest income normalized by net operating revenue) to capture 
                                                
27 I use a change in RWATA as a credit risk-taking measure because of the accompanying difficulties 
involved in differencing NPL quarterly. 
28Stiroh (2006) and Casu et al. (2011) use the equity to assets ratio, Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) use 
capital to risky assets ratio, and Baele et al. (2011) use the Tier 1 risk based capital ratio without explanations 
for their choice. A fourth candidate would be to include the Tier 1 leverage capital ratio. Berger et al. (1995) 
study the literature on capital ratio, and conclude that all measures are imperfect. 
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risk associated with different types of revenue-generating activities such as trading or 
investment banking (Stiroh, 2006). I also include liquidity ratio, loan ratio, and leverage 
capital ratio (leverage/tier 1 capital). In addition, I use dependent variables as control 
variables, except when they enter their own regressions, e.g. capital is used as a control 
variable in the regression where NPL is the dependent variable, but capital is not used in the 
regression where capital is the dependent variable. I also include credit enhancements and 
liquidity provision by the banks for their own and for third party securitizations scaled by 
BHCs’ total assets. I also alternate by scaling credit enhancements and liquidity provision 
by the securitized assets and by bank capital, since the capital cushion is meant to provide 
rescue in the adverse state of the world, i.e. scaling by BHC’s capital can possibly better 
reflect BHCs’ ability to provide recourse to their securitized loans. I do not venture any 
expectation about the effect it will exert on the dependent variables in any of my regressions. 
Subsequently, to analyze the risk retention mechanism more profoundly, I decompose the 
retained interest ratio into: Credit Enhancement Ratio (I also split it later into CEI, SUB and 
SLC Ratios; Liquidity Provision Ratio; Seller’s Interest Ratio; Third-party Credit 
Enhancement Ratio; Third-party Liquidity Provision Ratio. 
2.7! Empirical Results 
This section presents empirical results. First, I discuss the validity of the model. Then, I 
discuss results per dependent variable, i.e. BHCs’ credit risk, credit risk taking, profitability 
and capital levels. The main results are from the treatment effect model regressions, which 
are reported in Tables 2.4- 2.14. Finally, I discuss the regression estimates for credit and 
liquidity enhancements and how the effect has changed after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
The correlation between the error terms of the selection regression and the outcome 
regression (i.e rho=0) can be rejected in all the specifications of the treatment regressions. 
This shows that the securitization decision is indeed endogenous and that the treatment effect 
model is a more appropriate model to examine the effect of securitization on BHCs’ 
performance measures compared to the OLS panel regressions. In addition, I find that the 
variable “fad” is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent across all first-stage 
regressions. This suggests that the pressure to securitize stemming from other securitizing 
BHCs does affect a BHC’s decision to securitize its assets. 
In addition, I find that securitization increases credit risk (coefficient on securitization 
dummy (secdummy) in RWATA and NPL regressions is positive and statistically significant 
(Table 2.4, Column 3 and 7). As for the credit risk taking, I observe that securitization 
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reduces bank credit risk taking29  (secdummy is negative and statistically significant in 
ΔRWATA regression in Table 2.4 Column 5). As for profitability, in contrast to the majority 
of existing studies, I find that securitization reduces profitability (secdummy exhibits a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on Profitability in Table 2.4 Column 9). It is 
highly likely that my findings may differ from previous research because my sample period 
covers the financial crisis. As for capital, I observe that securitization increases capital levels 
(the coefficient on secdummy in the Capitalization regression is positive and statistically 
significant Table 2.4 Column 11). 
Turning to other control variables, I find that larger banks are more profitable but have 
lower capital levels (size exhibits a positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
Profitability in Table 2.4 Column 9, while it shows a negative effect on capital levels in 
Column 11). Further, I observe that banks with a higher share of NPL engage in credit risk 
taking on a higher scale, which may be because banks try to generate higher revenue to cover 
possible forthcoming losses (Table 2.4 Column 5). 
Regarding credit enhancements are concerned, I find that credit enhancements increase 
credit risk, which may seem intuitive since by retaining interest in securitization, banks 
expose themselves to additional risk (Table 2.4 Column 7). I also observe that banks that 
provide credit enhancements also engage in more credit risk taking (Table 2.4 Column 5). 
However, I also find that credit enhancements increase profitability (Table 2.4 Column 9). 
As for capital level, I find that credit enhancements and liquidity provision reduce capital 
level (i.e. the coefficient on Credit Enhancements and Liquidity Provision is negative and 
statistically significant in Table 2.4 Column 11). This may seem intuitive because when a 
bank provides explicit support, it must hold a certain amount of the risk-based capital. That 
is, an increase in the number of risk-weighted assets implies a decrease in the risk-weighted 
capital ratio.30 
                                                
29 Casu et al. (2011) find a negative effect of securitized assets on the credit taking, which is primarily 
attributed to the securitization of mortgages, HEC, and other consumer loans. This implies that banks take 
less risk to compensate for holding certain securitized assets such as commercial loans. However, they stress 
that the impact of securitization on the credit risk taking of the BHCs is ambiguous and it depends on the 
transaction. 
30 When a bank increases total capital to adjust exactly for the rise in risk-weighted assets, the capital ratio 
will remain unchanged after securitization. Instead, if the bank increases capital more than required by the 
risk-weighted assets, the capital ratio will increase. This means that the bank is taking additional protection 
against credit risk, to account for risks which are not explicitly specified in the regulations. 
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As for liquidity provision to third-party securitization, I find that liquidity provision 
decreases bank credit risk taking (i.e. the coefficient on the Third Part. Liquidity Provision 
in the ΔRWATA regression is negative and statistically significant in Table 2.4 Column 5). 
This may suggest that banks exposed to other banks cannot perfectly monitor those banks, 
they cannot “monitor the monitor” (i.e. to monitor whether other banks are monitoring their 
own borrowers (Freixas and Rochet, 2008) and thus they adjust their own risk-taking 
behavior accordingly so that they meet their obligation to extend credit lines if required. As 
for the liquidity provision to the third parties, I find that it decreases bank capital levels, as 
expected (Table 2.4 Column 11) .31 
Furthermore, I would expect that providing credit guarantees to third parties should have 
a positive effect on BHCs’ profitability because banks may choose whether to sell or not to 
sell the “guarantees” and to which banks to sell this protection against an adverse state of 
events. Ex ante I would expect that guarantees should increase banks profitability because 
banks can usually choose whether to extend the guarantee or not (any uncertainty about the 
quality of the loans provided by other banks will be reflected in the price of the guarantee). 
However, it is possible that my findings are influenced by the recent financial crisis. It has 
been noted that during the economic downturn, risk was not assessed correctly; it was 
underestimated, and consequently the guarantees were too cheap compared to the risk that 
they covered. Also, other studies report that banks that engage in securitization transactions 
have higher information opacity than banks with no asset securitizations (Cheng et al., 2008). 
They also find that information opacity increases with the magnitude of the securitized 
assets. However, I do not observe that providing credit enhancements to other securitizations 
increases bank profitability. That is, the finding referred to by Casu et al. (2013) as a possible 
positive diversification effect, i.e. investing in other institutions’ structures might have a 
positive effect on bank performance, is not confirmed in my results. 
I also decompose securitization assets into different types of securitization and rerun the 
regressions. The results reported are presented in Table 2.5- 2.9. In particular, I show that 
credit card, automobile loans and securitization of other loans increased credit risk (Table 
2.5 Column 5 and Column 11 and Table 2.7 Column 7 and Column 11, respectively). I also 
find that residential and credit card securitizations increased profitability (Table 2.8 Column 
                                                
31 It is important to point out, however, that the hypothesis that there is a correlation between the error terms 
of the selection regression and the outcome regression (rho=0) cannot be rejected in RWATA treatment 
regressions, which indicates that some other estimation technique may be superior to the treatment effect 
model. For that reason, I present results from RWATA regression, however, I refrain from drawing causal 
interpretations. 
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5 and 11). In addition, I observe that securitization of commercial loans reduced capital 
levels while other loans increased capital levels. Results also show that residential and credit 
card increased capital levels, however, results are not consistent across various 
specifications. 
In contrast to the majority of existing studies that suggest a positive effect of securitization 
on banks’ profitability, I find a negative relationship between securitization and BHCs’ 
profitability. This result could be driven by banks that redeploy their proceeds from 
securitized loans to increase their capital buffer instead of increasing profitability. Such 
findings are also consistent with Cohen (2013), who documents that during the recent 
financial crisis, banks actually reduced their profitability to improve their capital ratios. 
However, they note that in normal economic conditions, it is unlikely that banks would 
sacrifice their profits to increase capital requirements, especially when capital levels were 
well above the regulatory levels. My results also accord well with Pagano and Volpin (2010) 
who report that in uncertain financial times, opaque securitized products may reduce banks’ 
profitability. 
As for the capital level, I observe that securitization increases capital level, which is 
intuitive, since after loans have been sold, ceteris paribus, the level of regulatory capital 
increases. 
Generally speaking, when a BHC transfers its assets to the SPV, it has to decide how it is 
going to use the amount of liquidity from the asset sale. For example, it can keep cash on its 
balance sheet; it can also invest the funds into less risky assets; or it can use liquidity to repay 
its debt. In all these cases, the risk-weighted assets will decrease and the capital ratio will 
increase. However, banks can also invest in more risky assets, in which case its capital level 
will decrease. 
My findings align well with empirical literature that analyzes U.S. banks and finds that 
banks often used securitization to benefit from the capital arbitrage because regulatory 
capital requirements were less stringent for the securitized assets (Acharya et al., 2012). 
However, I stress that my findings may also result from the fact that some securitizing banks 
realized the risk associated with securitization activities, and therefore they consciously 
chose to increase their capital buffer above regulatory capital requirements on top of the 
immediate increase in the capital level that would result as soon as the loans had been sold 
off. In other words, since I find that securitizing increases BHCs’ credit risk and since banks 
are aware of this increased credit risk and other possible effects stemming from systemic 
risk, securitizing banks may want to hold an additional capital buffer. This is well accorded 
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with the evidence in Berger et al. (2008) that BHCs were more than adequately capitalized 
before the crisis (i.e. in my data sample mean Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of BHCs was 
around 12 percent compared to the regulatory requirements under which banks had to hold 
a Tier 1 risk-based ratio of 6 percent to be considered financially healthy. My findings, which 
show that securitization decreases bank credit risk-taking and profitability, but increases 
capital levels, may be consistent with the fact that banks may be relatively risk averse, i.e. 
banks realized that risks they were exposed to through retaining risks in these securitized 
assets were far greater and that the regulatory capital will not suffice to cover for the possible 
losses, thus they chose to hold capital buffer in excess of the regulatory minima.  
My interpretation is supported by some evidence in Casu et al. (2013), who note that the 
sample time period in my study is less biased by regulatory capital arbitrage because it 
involves the development and implementation period of Basel II, which should better align 
regulatory capital charges on banks’ assets and reduce the possibility of undertaking 
securitization to increase capitalization ratios. Nevertheless, I cannot exclude the pure capital 
arbitrage and state that my result stems from risk aversion of some of the biggest banks, 
because Basel II was adopted much later in the U.S. than in Europe, and even during the 
crisis, many U.S. banks were still operating under Basel I (Acharya et al., 2012). 
As far as credit enhancements are concerned, I find that credit enhancements increase 
credit risk (NPL), which may seem intuitive since by retaining their interest in securitization 
banks may expose themselves to additional risk. This finding is consistent with the evidence 
in Shin (2009) who notes that the risk inherent in securitized assets was not passed on to 
investors, but remained on banks' balance sheets, in the form of retained interest and 
guarantees, which is considered one of the key reasons for the severity of the financial crisis. 
I also observe that banks which provide credit enhancements also engage in more credit risk 
taking, contrary to the evidence in Casu et al. (2012), who note that before the crisis, credit 
enhancements did reduce bank credit risk taking. 
I also find that credit enhancements increase profitability. It is possible that banks increase 
their risk taking by extending risky loans and then by providing credit enhancements to those 
securitized assets; they ensure these securitized loans obtain AAA ratings, all of which 
subsequently brings banks higher profits. However, it is possible that credit enhancements 
increase bank profitability because banks exert more effort to continue monitoring their 
borrowers after they have sold off these loans. This is because they have retained some 
interest in these securitizations or because they act as a servicing agent and thus collect fees 
of the well-performing SPV for much longer. Therefore, the argument I provided earlier that 
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securitizing banks are relatively risk averse may be partly influenced by the provision of the 
credit enhancements to SPVs. 
As for liquidity provision to third-party securitization, I find that it decreases bank credit 
risk taking. It may also be because banks that provide guarantees to third parties are aware 
of the opaqueness of the assets held by other banks and even if other banks exert significant 
effort in monitoring their borrowers, the complexity of the securitization activities may add 
an extra layer of difficulty. That is, I find that extending protection to other banks makes 
banks more risk averse and makes them adjust their credit risk taking. 
Then, turning back to the result of the significance of the coefficient on BHC size, I 
observe that the coefficient on size is statistically significant across different specifications. 
That is, it was primarily the largest banks that engaged in securitization. This lends support 
to recent suggestions by policymakers that controlling for the largest systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs) may be more efficient than producing more complex 
regulations regarding risk retention. More discussion on the size of the BHC and its effect 
on various aspects of banks’ decision making will be provided in Chapter 3. 
As a next step, and motivated by recent studies which confirm that results may be driven 
primarily by the financial crisis period (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), I reran regressions by 
decomposing the treatment regressions into four sub-periods: (2001:Q2–2004:Q2, 2004:Q3–
2007:Q2, 2007:Q3–2010:Q2, 2010:Q3–2013:Q1) to gain a deeper insight into a relationship 
between securitization, risk retention and bank performance measures and how they varied 
within the entire time span. 
There needs to be caution because splitting the sample into shorter sample periods gives 
us less variation in the variables and some variables lose their statistical significance. For 
example, I find that securitization no longer has any effect on credit risk taking in any of the 
sub-periods (Table 2.11). 
However, I find that a positive economically and statistically significant effect of 
securitization on credit risk in all the sub-periods of the sample (Table 2.12) reinforces my 
findings in Table 2.7. That is, I show that results were not driven by the pre-crisis or post-
crisis period. I also find that securitization increased credit risk as measured by RWATA but 
only in the period before the crisis (Table 2.10). Results in Table 2.12 also show that credit 
enhancements and liquidity provision reduced credit risk in all sub-periods. This shows that 
credit enhancement along with liquidity lines were a relatively successful risk retention 
mechanism. Coefficients of the credit enhancements to third parties however exhibit a mixed 
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impact on BHCs’ credit risk. For instance, liquidity provision for third-party securitizations 
decreased credit risk before the financial crisis (Table 2.12 Column 3). In turn, credit 
enhancements to third-party conduits increased banks’ credit risk after the crisis (Table 2.10 
Column 9). However, results show that credit enhancements to third parties decreased credit 
risk before and during the crisis (Table 2.10 Column 3 and Column 5). I cannot provide any 
economic interpretation for this result, other than that third parties’ assets are usually more 
opaque, and it is rational to expect that banks would seek third-party guarantees for their 
worst quality assets, which increase the credit risk of the guarantees’ providers. Interestingly, 
liquidity provision to third parties decreased credit risk—however, only before the crisis 
(Table 2.12 Column 3). 
Overall, results support the evidence that guarantees were relatively successful in what 
they were structured to achieve. This also implies that making the risk retention mechanism 
more rigorous is not necessarily the best tool to prevent future crises. The design of the risk 
retention mechanism may have correlated with the likelihood of the financial crisis but it is 
unlikely that it was a main contributor to the crisis. 
In addition, I find that the decrease in profitability from securitization has primarily been 
driven by the post-crisis period (Table 2.13 Column 9), which may seem intuitive as the 
quality of assets sold became more apparent; markets have become more aware of the 
inferior quality of loans sold and buyers were willing to pay significantly less for securitized 
products. Securitization lost its pre-crisis attraction. 
As for capital levels, results confirm that securitization increased capital levels only 
before and during the crisis (Table 2.14 Columns 3, 5 and 7) and decreased capital levels 
after the financial crisis (Column 7). This may result from the fact that the elimination of all 
regulatory loopholes has taken place, or that banks stopped retaining their earnings to 
increase capital levels. Results however might have reversed because of market interventions 
that took place during the crisis. Similarly puzzling results are observed after the financial 
crisis, when credit enhancements and liquidity provision show a positive effect on capital 
levels; it is challenging to come up with an economic rationale for this finding. Results in 
Table 2.14 (Columns 3, 5, 7 and 9) also reveal that credit enhancements and liquidity 
provision to the third parties reduced capital levels. Although the economic magnitude of 
the effect differs, because of the difference in the regulatory capital requirements for the 
different types of guarantees, these differences are relatively small, because the credit and 
liquidity enhancements typically constituted no more than 5% of the securitization portfolio 
ABS.
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2.8! Robustness Tests 
This section discusses robustness checks. I arranged my tests as follows. First, to check 
whether the relationship between securitization and its determinants changes after a certain 
threshold I progressively winsorized tail observations, i.e. I winsorized control variables at 
2.5 percent and 5 percent32. This procedure, however, did not produce significant changes 
in the results, which indicates that my findings were not driven by the outliers. The results 
are reported in Table 2.15 and Table 2.16. 
Subsequently, I conducted the Instrumental Variable (IV) analysis.  I employed a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimator with fixed effects and a robust-clustering at the bank 
level. The results of the estimation are reported in Table 2.17.  
The Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 report the first stage regression, where my instrument 
“Fad” enters positively and statistically significant, while all control variables exhibit the 
signs as in the treatment effect regressions. The second stage of my IV regressions are 
reported in the Columns 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 of Table 2.17 The results confirm our main findings 
as per treatment effect model estimations. All else constant, the results show that securitizing 
banks securitization increases credit risk (coefficient on securitization dummy (secdummy) 
in NPL regression (Column 7) is positive and statistically significant. In relation to the credit 
risk taking, I observe that securitization reduces bank credit risk taking (secdummy is 
negative and statistically significant in ΔRWATA regression (Column 5). In regard to 
profitability, I find that securitization reduces profitability (secdummy exhibits negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on Profitability in Column 9). As for the capital adequacy, 
I observe that securitization increases capital adequacy (coefficient on secdummy in the 
Capitalization regression is positive and statistically significant in Column 11). 
Further verifying the validity of our instrument, Table 2.17 reports the underidentification 
and weak identification tests. For the former, we use Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic 
which is robust under heteroskedasticity and clustering on identifier in the case of a single 
endogenous variable and a single instrument (Michalak and Uhde 2012). The value of the 
test is between 6.3 and 8.9 in all the columns in Table 2.17, rejecting the null hypothesis that 
the equation is underidentified at the 0.5% level. For the weak identification, the Kleibergen-
Paap rank Wald F statistic is between 13.86 and 14.50 in all the columns in Table 2.17, 
                                                
32 Winsorisation consists of replacing the data below the Nth percentile with the Nth, e.g., a 1% winsorisation 
implies replacing the data below the 1st percentile with the 1st percentile data.  
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which is close to the Stock and Yogo (2005) 10% critical value of 16.38, rejecting the null 
hypothesis of a weak correlation between the endogenous variable and the instrument, that 
is, between securitization dummy and peer pressure “fad”.  
2.9! Conclusion 
Securitization has brought a fundamental change to the banking industry (Affinito and 
Tagliaferri, 2010). It is a process based on the following functions: the transfer of assets; 
SPV funding; servicing and profit extraction; collateral provision; and credit enhancement. 
Banks securitized their assets to obtain additional funding, to transfer risk to third-party 
investors, to generate fee income, to manage profits, and to minimize regulatory capital 
requirements (Rajan, 2005; Allen and Carletti, 2006). While securitization and credit-risk 
transfer techniques allow banks to move risks outside their balance sheet as well as to 
achieve portfolio diversification more easily, they can also encourage banks to engage in 
excessive risk taking by using the funding obtained from securitization to issue new, more 
risky credits. Consequently, banks may end up being more at risk if they decide to keep the 
junior tranche in a securitization, or because of the guarantees that banks extend to 
securitization vehicles. Credit-risk transfer techniques may not only increase banks’ 
systematic risk, but they are also likely to affect financial stability as a whole, i.e. they may 
increase systemic risk. 
The literature has not reached consensus on the effect of securitization on bank 
performance measures. As documented in the existing studies the net impact of 
securitization on the riskiness of issuing banks is ambiguous and will depend on the structure 
of transactions, in particular on the magnitude of the credit support (both implicit and 
explicit) provided by banks to their own and third-party securitizations. That is, while there 
is considerable literature on the relationship between securitization and risk, the literature on 
credit enhancements, liquidity provision and the interconnection of banks via guarantees is 
more scarse. 
Differences in regulations may explain the divergence in previous studies on 
securitization between different geographical regions. In general, securitization allowed 
financial firms, especially in the U.S., to circumvent regulatory capital requirements. In 
general, there was less “skin in the game” in the U.S.33, compared to Europe. In Europe, 
                                                
33 This issue has been identified as one of high importance and been addressed in response to the occurrences 
in the market during 2007–2009 in the Dodd-Frank Act Section 939A which mandates that issuers must 
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regulation and underwriting standards were significantly more robust. The resilience of the 
structured European finance market can be evidenced in the post-crisis default data provided 
for example by the OECD Report (2011) which uses Standard & Poor’s estimations to 
calculate that from mid-2007 to the end of 2010 only 0.95% of all European structured 
finance issues defaulted, compared to 7.7% of U.S. structured finance issues and 6.3% 
among universal global corporate bonds. 
In this chapter, I contribute to the broader understanding of the securitization process, as 
well as risks arising from banks’ engagement in securitization activities by providing 
liquidity and credit enhancements. My analysis of the credit and liquidity enhancements to 
BHCs own and to third-party securitization activities is relevant to the ongoing discussions 
on how to redesign the risk retention mechanism, and better align banks incentive to lend 
and securitize. In particular, I use the treatment effect model to examine the relationship 
between securitization and credit risk, profitability and capital levels. I use this model to 
alleviate the sample selection bias that plagues many existing studies in this field. In 
particular, the results in this chapter show that securitization increases credit risk. However, 
it reduces bank credit risk taking. Subsequently I find that securitization has a negative 
impact on banks’ profitability and capital levels in the post-crisis period. 
As for the regulatory capital arbitrage hypothesis, although I cannot totally eliminate it, I 
show some evidence that some banks consciously chose to increase their capital buffer. 
Another caveat in interpreting the effect on credit enhancements and liquidity provision 
might be the implicit support that has played a significant role in banks’ decisions to 
securitize assets. That is, because of the interference by implicit guarantees to explicit 
guarantees it may be challenging to reach a definite conclusion on the effect of credit 
enhancements and liquidity provisions on banks’ performance. In addition, I explore how 
the effect of securitization on the BHCs’ performance measures changes over time. I observe 
that the relationship between securitization and banks’ performance is affected significantly 
throughout the crisis period. 
Overall, as noted in Greenspan (2000), securitization enabled a more efficient allocation 
of risk to a wider range of agents; it also allowed more effective risk management and 
                                                
retain some exposure in their own deals. However, to the best of my knowledge, regulations are relatively 
silent on how much credit enhancement and liquidity support banks can provide. That is, risks stemming 
from banks’ own actions versus those from foreign financial institutions have not been explicitly addressed. 
The nature of the risk stemming from banks investing directly and providing guarantees is certainly different, 
and thus this motivates me to address these issues in my study. 
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enhanced market liquidity. However, at the same time it lowered lending standards by 
relaxing constraints on credit availability and distorting the incentives of U.S. banks to 
screen and monitor their borrowers. Securitization also increased the risk of crisis and 
reduced economic welfare (Rajan, 2005; Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). 
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Chapter 3! 
The Effect of BHCs’ Exposure to Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Conduits on BHCs’ 
Information Opacity and Systemic Risk 
3.1! Introduction 
In the late fall and winter of 2008–2009, the worldwide economy and financial markets 
collapsed. The stock market fell by 42 percent in the U.S. and, on a dollar-adjusted basis, 
the market dropped 46 percent in the U.K., 49 percent in Europe at large, 35 percent in Japan, 
and around 50 percent in the largest Latin American countries. Likewise, global GDP fell 
by 0.8 percent with the decline in advanced economies by a sharp 3.2 percent. Furthermore, 
international trade fell by almost 12 percent (Acharya et al., 2013). 
The recent financial crisis brought to the surface fundamental flaws in the design of the 
shadow banking system (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012).34 Shadow banking was perceived as 
stable and non-risky because of the guarantees provided by the private sector.35 However, 
since the solvency of the put providers was questioned shadow banking has undergone a 
major collapse, partly because credit rating agencies, risk managers and investors 
underestimated the tail risks in guarantees from the private sector. 
What became apparent after the crisis erupted is that there was high uncertainty about 
banks’ holdings and inter-bank connections that contributed to the financial turmoil. 
Governments that did not account for the fact that some banks were too interconnected, often 
ended up with banks “too big to fail”, “too big to jail” and “too many to fail” (too many 
financial institutions to bail out). 
Large amounts of short-term lending via ABCP and repurchase agreements (repos) 
collapsed during the financial crisis. Credit losses on subprime mortgages affected the ABCP 
market via the runs on programs that were exposed to these assets. As investors lost 
                                                
34 Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) define shadow banking as banking intermediation without public liquidity and 
credit guarantees. In reality, however, the operations of many shadow banking vehicles and activities 
interlink with traditional banking via credit enhancements, liquidity backup lines, implicit support to SPVs, 
and so forth. 
35 Credit guarantees are structured to align the risk and control excessive risk taking of banks, a view 
consistent with the optimal allocation of control rights under asymmetric information (Acharya et al., 2010). 
This ensures that sponsors have incentives to screen the conduit’s asset purchases (Ramakrishan and Thakor 
(1984); Calomiris and Mason (2004)). Guarantees also ensure that ABCP qualifies for the highest ratings 
from credit rating agencies. In turn, the highest ratings ensure that some financial institutions, for example, 
money market funds are legally allowed to invest in ABCP (Kaperczyk and Schnabl, 2009). That is, 
guarantees were a crucial factor that facilitated the rapid expansion of the market by injecting the large doze 
of confidence into assets for investors (e.g. Levitin and Wachter, 2012). 
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confidence and ABCP could not roll over, support provided by the banks was called on 
which increased the pressure on bank balance sheets even more. Thus, as banks were more 
uncertain about their ability to fulfill their commitments they had to reduce their lending to 
each other and so the effects on the initial ABCP runs magnified even further. 
Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2012) and Schroth, Suarez and Taylor (2014) examine the 
debt runs during the 2007 ABCP crisis and report that ABCP played a much more significant 
role than the repo market in supporting both the expansion and contraction of the shadow 
banking sector. 
ABCP rose from $650 billion at the beginning of 2004 to $1.2 trillion before the 
beginning of the crisis36. However, in 2007 the ABCP market shrunk rapidly. When the 
crisis erupted, a significant number of banks had to be bailed out or merged with other banks 
due to huge losses from exposure to conduits. When the value of subprime mortgages 
became highly uncertain in the summer of 2007, purchasers of ABCP became worried that 
the assets backing their commercial paper would drop in value. The ABCP market rapidly 
diminished, with ABCP falling by $190 billion in August 2007 and then by another $160 
billion within the same year. The crisis in the ABCP market had a profoundly negative effect 
on banks—directly because they invested in ABCP, and indirectly because they insured the 
ABCP by providing credit and liquidity enhancements to ABCP conduits37 sponsored by 
other banks. 
The majority of the guarantees were structured as liquidity enhancements38 that reduced 
their regulatory capital requirements to at most a tenth of the capital required to hold for on-
balance sheet assets. Thus banks were benefiting from regulatory capital arbitrage (Acharya 
et al., 2010).39 Also, the majority of conduits had guarantees strong enough to cover for all 
                                                
36 Total amount of outstanding commercial ABCP is available from Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/cp/about.htm. 
37 ABCP conduits are SPVs set up by banks that issue short-term paper to finance medium- and long-term 
asset claims. 
38 In the United States, bank regulators historically made a distinction between credit and liquidity 
guarantees. Credit guarantees were estimated to cover credit risk and, thus, were considered equivalent to on-
balance sheet financing. Assets covered by credit guarantees, therefore, had the same capital requirements as 
assets held on the balance sheet. Liquidity guarantees were considered to cover liquidity risk but no credit 
risk. Regulators required no capital for liquidity risk. Similarly, extendible notes guarantees and SIV 
guarantees were judged to be weaker forms of liquidity guarantees and did not require banks to hold any 
capital. This regulation generated a sharp discontinuity between the capital requirements for credit guarantees 
and other types of guarantees. Over time, banks developed guarantees that were classified as liquidity 
guarantees but effectively covered credit risk. Banks created these guarantees by defining asset default in 
such a way that ABCP almost always matured before assets were declared in default (Acharya et al., 2013). 
39 In contrast to credit enhancements that required full capital charges, essentially until September, 2004 
liquidity guarantees did not require any additional capital charges; then from 2004 until January 2010 they 
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of the possible losses, which made the entire setting up of ABCP conduits almost equivalent 
to on-balance sheet financing. 
I contribute to the growing empirical literature on the relationship between off-balance 
sheet activities, asymmetric information and systemic crisis. I examine whether exposure to 
ABCP conduits increased the information opacity of BHCs and whether exposure to ABCP 
and information opacity exerted any impact on the accumulation of systemic risk. It is 
natural to expect that a higher degree of uncertainty was costly for the banks, as it may have 
deterred investors from investing into these more opaque banks. I also stress that I examine 
opacity from the perspective of the investors who invested in BHCs, not the investors who 
invested directly into ABCP conduits (e.g. mutual funds). 
I stress that there are important differences between ABCP and term ABS. There is a 
common misconception that they are similar investments. In what follows I present some 
major differences between ABCP and ABS. 
In contrast to ABS, which are usually over one year, ABCP is generally issued with a 
maturity of under three months. Also, as noted in the BlackRock publication “Understanding 
ABCP”40 (2013: 4), with ABCP there is  
“no such concept as expected and legal final maturity as in the term ABS market. 
For example, if the loans in ABS structure are prepaying at a much slower rate 
than originally projected or default rates are higher than original expectation, 
then an investor may not get paid back on the expected maturity date but on the 
legal final maturity date which will be later than the expected maturity date. 
With ABCP there is only one maturity”.  
In addition, ABS usually has exposure to a single sector, e.g. mortgages, student loans, 
credit cards, while the majority of ABCP conduits have diversified portfolios of assets. In 
addition, ABCP conduits benefit from more levels of credit enhancement than ABS and, 
thus, they are considered to be a safer investment. 
This study is timely, given the scale of the ABCP market and the government bailouts 
that followed the eruption in this relatively “safe market”. I also contribute to the discussion 
                                                
had a 10 percent conversion factor, and only after 2010 was this loophole eliminated. The banks providing 
the liquidity guarantees were effectively taking the risk on their balance sheets like the providers of the credit 
enhancements because investors in the short-term ABCP would stop rolling over the debt if the assets were 
not performing satisfactorily (Acharya et al., 2013). 
40 https://www.blackrock.com/cash/literature/whitepaper/understanding-abcp-a-primer.pdf. 
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of the increased disclosure of the banks’ balance sheets. Transparency is important because 
it allows equity and debt holders to monitor the banks and share this function with regulators. 
Different market participants may have different expectations about the probability of a 
change in ABCP market conditions and/or a different assessment of issuers’ dependence on 
securitization funds, which may be reflected in the bid–ask spread, commonly used in the 
literature as a measure of information asymmetry (e.g., Mohd, 2005; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000). 
Existing studies have focused mainly on the benefits that may arise as banks engage in 
the ABCP market. For example, Elyasiani and Wang (2008) note that banks may benefit 
from the diversification by engaging in off-balance sheet activities, such as securitization 
and buying and selling of credit protection, or they might take advantage of the regulatory 
capital arbitrage as in Acharya et al. (2010). In contrast, I focus mainly on the costs to the 
banks stemming from such activities. 
To my knowledge, this is one of the first studies to examine the costs of exposure to 
ABCP from the perspective of the investors in BHCs, which provided guarantees to ABCP 
conduits. Also, to the best of my knowledge, no previous study has looked at the effect of 
guarantees to ABCP on systemic risk. Thus, I also examine whether guarantees to ABCP 
increased systemic risk. 
A recent format change in quarterly Reports of Income filed with regulators by banks, 
enables me to study this issue in more detail. The dataset that I use is a significant departure 
from the previous studies in that I can directly evaluate the effect of the credit and liquidity 
enhancements to own and third-party ABCP conduits on banks’ opacity, as a result of novel 
data available at the FED regulatory database. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I present the institutional background to 
the ABCP market. Second, I analyze the data, discuss the methodology and my chosen 
specification and empirical strategy. In the third section, I present the results of the 
regressions and discuss their implications. The fourth section caters to robustness exercises. 
The fifth section summarizes and concludes. 
3.2! Overview 
3.2.1! Institutional background of ABCP 
ABCP is a form of senior secured, short-term borrowing, in contrast to corporate 
commercial paper (CP), which is a senior unsecured short-term debt. 
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The first ABCP conduits appeared in the mid-1980s. The ABCP conduit is an SPV 
typically structured as a limited purpose company, which funds a portfolio of assets using a 
standard securitization framework where the financing of assets is accomplished through the 
issuance of ABCP as their primary liability. ABCP is a security with a term to maturity 
usually no longer than 270 days in the U.S. However, often ABCP is issued for under 30 
days. In contrast to term securitizations, which have a fixed life span, ABCP programs are 
intended to be essentially perpetual. Most maturing ABCP is repaid with the proceeds of a 
newly issued ABCP and, thus, the entire process is “rolling”. ABCP provides corporations 
with alternatives to direct debt issuance and term ABS. Although the majority of ABCP 
conduits are “plain vanilla”, some ABCP conduits have expanded to include extendible CP 
(usually single-seller programs that finance credit card receivables or mortgages), medium-
term notes, and in some cases, subordinated debt to provide credit enhancement (Moody’s, 
2003). 
Many of the assets included in an ABCP program do not have rating agencies’ explicit 
ratings. For instance, Moody’s Prime 1 rating on the ABCP program refers only to the CP 
notes issued by the ABCP program. Hence, Prime 1 rating applies only to the conduit as a 
whole, and not to any particular asset. Generally, ABCP programs are subject to two major 
risks: credit risk, i.e. the likelihood that the receivable will incur losses and thus they will 
not be fully collectible, and liquidity risk, i.e. that collections on receivables will not be 
obtained in time). The rating of a partially41 supported ABCP program depends on the 
performance of the program’s assets, on the amount of credit support and the credit strength 
of the counterparties that provide different support facilities. In contrast to the partially 
supported programs, the rating of the fully supported ABCP program is directly linked to 
the credit strength of the guarantor. That is, the program is fully supported when ABCP 
investors are immune to asset deterioration because they fully rely on the third-party 
guarantees to ensure that repayment of ABCP occurs on time. Full support for the transaction 
can be provided, for example, by a surety bond from a monoline insurance company, an 
irrevocable letter of credit from the sponsoring bank or a “wrap” (i.e. full guarantee 
                                                
41 The risk-based capital standard that came into force around 1988 imposed a significant cost on the support 
providers (typically banks). Banks were required to hold regulatory capital for the amount of support that 
they extended. In fully supported ABCP programs, for example, banks had to hold regulatory capital for the 
entire face amount of ABCP outstanding because the credit support was perceived as a “direct credit 
substitute” and not just a loan commitment. Thus, banks decided to provide partial support rather than full 
support to avoid excessive regulatory charges. Thereby, banks could benefit from more favorable risk-based 
capital requirements and keep offering funding at attractive rates for sellers. This is primarily why partially 
supported ABCP programs became more popular than fully supported ones. 
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repayment by a highly rated party). These programs will also have a program wide credit 
enhancement of around 5 to 10 percent of the purchase commitment. Most transactions will 
also have liquidity support, provided by syndicates, i.e. several banks equal to maximum 
purchase commitment plus some amount to cover for the interest rate on ABCP. A liquidity 
facility can also be provided by one institution, but be guaranteed by another. For example, 
in variable rate demand obligations there may be a standby bond purchase agreement, which 
is a liquidity facility that is provided by the commercial bank and which is also wrapped by 
the monoline insurance company (Moody’s, 2003). 
As for the types of ABCP conduits, there are five principal types of ABCP programmes: 
general purpose multi-seller; single-seller; securities arbitrage; structured investment vehicle 
(hereafter SIV) and some hybrid programs which combine features of several ABCP 
programs (Covitz et al., 2009).  The main difference between ABCP conduits lies in the type 
of assets held, sponsors and services provided by the sponsor.  
The most traditional ABCP program is a multi-seller program, in which a bankruptcy-
remote conduit purchases receivables and loans from multiple firms. The sponsor is typically 
a financial institution that provides the conduit with a committed liquidity line, administers 
its daily operations, and sometimes also provides the conduit with credit enhancement 
through a letter of credit that absorbs credit losses. At the end of July 2007, there were 98 
active multi-seller conduits in the US (Covitz et al., 2009).  
Single-seller conduits are typically used by companies or banks to securitize their own 
balance sheet, e.g., a portfolio of credit cards or auto loans, whereas large banks employ 
multi-seller programs to securitize the assets of various of their customers, as in the case of 
trade receivables (Durrer, 1997).  The majority of single-seller conduits mainly fund auto 
loans, credit-card receivables, mortgages, mortgage-backed securities. Many of these single-
seller conduits issued extendible paper, which allow the issuer the option to extend the 
maturity of its paper and pay a pre-specified penalty rate to the investor. One of the reasons 
why a bank might decide to establish its own ABCP program instead of participating in a 
multi-seller programme is because it may find various cost advantages or more advantageous 
accounting or tax treatment from setting up single-seller conduits (Moody’s, 2003). Before 
the crisis erupted in August 2007, there were 51 active single-seller programs.  
Securities arbitrage programmes, involve banks sponsoring conduits to finance long-term 
assets through a special purpose entity that has a lower regulatory capital charge than if the 
assets were held on balance sheet. Securities arbitrage programmes have explicit agreements 
with their sponsoring banks for committed back-stop liquidity lines covering all their short-
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term liabilities. Securities arbitrage programmes allowed banks to exploit regulatory capital 
arbitrage opportunities. In July 2007, there were 35 active securities arbitrage programmes 
(Covitz et al., 2009). 
Similarly to securities arbitrage programmes, SIVs fund highly-rated securities. But 
unlike the securities arbitrage programs, which had full liquidity lines, SIVs relied on 
dynamic liquidity management strategies, which involved liquidating assets to pay investors 
in the event of distress. In July, 2007 there were 35 SIVs in operation, which ceased to exist 
after the crisis erupted in August, 2007 (Covitz et al., 2009). 
Hybrid programmes combine features of securities arbitrage and multi-seller programs. 
In July 2007, there were 18 active hybrid programmes. All the remaining programmes were 
not classified (Covitz et al., 2009).  
The largest ABCP programs are usually partially supported bank sponsored multi-seller 
programs. Each transaction in the multi-seller conduit is typically structured similar to a term 
securitization or a secure loan and is collateralized by a pool of assets. In addition, unlike 
longer-term structured credit, ABCP pools are usually not tranched, thus the debt is repaid 
proportionally to all investors.42 
   Specific regulations also apply to entities who can invest in ABCP. “Qualified buyers”43 
are usually money market funds, who are the largest single class of investors in ABCP, 
investment funds, corporations and sophisticated and wealthy individuals. Typically, the 
highest ratings from credit ratings agencies ensure that some financial institutions, for 
example, money market funds, are legally allowed to invest in ABCP (Kasperczyk and 
Schnabl, 2009). 
Registration and disclosure rules mean that the ABCP market is now very competitive in 
relation to other money market instruments, providing a high-quality credit profile and 
exemption from registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC). 
Thus, because of the structure of ABCP programmes, the conduits are not required to be 
registered under the Company Act, nor are the CP notes obliged to be registered under the 
Securities Act of 1933. This allows for avoiding costly and time-consuming registration. As 
for the disclosure rules, ABCP programs are structured to satisfy the disclosure of Rule 2a-
7, which states that conduits must disclose any asset that comprises 10 percent or more of 
                                                
42 “Report to the Congress on Risk Retention”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010. 
43 “Qualified purchasers” as defined in Section 3(c)7 of the Investment Company Act and “ Qualified 
Institutional Buyers” as in Rule 144a under the Securities Act. 
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the value of total investments made by the conduit. Since ABCP typically prefers not to 
disclose the names of the sellers of the assets funded by the program, they diversify their 
assets to satisfy that 10 percent assets ratio and to meet Rule 2a-7. Hence, the administrator 
of the conduit discloses all the information (e.g. asset type, funding amount, amount of the 
credit enhancement, performance of each deal, etc.) but not the name of the seller. This is 
done partly because, in contrast to the corporate CP, ABCP investors are not directly exposed 
to the seller’s credit risk, therefore there is no need for them to know the seller. 
ABCP program sponsors, while relatively few in number, make up a significant part of 
the banking sector. They are usually larger than ABCP non-sponsoring banks, which adds 
to their importance in the financial sector and also makes them SIFIs.44 
As of 30th September 2001, there were approximately 280 active ABCP conduits, with 
more than $691 billion in outstanding commercial paper. Before the crisis, more expensive 
conduits usually issued paper at 5–10 basis points below LIBOR, the cheaper programs at 
5–10 basis points over LIBOR. By July 2007, ABCP was the largest money market 
instrument in the United States with $1.3 trillion outstanding. However, following concerns 
regarding asset value beginning in August 2007, money market funds withdrew from the 
market and the value of outstanding paper collapsed to $833 billion in December 2007 (Irani, 
2011). After the initial shock, off-balance sheet conduit assets and liabilities became de facto 
on-balance sheet. Moreover, the market liquidity of asset- and mortgage-backed securities 
dried up, as banks were no longer able to securitize these loans and investors were unwilling 
to purchase them directly (Cornett et al., 2011; Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov., 2014). 
When the crisis began, the interest rate spread of overnight ABCP over the Fed rate rose 
from 10 basis points to 150 basis points within one day. 
Investors in ABCP conduits could not evaluate the risk correctly; even more so the 
investors in BHCs, who were even less likely to take into account the fact that their BHCs 
were exposed to these risks by providing guarantees to the third-party ABCP conduits. 
Explicit guarantees, coupled with implicit support that many banks usually extended to 
ABCP conduits for the reasons such as “moral” standing or protection of their reputation, 
made it difficult to evaluate the riskiness of their BHCs. 
                                                
44 To provide an example of a particular conduit, as of January 1, 2007, Grampian Funding was the largest 
conduit rated by Moody's. The conduit had $37.9 billion of ABCP outstanding. It was set up by the British 
bank HBOS, rated AAA, and fully invested in U.S. assets with a 36 percent allocation to residential 
mortgages. HBOS provided a full liquidity guarantee for maturing paper, which was put to use on August 22, 
2007 (Irani, 2011). 
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The general run on all conduits brought down conduits (e.g. SIV conduits) that could 
have continued if investors had had a clear understanding of each conduit’s asset 
composition and quality. However, this was not possible due to the sophistication of this 
market and the general lack of transparency of the ABCP structures. For example, the 
Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) report notes that neither 
the brokers nor the chief compliance officers interviewed were familiar with the nature of 
the liquidity guarantees built into the non-bank ABCP. Furthermore, they did not know the 
difference between the global-style liquidity arrangements and so-called Canadian liquidity 
arrangements, for example. Instead, they just relied on credit ratings to assure them that the 
products were safe to sell. However, asset holdings of ABCP conduits, like those of the 
banks, are not transparent. While the vast majority of ABCP programs have credit ratings 
from the major rating agencies, credit support mechanisms vary and the specific assets held 
in the programs are not widely known. For example, some ABCP programs viewed their 
holdings to be “proprietary” investment strategies and deliberately did not disclose. Thus, 
random events or concerns about an economic downturn can create uncertainty about asset 
values. This uncertainty is greater when less information is available about the assets. 
Overall, it is rational to assume that it was impossible for investors in banks to understand 
the risk to which banks were exposing themselves through extending guarantees to ABCP 
conduits. However, if they had realized these risks, investors would rather have invested in 
banks with little exposure to ABCP. 
As for the guarantees, they were a crucial factor that facilitated the rapid expansion of the 
market by injecting confidence into the assets for investors (e.g. Levitin and Wachter, 2011). 
Guarantees are structured to align the risk and control the excessive risk taking of the banks, 
a view consistent with the optimal allocation of control rights under asymmetric information 
(Acharya et al., 2010). This ensures that sponsors have incentives to screen the conduit’s 
asset purchases (Ramakrishan and Thakor, 1984; Calomiris and Mason, 2004). 
A wide body of empirical research supports the finding that markets function better under 
increased transparency (e.g. Goldstein et al., 2007). Thus, it is important to identify those 
activities, which significantly contribute to opacity in the banking sector, before a myriad of 
excessive disclosure regulations is produced. That is because increased disclosure may not 
always be beneficial and, in the presence of market failures, may bring instability or reduce 
market quality (Morris and Shin, 2007; Pagano and Volpin, 2010). 
Examining the motives for certain bank behaviors, and analyzing the consequences of 
exposure to the ABCP market, for example, is also of paramount importance to policymakers 
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in structuring new capital regulations. As noted in Acharya et al. (2010), conduits were a 
low-return strategy for banks and the benefits of setting up these conduits were not 
pronounced. For example, Deutsche Bank reports in its annual report in December 2007 that 
conduits generated fees of 6 million euros relative to a total commitment of 6.3 billion euros. 
Similarly, the Bank of New York Mellon reports in December 2006 revenues of $3 million 
relative to a commitment of $3.2 billion (Arteta et al., 2008), which seems surprising after 
one sees how keenly banks engaged in these activities. Assuming that conduits have no costs 
and revenues are equal to profits, banks earned about 10 basis points on conduit assets. Also, 
for some smaller banks the conduit activities were in fact large enough to wipe out the entire 
bank capital. For larger banks, conduit activities were small enough to withstand the losses 
on conduit assets, but these banks weakened as the financial crisis continued (Acharya et al., 
2013). Such small profits with high risks pose questions about the costs and benefits of 
exposure to ABCP. This is an important issue to examine because the issuance of ABCP is 
again on the rise. US ABCP outstanding stood at $226 billion through early December 2015, 
81% below the $1.2 trillion peak seen in July 2007 (Fitch Ratings, 2016). However, Fitch 
Ratings (2016) predict a robust demand for ABCP and notes that sponsors of the major 
ABCP programmes, i.e. multi-seller and single-seller ABCP conduits, remain active. 
3.2.2! Opacity 
Opacity can be defined as an ex ante ambiguity about the profit-and-loss probability 
density function so that ex post actual losses are likely to become subject to considerable 
conflict (Ansari, 2012). The opposite of opacity is “transparency”. A transparent investment 
is when the provider of the capital is well informed ex ante about the payoff distribution, 
and fully consents to bear the risks to which their capital is employed. This definition 
characterizes opacity largely in terms of ambiguity about the risk ex ante. 
In its report on “Enhancing Bank Transparency”, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (1998: 4) defines transparency as “public disclosure of reliable and timely 
information that enables users of that information to make an accurate assessment of a bank’s 
financial condition and performance, business activities, risk profile and risk management 
practices”. Thus, in the finance industry, opacity is more commonly understood as a lack of 
available credible information about the credit score of borrowers or about the assets traded 
in over-the-counter markets. This makes banks’ risk taking hard to monitor (Myers and 
Rajan, 1998; Morgan, 2002). In turn, Pagano and Volpin (2010) argue that regulation on 
transparency is necessary to make financial systems more efficient. They find that opacity 
is privately optimal. However, it is not socially optimal. They argue that more information 
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may enhance lending in the financial sector. Generally, information asymmetry is of 
particular interest to academics who study the banking sector, because this industry is unique 
in terms of opaqueness and is usually perceived as a black box (Morgan, 2002). 
There exists substantial evidence that suggests that banks' opacity contributes to financial 
crises by impairing the market's ability to discipline banks. Investors cannot price banks' 
default risk if they are unable to assess the quality of banks' assets. Banks will take excessive 
risks anticipating that they will not have to pay. Excessive risk taking ex ante magnifies the 
costs of bank opacity ex post. 
As for the link between opacity and guarantees to ABCP conduits, it is possible that credit 
guarantees were ignored not only by investors but also by bank managers who did not keep 
pace with financial engineering (Carletti and Allen, 2009; Acharya et al., 2013). In addition, 
it is worth noting that banks often provided non-contractual implicit recourse to ABCP 
conduits for reputational reasons. This made it difficult for investors to monitor their banks 
as they could not assess whether implicit recourse45 existed for some banks’ set up conduits. 
In other words, information users may find it difficult to determine the probability that a 
bank will for example offer implicit recourse. 
In this chapter information asymmetry is approximated by the BHC’s stock bid–ask 
spread, a standard proxy for asymmetric information used in Welker (1995), Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000), and Mohd (2005), and a variant of which is also used as a measure of 
illiquidity by Amihud and Mendelson (1989). 
The term "bid" refers to the highest price a buyer is willing to pay for a specified number 
of shares in a stock at any given time. The term "ask" refers to the lowest price at which a 
seller will sell the stock. The bid price will almost always be lower than the ask or “offer” 
price. The difference between the bid price and the ask price is called the “spread." In 
particular, I hypothesize that if outside investors find it difficult to assess the benefits and 
costs of their banks’ exposure to ABCP via guarantees, the bid–ask spread should increase.46  
Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is specified and examined in the 
following sections: 
                                                
45 Implicit recourse involves issuers transferring additional higher quality assets to the initial pool of the 
transferred assets to strengthen the quality of the collateral behind the asset-backed securities. The issuer may 
also agree to add cash or other credit enhancements to a deal to protect securitization investors from losses 
due to underperforming assets. 
46 My choice of proxy and prediction that higher opacity will be reflected in a higher bid–ask spread aligns 
well with Bagehot (1971). 
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H1: BHCs with higher exposure to ABCP conduits, have higher information opacity. 
If exposure to ABCP increases information opacity, it would imply that greater 
transparency and more stringent disclosure requirements could simultaneously reduce costs 
and perhaps help restore confidence in the banking industry. Certainly, the goal of achieving 
transparency has become more challenging in recent years as banks’ activities have become 
more complex and dynamic. 
Cheng et al. (2008) note that asset securitization is more complex compared to other 
financing techniques. Usually, firms rely on multiple SPVs and on specialists from several 
disparate areas such as accounting, bankruptcy law, commercial law, securities law, finance 
and tax to structure securitization transactions. Therefore, it is natural to predict that 
investors may find it difficult to completely understand the implications of securitizations or 
may find the costs of analyzing such transactions prohibitively high. Thus, it is likely that 
many investors cannot accurately assess the implication of asset securitizations. 
Furthermore, it is likely that the effect on opacity will vary depending on whether banks 
extended guarantees to their own sponsored conduits or to the third party conduits. Hence, I 
examine whether there would be differences in bid–ask spread if BHCs extended protection 
to their own set up ABCP conduits versus guarantees provided to the third-party ABCP 
conduits. 
Concludingly, studies on the relationship between stock market return expectations, 
investors’ risk aversion and investment decisions were conducted; however, to the best of 
my knowledge no studies examine these issues in relation to the ABCP market. 
3.2.3! ABCP exposure and volatility of returns 
The next part of my study is motivated by Acharya et al. (2013) who find that banks’ 
stock price deterioration at the start of the financial crisis was linked to their exposure to 
ABCP conduits. 
I conjecture that the provision of guarantees to ABCP conduits could be reflected in the 
volatility of the BHCs’ stock returns. I derive the following testable hypothesis: 
H2: Exposure to ABCP increases the volatility of BHCs’ returns. 
Apart from the previously mentioned increase in the spread, increase in the volatility of 
returns could have an additional cost for banks being exposed to ABCP. Increase in the 
volatility of returns might result from banks’ commitment to extend the support to ABCP 
conduits, which in turn could have caused fluctuations in the BHCs’ returns. Generally, it is 
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natural to expect that, if investors viewed the entire setting up of ABCP conduits and 
extending guarantees to them as a risky activity, they might be less willing to invest in those 
banks that are exposed to the ABCP market. Thus, the fact that BHCs extended protection, 
and thus in fact held all the risk on their balance sheets might have had a negative effect of 
credit or liquidity enhancements on BHCs’ stock returns and higher returns volatility had 
investors been aware of the risks to which their BHCs were exposed, and took those into 
account when buying shares in these BHCs. However, I should not observe any effect in the 
instances such as: if investors were not aware of the risk posed; they believed that banks 
were in good enough condition to extend protection if called upon; or investors anticipated 
that their banks would receive financial help from the government if their financial position 
was not sound enough to extend the protection.47 
In general, from a macroeconomic point of view, volatility is important because of the 
growth benefits conferred by stability (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Aghion et al., 2005). From 
the viewpoint of the firms, volatility is important, because stable firms, e.g. firms firms with 
smooth cash flows, face lower expected costs from financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 
1985). Also, financial policies are more effective for solving agency problems in stable firms 
(Stulz, 1990), and investors value firms with smooth cash flows at a premium (Rountree et 
al., 2008). 
My third hypothesis concerns the banks’ exposure to ABCP and their systemic risk. I 
elaborate more on financial stability analyzing how ABCP guarantees added to the systemic 
risk. 
3.2.4! Exposure to ABCP conduits, opacity and systemic risk 
Since the financial crisis there has been much discussion regarding guarantees to ABCP 
conduits making banks systemically more risky. Financial firms are systemically important, 
if the failure of the firm to meet its obligations to creditors and customers may have 
significant adverse consequences for the financial system and the broader economy. 
                                                
47 It may be the case however that ABCP did not add to any volatility because even if investors had not been 
ignorant but could have perfectly well observed whether and how much their banks provided those ABCP 
guarantees, they could have anticipated unconditional support from the government. This is aligns well with 
recent evidence. For example Acharya, Anginer and Warburton (2015) find that bondholders of major 
financial institutions have an expectation that the government will shield them from large financial losses 
and, as a result, they do not accurately price risk. An implicit government guarantee dulls market discipline 
by reducing investors’ incentives to monitor and price the risk taking of potential too-big-to-fail candidates. 
In summary, it is rational to expect that if guarantees did not affect returns volatility, it may be because 
investors were not aware of their BHCs’ activities or perhaps they were anticipating government intervention 
in case the ABCP market failed, inferred from the magnitude of the ABCP market. 
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A current challenge in this field of research is that there is no consensus on the definition 
of systemic risk, and thus the measures of systemic risk show a substantial heterogeneity. 
Prominent systemic risk measures are the marginal expected shortfall (MES) of Acharya et 
al. (2010), the systemic risk measure (hereafter SRISK) of Brownlees and Engle (2011). The 
aforementioned systemic risk measures have an exact economic interpretation. For example, 
MES corresponds to a firm’s expected equity loss when the market falls below a certain 
threshold over a given horizon, namely a 2 percent market drop over 1 day for the short-run 
MES, and a 40 percent market drop over six months for the long-run MES. The main idea 
is that the banks with the highest MES contribute to the market’s decline the most. Thus, 
these banks are the greatest drivers of systemic risk. In turn, the SRISK is a function of the 
level of leverage of the firm and MES, the tail expectation of the firm equity returns 
conditionally on a substantial loss in the market. While the leverage of a firm can be 
measured using balance sheet data, MES requires appropriate time-series methodology. 
Brownlees and Engle (2011) note that MES provides useful tools for monitoring systemic 
risk and, in retrospect, it captures several of the early signs of financial crisis. For instance, 
eight companies out of the SRISK top ten a year and a half before the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy turned out to be troubled institutions. 
On an ex post basis, if I observe a clear linkage, this may make the monitoring of the 
BHCs easier for investors in the future and reduce risk aversion of investors to ABCP paper 
(e.g. since MES and SRISK are freely available on a daily basis on the VLAB website48). It 
may also reduce the rationale for the government to bail out many of such programs on the 
grounds that information was freely available. Thus the argument that investors could not 
assess the risk would be less plausible. In addition, investigating the relationship between 
asymmetric information and systemic risk is crucially important per se, because as Goodhart 
(2010) notes, asymmetric information can contribute to the market freezing up. Leaving 
aside the discussion of systemic risk measures49, I examine whether exposure to ABCP 
conduits, and higher information opacity, increases systemic risk. The following hypothesis 
is specified based on the above discussion. 
                                                
48 VLAB (vlab.stern.nyu.edu or systemicriskranking.stern.nyu.edu) provides estimates of systemic risk for 
the largest U.S. financial firms for the most recent period. It is a leading website for systemic risk, updated 
weekly to allow regulators, practitioners and academics to see early warnings of system risks. However, it 
does not provide historical data. I am grateful to Rob Cappellini at the Volatility Institute, NYU, who 
provided me with the data. 
49 Appendix 2 presents the derivation of these measures and the graph that shows how banks’ MES varied 
from 2001 to 2013. 
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H3: Exposure to ABCP conduits and information opacity increases BHCs’ systemic risk. 
Bank businesses are complex by nature and are subject to relatively high information 
opaqueness and asymmetries between insiders and outside stakeholders (Morgan, 2002). 
This information problem about complex business operations and high agency costs (e.g., 
the relatively high cost of monitoring banks by outside stakeholders) tends to precipitate the 
contagion of bank distress risk and crash risk among banks or their transmission to other 
banks in the banking sector (Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988; Caballero and Simsek, 2009). 
Hence I expect a positive relation between ABCP and systemic risk. I also expect to observe 
that opacity increases systemic risk. 
3.3! Related Literature 
Literature on asymmetric information is abundant, but research on the opacity of BHCs 
and their exposure to ABCP conduits is limited. My analysis of the information on opacity 
is most closely related to Cheng et al. (2008). As for the relationship between stock returns 
volatility and ABCP guarantees, my study is in accordance with Acharya et al. (2010, 2013, 
2014). Section 3.5 where I analyze systemic risk is linked to Acharya and Richardson (2009), 
Acharya and Schnabl (2009), Shin (2009) and Acharya et al. (2013). 
3.3.1! Opacity 
Evidence as to whether securitization and exposure to conduits increase or decrease 
information opacity is not conclusive. 
Cheng et al. (2008) find that banks that engage in securitization transactions have higher 
information opacity compared to the banks that do not securitize. Cheng et al. (2008) report 
that there exist two main reasons why complex securitization transactions may lead to 
information opacity. The first reason is related to the difficulty of assessing whether the risks 
of the securitized assets have been transferred to outside investors. For example, investors 
may find it difficult to assess to what extent retained interests leave the issuer more or less 
exposed to risk. In addition, on-balance sheet retained interests do not fully capture issuers’ 
risk retention. For example, they do not capture risk retention through servicing rights or 
recourse obligations. It is difficult to assess to what extent securitizations expose a firm to 
changes in market conditions. All this uncertainty may lead to the increase in information 
asymmetry that would have further consequences for banks. For instance, information 
opacity may affect a firm’s cost of capital (Barry and Brown, 1985; Coles and Loewenstein, 
1988; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2006) and the efficiency of capital markets (Zhang, 
2006). 
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However, the opposite can also be true. By transforming illiquid assets into open market 
traded securities, securitization may increase the average transparency of what would 
otherwise be opaque assets (Foley et al., 1999; Schwarz, 2004). By issuing ABS based on 
pools of financial assets, firms are obliged to disclose more information about these assets 
(through registering ABS with the SEC) compared to what they would disclose if they kept 
the assets on the balance sheet (Cheng et al., 2008). Following securitization, periodic 
reports on the performance of the securitized asset pool are filed with the SEC. In addition, 
the statistical properties of the securitized financial assets are periodically published by 
credit rating agencies that assess the performance of ABS throughout their lives, and provide 
third-party monitoring of the securitized assets. 
My analysis is also related to the literature that examines whether banks are more opaque 
than other firms (Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al., 2004; Haggard and Howe, 2007). Although 
the evidence is generally mixed, the literature suggests that banks’ assets are more difficult 
for outside investors to value compared to the assets of non-bank firms. This can be seen as 
supportive of my hypothesis that investors may face significant challenges in evaluating 
banks’ exposure to the ABCP market. The literature (e.g. Berlin and Loeys, 1988; Diamond, 
1989, 1991; Morgan, 2002; Haggard and Howe, 2007) shows that although underlying 
financial assets used in securitization are subject to information opacity irrespective of 
whether they are securitized or kept on the balance sheet, bank assets are more difficult to 
value for outside investors than are the assets typically found on a non-financial firm’s 
balance sheet. My study also relates to studies on the source of the opacity. For example, 
Flannery et al. (2012) examine whether a bank’s portfolio composition affects its opacity. 
They document that various portfolios had divergent effects on bank opacity during the 
financial crisis; however, the portfolio source of opacity is difficult to pin down. 
The choice of the bid–ask spread as an empirical proxy for information asymmetry is 
motivated by prior literature (Welker, 1995; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Mohd, 2005). The 
bid–ask spread is a measure of information uncertainty and relates to the inability of market 
participants to agree upon a price for the bank’s equity offerings. When information 
asymmetry among market participants is high, informed traders can exploit their 
informational advantage at the expense of uninformed traders. The market makers realize 
that they are faced with an adverse selection problem and increase the bid–ask spread to 
protect themselves against expected losses from trading with more informed investors. This 
argument suggests a positive association between the degree of information asymmetry and 
bid–ask spreads and justifies the use of spreads as a proxy for information asymmetry. The 
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relative bid–ask spread that measures information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed traders was first discussed by Bagehot (1971). Bagehot’s intuition was 
subsequently modeled by Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle 
(1985). Typically, bid–ask spread is defined as the quarterly average of the monthly 
differences between the closing ask and closing bid quotes, scaled by the average of the ask 
and the bid, and is expressed in percentage terms. However, several variants of the spread 
may be encountered in the literature, but the conceptual differences are minor (Flannery et 
al., 2013). 
I also contribute to literature that examines the optimal levels of banks’ opacity. For 
instance, Thakor (2015) documents that although the opacity of bank balance sheets was 
considered as a contributor to the liquidity shortages during the 2007–2009 crisis, it has been 
suggested theoretically that banks are optimally opaque because this makes the claims of 
risk-averse depositors information-insensitive, thereby facilitating risk sharing. In turn, 
Dang et al. (2014) note that bank opacity is an optimal response to demand depositors’ need 
for secrecy. The bank uses early depositors’ money to invest in the borrower’s project, but 
in exchange promises not to divulge information about the borrower so as to facilitate ex 
ante efficient risk sharing and information-insensitive trade between early and late 
depositors. Thus, bank opacity is designed to provide efficient risk sharing to risk-averse 
depositors. My study is also related partly to Bushman et al. (2004) who note that reduced 
reporting transparency can hinder the efforts of investors to understand firm operations and 
value. 
My study is also related to prior literature, which shows that information opacity affects 
a firm’s cost of capital (Barry and Brown, 1985; Coles and Loewenstein, 1988; Lambert et 
al., 2006) and the efficiency of capital markets (Zhang, 2006). 
Furthermore, my study also relates to Acharya et al. (2010) who note that banks with 
more exposure to ABCP were more likely to have a higher probability of default. They also 
perform an event study to look at how the cumulative returns were affected by the banks’ 
exposure to conduits between the 7th and 10th August, 2007. They find that returns of the 
banks with higher conduit exposure were negatively more affected by the crisis as compared 
to banks with lower exposure to the conduits. In particular, Acharya et al. (2010) show that 
in the pre-crisis period there is no relationship between exposure to ABCP and stock returns. 
However, around the beginning of the financial crisis, i.e. August 9, 2007, commercial banks 
with higher exposure to ABCP conduits had a larger decline in stock returns. They also note 
that credit guarantees directly affect the ability of conduits to issue ABCP after the financial 
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crisis, i.e. conduits which had weaker guarantees, i.e. where the measure of the strength of 
the guarantee is the riskiness of the sponsor as measured by the sponsor credit default swaps 
(hereafter CDS) spreads saw diminished ability to issue ABCP. As far as investors are 
concerned, Acharya et.al (2010) examine whether investors in ABCP could actually rely on 
these guarantees once the crisis erupted. They find that all investors in conduits with strong 
guarantees suffered almost no losses and were repaid in full. That is, they document that 
ABCP conduits provided little risk transfer during the run and that losses from conduits 
remained with banks instead of outside investors, i.e. banks with more exposure to ABCP 
conduits had lower stock returns. 
In another study Acharya et al. (2013) analyze the incentives that prompted banks to 
engage in ABCP market. They find that U.S. commercial banks structured their support to 
ABCP conduits to reduce regulatory capital. 
My analysis also relates to Covitz et al. (2009) who analyze the runs in the U.S. ABCP 
market. Covitz et al. (2009) note that around one- third of all ABCP programs were in a run 
at the beginning of the crisis.50 They also show that runs on ABCP conduits were negatively 
related to the strength of their credit guarantees. 
My study also relates to Irani (2011) who studies how the funding shock associated with 
the collapse of the ABCP market was transmitted by commercial banks to the market for 
corporate liquidity. He uses the variation in the financial condition resulting from the 
differential exposure of banks to the mid-2007 collapse of the ABCP market to assess the 
impact on liquidity provision to U.S. non-financial corporations via syndicated lines of 
credit. Irani (2011) finds that high-quality borrowers were more likely to exit relationships 
with the banks exposed to ABCP during the ABCP crisis. 
This study also relates partly to the literature that examines business diversification and 
discount in value (Laeven and Levine, 2007). It has been documented that diversification is 
accompanied by an increase in information asymmetry, which in turn may result in 
“information discount”. In the context of ABCP, setting up ABCP conduits allowed banks 
greater diversification. However, some empirical studies note that stockholders do not seem 
to appreciate BHCs’ pursuit of non-interest income activities. In particular, if an information 
                                                
50 Covitz et al. (2009) document that runs in the ABCP market were mostly fundamental, however, they also 
provide some evidence for the fact that runs were caused by the investor’s panic (non-fundamentals-driven). 
This panic driven ABCP run is similar to the bank run where investors withdraw their funds from a 
potentially insolvent bank. Maturity of assets in ABCP conduits takes longer than the liabilities, which 
positively impacts the possibility of the runs in the ABCP market. 
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asymmetry problem worsens along with the firm’s business diversification resulting in a 
highly opaque banking sector and an erosion of trust in the financial sector as a whole, 
investors may simply value the firm at a discount because of the information disadvantage 
compared to investing in focused firms. 
My study also relates to Kisin and Manela (2014) who estimate the shadow cost of bank 
capital requirements by exploiting the loophole in the regulatory requirements when banks 
could face lower regulatory charges by providing liquidity guarantees to ABCP conduits as 
opposed to providing credit enhancements. They estimate that a ten percentage point 
increase in capital requirements (Tier 1 capital ratio) would cost $2.2 billion a year for all 
banks that exploited the loophole combined, and $3.7 billion for all U.S. banks. The average 
cost per individual bank is $143 million, or 4 percent of annual profits. They estimate that 
lending interest rates would increase by 3 basis points and quantities would decrease by 1.5 
percent. 
Section 3.5 of my study, in which I examine systemic risk relates to Yorulmazer (2013), 
who analyzes the use of CDS for regulatory capital relief and their effects on systemic risk. 
Yorulmazer (2013) shows that when a bank acquires a CDS contract, it is able to hold less 
capital against risky investments. This allows the freeing up of regulatory capital and allows 
a bank to expand its balance sheet. The author notes that when the failure of the risky project 
and the insurer are correlated the probability of double default increases, i.e. the likelihood 
of the credit risk and the counterparty risk materializing at the same time is higher, so that 
the CDS provides only partial insurance. In the same fashion, motivated by the link between 
CDS and systemic risk, I study guarantees to ABCP conduits and systemic risk because 
commitment to provide guarantees to ABCP are likely to affect the MES of the BHC. 
3.3.2! Systemic risk 
There is no widespread agreement on the definition of systemic risk. The measures of 
systemic risk have a relatively high degree of heterogeneity.51 
Two standard measures of risk used in pre-crisis financial literature is the value at risk 
(hereafter VaR) and the expected shortfall (hereafter ES) which focus on the risk of an 
individual financial firm in isolation. Both VaR and ES measure the potential loss incurred 
by the firm as a whole in an extreme event. Specifically, the VaR is the maximum amount 
                                                
51 Bisias et al. (2012) provides a comprehensive a survey of 31 measures of systemic risk in the economic 
and finance literature. 
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that the bank loses with confidence 1 − α, that is, Pr (R< − VaRα) = α, where R stands for 
returns and the parameter α is typically taken to be 1 percent or 5 percent. Recent literature 
has noted many limitations of the VaR measure (Brunnermeier et al., 2009), especially 
during the recent financial turmoil because it failed to identify possible “tail” losses in the 
senior tranches (rated AAA). VaR models assume that the asset returns follow a normal 
distribution and disregard the fat-tailed properties of actual returns, underestimating the 
likelihood of extreme price movements. In other words, VaR only measures the distribution 
quantile and disregards extreme loss beyond the VaR level. This means it fails to take into 
account the risk referred to as “tail risk”. To alleviate the problems inherent in VaR, Artzner 
et al. (1999) propose the use of ES. ES is the expected loss conditional on the loss being 
greater than the VaR. The ES is a more robust measure of a bank’s individual risk than VaR. 
Three prominent examples of systemic risk measures, developed post-crisis, are the MES 
of Acharya et al. (2010), the SRISK of Brownlees and Engle (2011) and Acharya et al. 
(2012), and the Delta Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) of Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011).52 Different risk measures led to identifying different SIFIs. 53 
In my study, I use SRISK and MES, which capture in a single measure many of the 
characteristics considered important for systemic risk such as size, leverage and 
interconnectedness (Acharya et al., 2010). The derivation of these measures is as follows. 
The MES can be viewed as a natural extension of the concept of marginal VaR proposed 
by Jorion (2007). It measures the increase in the risk of the system (measured by the ES) 
induced by a marginal increase in the weight of firm i in the system. The higher the firm’s 
                                                
52 These three systemic risk measures have been favoured in the latest empirical studies because have more 
explanatory power than sophisticated ones and also because they are easier to grasp and explain (Benoit et 
al., 2012). First, the MES corresponds to a firm’s expected equity loss when market falls below a certain 
threshold over a given horizon, namely a 2 percent market drop over 1 day for the short-run MES (hereafter 
SRMES), and a 40 percent market drop over six months for the long-run MES (hereafter LRMES). The basic 
idea is that the banks with the highest MES contribute the most to market declines; thus, these banks are the 
greatest drivers of systemic risk. Second, the SRISK measures the expected capital shortfall of an institution 
conditional on a crisis occurring. The intuition is that the firm’s with the largest capital shortfall will 
contribute the most to a crisis and therefore should be considered as the most systemically risky. Third, the 
CoVaR corresponds to the VaR of the financial system conditionally on a specific event affecting a given 
firm. The contribution of a firm’s to systemic risk (CoVaR) is the difference between its CoVaR when the 
firm’s is, or is not, in financial distress. 
53 Systemic risk measures calculation is the initiative undertake by the NYU Stern V-Lab. A model of this 
form is implemented based on publicly available data in order to determine which institutions are 
systemically risky, what the cost of a bailout would be, and how this leads naturally to a regulatory strategy. 
The results of this analysis are updated weekly and posted at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk) for 
approximately 100 U.S. financial firms and for 1200 global financial firms. 
 76 
MES (in absolute value) the higher the individual contribution of the firm to the risk of the 
financial system. 
MES depends upon the volatility of a firm’s equity price, its correlation with the market 
return and the co-movement of the tails of the distributions. These in turn are estimated by 
asymmetric versions of GARCH models such as Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) 
and nonparametric tail estimators. The MES is then extrapolated to reflect a financial crisis 
that takes several months and involves significant market declines. Finally, these reductions 
in equity value will give rise to capital shortages for highly levered firms. The capital 
shortfall is computed assuming a standard prudential capital buffer. 
In turn, the SRISK measure proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2011) and Acharya et al. 
(2012) extends the MES. The SRISK corresponds to the expected capital shortfall of a given 
financial institution, conditional on a crisis affecting the whole financial system. In this 
perspective, the firms with the largest capital shortfall are assumed to be the greatest 
contributors to the crisis and are the institutions considered to be most systemically risky. 
Appendix 2 presents a formal definition of these systemic risk measures. 
3.4! Data 
Data come from several sources. The core sample is a panel of all publicly traded U.S. 
BHCs that report on form FR-9YC, which is filed quarterly on a consolidated basis by all 
U.S. BHCs with over $150 million in assets ($500 million after 2006) and is retrieved from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago54 via the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). It 
covers the period from 2001:Q2–2013:Q1. In March 2006, the minimum reporting size for 
the BHCs was raised from $150 million to $500 million. This significantly skews the sample. 
To overcome this problem, I delete all the observations that do not reach the minimum 
reporting threshold over the sample period. I do this in order to make sure that banks which 
began reporting prior to 2006, continue reporting after the threshold was raised from $150 
million to $500 million in 2006. I adjust the threshold of $500 million for price level per 
quarter with base March, 2006. This method of deleting the observations ensures that they 
are not deleted randomly, but helps to preserve all the observations of the BHCs that once 
                                                
54 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company Data is available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_reports/bhc_data.cfm. 
Also, using the Fed’s BHCs’ data helps to identify more matches with CRSP since market data come from 
listed BHCs, rather than their (unlisted) subsidiaries. In addition, decisions regarding investment and risk-
taking behavior are usually made on an aggregate basis, thus BHC data are a more accurate representation of 
the big financial institutions (Casu et al., 2011). 
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started reporting and continue to do so even after a temporary drop in their total assets. This 
procedure drops around 50 observations per quarter from 2001 to 2006.  
Subsequently, I obtain the BHC market data from the University of Chicago’s CRSP 
database, which I access through WRDS. CRSP holds stock price related data for publicly 
traded companies. I retrieve quarterly data on the publicly traded BHCs that operated in the 
U.S. during the period 2001:Q2–2013:Q1. Then, I link two data sources by CRSP—
permanent company number (permco), FRB (Federal Reserve Board) entity code—and the 
institution name from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY)’s research 
department.55 I identify BHCs that appeared both in the BHC regulatory database and in 
CRSP, which yields 769 matches.  Subsequently, I compile the final dataset. I eliminate 
firms with insufficient trades to permit reliable estimates of the firm’s market microstructure 
properties. In particular, I omit any BHC quarter for which the stock had fewer than 100 
trades, the average quoted spread exceeded 10 percent of the share price, or the average share 
price was less than $2. This procedure deletes approximately 20 observations per quarter. I 
also omit any firm’s quarter in which the stock had a split or paid a stock dividend greater 
than 10 percent, because research suggests there are significant microstructure changes 
following a split (e.g. Desai et al., 1998). Following Baele et al. (2011), observations from 
banks with no trading activity for more than 20 percent of the trading days are excluded from 
the sample to reduce noise in the data. Infrequent trading makes price changes excessively 
volatile. Illiquid stocks have larger spreads, and small changes in demand can have a 
substantial impact on price, further distorting real price discovery. I also manually deleted 
BHCs that had the same data for all quarters but differed in the names in the Fed database, 
while they had the same PERMCO or CUSIP codes. I deleted 12 BHCs. In addition, I 
eliminate observations with missing, negative or zero values for total assets, and 
observations where the loans to assets ratio exceeds 100 percent. Observations that report 
zero equity capital are also removed. Approximately 50 observations are deleted per quarter. 
In addition, if the quoted spread is less than or equal to zero (i.e. the market is crossed or 
locked), the data point is excluded from the computation (403 observations are deleted). 
                                                
55 To obtain a CRSP identifier for each BHC in my sample I use the dataset prepared by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (hereafter FRBNY) that links the BHC, bank identifier (RSSDID), and the The Center for 
Research in Security Prices (hereafter CRSP) identifier (PERMCO). The CRSP-FRB link data is available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html. In the section, where I analyze 
exposure to ABCP, opacity and systemic risk, I supplement the dataset with matches that I collected 
manually. 
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Subsequently, I replaced missing values for the guarantees with zero (around 20 
observations per quarter). 
This dataset is a departure from the previous studies in that I directly evaluate the effect 
of the credit and liquidity enhancements to own and third-party ABCP conduits resulting 
from new data available on the FED regulatory database. I have a dataset for 677 BHCs, of 
which 37 BHCs are exposed to ABCP. 
In the third section of this essay, where I analyze the relationship between exposure to 
ABCP conduits, information opacity and systemic risk, I link the existing dataset with the 
systemic risk measures MES and SRISK. My choice of the BHCs’ sample is based on the 
sample of BHCs in Brownlees and Engle (2012), who limit their sample to top financial 
institutions that played the major role in the recent financial turmoil. My sample consists of 
37 BHCs, out of which 23 BHCs are exposed to ABCP via the guarantees that they extended 
to ABCP conduits. 
3.5 Methodology 
Following previous studies (e.g. Battaglia and Gallo, 2010), I use the fixed effect56 panel 
regressions model with multiple specifications clustered at the BHC level to estimate the 
effect of the test variables on the information asymmetry. 
The model specification is as follows: 
Info.Asymmi,t=βi*(ABCPguarantees)i,t +βj*( Controls)i,t + qi,t +vi,t + εi,t,                   (3.1) 
where the dependent variable is information asymmetry (Info.Asymm), 
ABCPguaranteesijt are guarantee types for individual banks, Controlsit is the vector of 
various bank characteristics, vi are bank fixed effects, qt are time dummies and εit is the bank 
specific error term.  
Information asymmetry is proxied by the bid–ask spread (BAS): !"#=|!$%−"&'|, where 
bid–ask spread is measured as the difference between the highest ending ask and the lowest 
bid. I alternate this measure and use both quoted spread, which is the difference between the 
best ask price and best bid price, as well as a relative quoted spread which is the quoted 
spread scaled by the bid–ask midpoint. Other measures include the effective spread, which 
                                                
56 To test whether there is any correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables the Hausman 
specification test is carried out upon running the fixed effects and random effects regression models (Baltagi, 
2008). The null hypothesis that random effects is the appropriated model is rejected.  Therefore, a fixed 
effect model is chosen to control for unobserved time-invariant bank-specific effects. By including sponsor 
fixed effects, I control for time invariant unobservable sponsor characteristics. 
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is twice the absolute value of the difference between the trade price and the prevailing bid–
ask midpoint, as well as the relative effective spread, which is the effective spread scaled by 
the quote midpoint. 
I follow Erel et al. (2012) who use guarantees to ABCP conduits as indicators as to 
whether some banks were exposed to ABCP markets.57 That is, following Erel et al. (2012), 
I use a dummy variable, named guarantor that is equal to 1 if bank is active in ABCP market, 
i.e. the maximum amount of its credit exposure arising from credit or liquidity enhancements 
provided to ABCP conduit structures is not zero in any quarter between 2001 and 2013. I 
also examine ABCP by using the absolute values of the guarantees. That is, the main 
independent variables are guarantees to ABCP (i.e. Credit Exposure own conduits and Credit 
Exposure other conduits to conduit structures in the form of standby letters of credit, 
subordinated securities: conduits sponsored by the bank, a bank affiliate or the bank's 
holding company and to conduits sponsored by other unrelated institutions. I also included 
Liquidity Exposure to own conduits and Liquidity Exposure to other conduits: liquidity 
provision to conduits sponsored by the bank, a bank affiliate or the bank's holding company 
and conduits sponsored by other unrelated institutions). This allows me to examine the 
differences between credit and liquidity guarantees, as well as to explore the differences 
between guarantees to conduits set up by BHCs themselves and to conduits set up by other 
BHCs. 
The specification utilizes control variables such as BHCs’ size, profitability, NPL, capital 
levels, following previous studies in this area. Controlling for size is important, for various 
reasons. For example, during 2013, the sample of stocks with market capitalization of less 
than $1 billion had much larger spreads than mid-cap stocks with market capitalizations 
ranging from $1 to $5 billion. In contrast, the smallest stocks have exceptionally large 
spreads. In addition, bank size can also relate to the information environment quality. Larger 
banks are usually more often followed by the analysts (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Lang 
and Lundholm, 1996) and they have a richer information environment. As a result, they have 
lower information asymmetry. Also, larger banks are likely to have a lower stock volatility 
than smaller banks as noted by Baumann and Nier (2004). I also include trading volume 
(Volume) among the control variables in the opacity regressions, because higher trading 
                                                
57 Item BHCKB806 reports the maximum contractual credit exposure remaining for conduits sponsored by 
the bank or bank affiliate, and BHCKB807 reports the same information for conduits sponsored by other 
institutions. BHCKB808 reports the unused facilities for liquidity protection for conduits sponsored by the 
bank or affiliate, and BHCKB809 reports unused liquidity facilities for conduits sponsored by other 
institutions. 
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volume is likely to be associated with higher liquidity and lower information asymmetry. As 
for NPL, I include these as a measure of credit risk (Casu et al., 2013), because NPL are also 
likely to increase information asymmetry. Including NPL is also important in the second 
regression where I examine the volatility of returns. An increase in asset risk is likely to raise 
stock price volatility. In some specifications I also use an FDIC Texas ratio as a proxy for 
the overall troubled loans of the bank which are banks’ non-performing assets (excluding 
government sponsored non-performing loans), divided by tangible common equity and loan 
loss reserves. I alternate control variable to observe whether this produces any changes in 
the main results. I also include the profitability measure (ROA), because more diversified 
banks (e.g. those that extend guarantees) are likely to be more profitable. In addition, I use 
a bank capital ratio, because capital is likely to affect information asymmetry, if for example 
better-capitalized banks are perceived as being more stable; and it is highly likely that their 
value will be less volatile. I also include stock return volatility because more volatile stocks 
are subject to more information asymmetry and disagreement among investors and analysts. 
Also, standard return volatility can be a proxy for idiosyncratic risk. 
As for the endogeneity issues in the opacity and exposure to ABCP regressions (even 
though it is unlikely that BHCs would be choosing whether to be exposed to ABCP based 
on their bid–ask spread levels), I still choose to follow Stiroh (2006), Affinito and Tagliaferri 
(2010) and Casu et al. (2011) and have the explanatory variables lagged one period to relax 
possible causality problems. 
In turn, I winsorize the independent and dependent variables at the 1 percent level to 
account for data errors and limit the effect of potential outliers. I also cluster error term at 
the BHC level to allow for correlation in the error terms within the BHCs. 
I also examine the differences between the effect of liquidity and credit enhancements on 
opacity. Although the liquidity and credit guarantees provided essentially the same 
protection (Acharya et al., 2013), ex ante they were not equivalent (the capital requirements 
for the credit enhancements were higher). If I do not observe any difference on the effect of 
information opacity between various types of the guarantees, this will add to my hypothesis 
that investors may have been ignorant. Also, if I observe differences in the effect of ABCP 
guarantees on the bid–ask spread, I would expect that the guarantees provided to the third 
parties may increase information opacity more than the guarantees to conduits set up by the 
same BHCs’ ABCP. Also, if there are significant differences between the impact on 
information opacity between credit and liquidity, enhancements would show whether 
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investors accounted for the possibility that their banks were exploiting the regulatory 
loophole before 2010. 
Subsequently, I split time periods into before and after the crisis to account for the 
difference between the pre-crisis and after the crisis period. If financial crisis made investors 
more concerned about the prospects of their banks, it might show up in a more significant 
coefficient of the ABCP guarantees on opacity. 
My dataset allows me to explore the link between exposure to ABCP, information opacity 
and BHCs’ returns volatility. I expect to observe that opacity is negatively correlated with 
returns and positively with increased returns volatility.58 Thus, I run fixed effect regressions 
with multiple specifications in the second part of the analysis, where the dependent variable 
is BHCs’ stock returns volatility (I calculate standard deviation on stock returns as a measure 
of return volatility, following Nijskens and Wagner, 2011). 
My basic specification is: 
Rit=α+βABCPGuaranteesijt+ƴXit+vi+qt +εit         (3.2) 
σit=α+βABCPGuaranteesijt+ƴXit+vt+qt+εit         (3.3) 
where Rit are stock returns, and σit is stock returns volatility, Guaranteesijt are guarantee 
types for individual banks, Xit is the vector of various bank characteristics, vit are bank fixed 
effects, qi,t are time dummies and εit is the bank specific error term. Stock returns volatility 
is calculated as the standard deviation of daily returns over the three-month period ending 
on the FR-9YC observation date.59 Bank stock returns are quarterly stock returns, calculated 
for each bank by adding daily returns. To eliminate possible disturbances caused by dividend 
payments, stock splits and other capital actions, I use total return indices for individual 
stocks. 
Subsequently, using the second dataset I examine whether exposure to ABCP had any 
effect on systemic risk: 
MESit=α+βGuaranteesijt+ƴXit+vi+qt+εit                                       (3.4) 
                                                
58 Off-balance-sheet activities triggered a substantial increase in the volatility of banks' net operating revenue 
growth (Acharya et al., 2002; Stiroh, 2004, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Calmès and Liu, 2009; Calmès 
and Théoret, 2009; De Jonghe, 2009). 
59 Hansel and Krahnen (2007), Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) and Uhde and Michalak (2010) proxy market risk 
with equity betas. Baele et al. (2011) employ both, and Stiroh (2006) utilizes only volatility. Whereas betas 
measure the stock’s exposure to the market’s volatility, stock volatility measures total bank risk as observed 
by the market. This motivates my choice for equity volatility as the superior risk measure (Stiroh, 2006). 
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SRISKit=α+βGuaranteesijt+ƴXit+vi+qt+εit                                    (3.5) 
where MESit and SRISKit are measures of systemic risk, Guaranteesijt are guarantee types 
for individual banks, Xit is the vector of various bank characteristics and εit is the bank 
specific error term. I also include information opacity in some of the systemic risk 
regressions to observe whether information opacity has exerted any effect on the systemic 
risk. 
3.5! Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for main variables employed are reported in Table 3.1 and they are 
split into summary statistics for BHCs which are exposed to ABCP and which are not in 
Table 3.2. 
The distinguishing features between BHCs that extend these guarantees and those 
that do not are the following. In the first dataset, the average quarterly spread between 
lowest bid and highest ask is $3.6 for BHCs exposed to ABCP and $1.8 for BHCs not 
exposed to ABCP conduits. That is, univariate findings suggest that banks exposed to ABCP 
guarantees are significantly more opaque, which confirms my ex ante hypothesis. 
The main difference between BHCs exposed and those not exposed to ABCP is the size, 
which has frequently been mentioned in the literature related to the recent financial crisis. I 
observe that banks that extended protection during the sample period are about 48 times 
larger than banks that did not.60 However, not all of the biggest banks sponsored ABCP. For 
example, in my sample, neither SunTrust Banks, U.S. Bancorp, Washington Mutual Inc. or 
Wells Fargo & Company have sponsored any ABCP conduits. I also find that BHCs that 
extend ABCP guarantees are significantly more leveraged. They are also less capitalized. 
However, they are more liquid, have lower operating costs and are more profitable. In 
addition, they have lower credit risk. As for stock returns, ABCP guarantors have lower 
stock returns. I also observe that large banks tend to display higher levels of systemic risk 
(Figure 3.1 in Appendix 3). In addition, I find that the majority of BHCs that provided 
guarantees to conduits structured them in the form of the liquidity back-up lines to their own 
conduits with some systemically risky BHCs significantly providing more liquidity 
guarantees than credit enhancements. 
                                                
60 I include the variable size (millions) because the logarithmic transformation of the size variable distorts the 
real difference in asset value. 
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3.6! Results 
3.6.1! Opacity 
The relationship between the control variables and the bid–ask spread is in line with my 
expectations in Table 3.4. I find that both the credit exposure and liquidity provision to 
ABCP increase BHCs’ opacity. 
Also, I find that larger banks and banks with higher credit risk have higher bid–ask 
spreads. The finding that large banks are more opaque might be a little surprising because 
one would expect that large banks may be followed by more analysts or that large banks 
would disclose more information to the public. However, it seems that large banks were 
involved in many off-balance sheet operations that actually made those banks more difficult 
for investors to value. I find that large banks are also more opaque. Securitizing banks had a 
higher bid-ask spread, which is consistent with previous research that off-balance sheet 
activities are usually more opaque and are more difficult to monitor than on-balance sheet 
activities. Among other findings, I observe that banks with lower net operating revenue are 
also more opaque. 
As for other findings, I find that loans do not increase opacity. Although such a result 
may be surprising at first glance, it becomes more intuitive once one thinks about the nature 
of banks’ loans. Loans are in general homogeneous across banks and are relatively easy to 
monitor for outsiders, compared to off-balance sheet activities. In addition, I find that higher 
profitability and higher capital levels are associated with reduced opacity. 
Overall, it seems that smaller bid‒ask spreads can act as a positive signal because in my 
data sample it is the better capitalized and more profitable banks, and banks with lower credit 
risk which have lower level of information opacity. 
When I split the sample into two periods—before and after the date when crisis erupted—
I find that exposure to ABCP conduits increases information opacity only after the crisis and 
exerts no effect before the crisis (Table 3.5). That is, once investors became aware of the 
weakness of the ABCP market and lost confidence in it, they reacted swiftly to withhold 
further investments because they could not judge the risk of the conduits to which their banks 
were exposed through providing various guarantees. 
In addition, I observe that while liquidity guarantees have been increasing information 
opacity both before and after the crisis, the credit guarantees increased bid‒ask spreads only 
after the crisis erupted (Table 3.6). This is consistent with the hypothesis that investors were 
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not aware of all the risks to which banks were exposed when providing guarantees to ABCP 
conduits. That is, I find that after August 2007, both credit and liquidity guarantees to ABCP 
conduits had increased information opacity. 
Another interesting finding is that banks that were more leveraged before the crisis also 
had lower spreads, while after the crisis a higher leverage ratio was associated with higher 
information opacity. The same result holds for banks with higher credit risk. A larger number 
of non-performing loans only exerted a positive impact on the bid‒ask spread after August 
2007. 
3.6.2! Returns and volatility of returns 
I do not observe that exposure to ABCP had any impact on the returns in the first data 
sample. However, when I run the same regressions using the second dataset, I find that 
guarantor is negative and statistically significant in column 2 and 6 of Table 3.7. That is, I 
do observe that banks exposed to ABCP conduits had lower returns. Furthermore, the result 
that exposure to ABCP conduits reduced returns is persistent even after I control for 
information opacity. 
As for the volatility of returns, I observe that exposure to conduits had no significant 
effect on the volatility of returns in Table 3.8. I do observe however that liquidity guarantees 
exhibit a positive and statistically significant effect at 10 percent on the volatility of returns. 
Among other findings, I observe that larger banks had lower volatility of returns. As for 
credit risk, results show banks with higher credit risk also had a higher volatility of returns. 
In addition, consistent with my ex ante hypothesis, my results show that higher information 
opacity is associated with a higher volatility of returns. 
3.6.3! Systemic risk 
I do not find evidence that exposure to ABCP increases systemic risk as measured by 
MES or by SRISK (Tables 3.9 and 3.10).61 The variable guarantor has no effect on systemic 
risk. However, when I disaggregate guarantor into credit enhancements and liquidity 
provision to banks’ own and third parties’ conduits, I find that banks’ exposure through 
liquidity guarantees to BHCs’ own set up ABCP conduits increases MES, while liquidity 
guarantees to ABCP conduits set up by other banks decrease MES (Table 3.9 Column 3).  
                                                
61 Measures of systemic risk are in their embryonic stage. However, a mere look at the empirical papers 
reveals that researchers favor MES over SRISK. Thus, I present initial results using both MES and SRISK. 
However, later in the analysis, I use only MES as a measure of systemic risk. 
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The finding that the effect from liquidity provision to own versus liquidity provision to 
other conduits has the opposite sign is not very surprising because I expected to find 
significant differences between guarantees extended to own and third-party conduits based 
on the evidence in the existing literature. For example, Acharya et al. (2010) examine the 
differences between multi-seller conduits that invest primarily in their assets, originated by 
their own clients, or banks versus credit arbitrage conduits, which invest mainly in the assets 
securitized by the other banks and document that the crisis affected more severely conduits 
that bought other banks’ assets. However, what is puzzling is that guarantees to own conduits 
increase systemic risk even more. I cannot offer any economic rationale for this finding. 
Interestingly, when I include the bid–ask spread (i.e. Opacity) into the regression of MES 
on guarantees (Table 3.11 Column 3), the bid–ask spread or opacity is positive and 
statistically significant, whereas the magnitude of the coefficients on the guarantees 
decreased.  
This is intuitive as it shows that the bid–ask spread captures some of the uncertainty 
stemming from the guarantees. Banks with more opacity are more difficult to monitor and 
they might be tempted to take more risk. It is also possible that some banks may deliberately 
create opacity to disguise some of their excessive risk taking or their increased 
interconnectedness with other financial institutions. This result is well accorded with the 
following agent’s problem: opacity is valued by bank managers since it makes it more 
difficult to discipline staff and makes it more difficult to make their performance pay related. 
In addition, I observe that banks with higher credit risk also had higher systemic risk in 
contrast to more profitable banks. That is, my results show that higher profitability 
significantly reduces MES, consistent with my predictions. 
In turn, I find that larger banks have higher systemic risk, the results being statistically 
and economically significant. This aligns well with the most recent evidence that large 
financial institutions pose greatest risk for the finance industry. The size effect, however, is 
not robust across all my specifications. The effect of the size related variables may not be 
significant given that size is my primary criterion for sample selection in the second dataset; 
i.e. in my systemic risk dataset all the BHCs are large. 
The results also show that information opacity increased not only the volatility of returns 
(Table 3.8), but it also systemic risk (Table 3.11). Among other results in Table 3.11, for 
instance, I do not find that banks with a higher capital level ratio have lower MES. This 
would be intuitive to expect, as higher capital levels reduce system-wide fragility due to 
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capital acting as a potential buffer in absorbing liquidity, information and economic shocks 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Angiger, 2014). 
3.7! Robustness Tests 
I use other measures for the opacity, namely effective spread, quoted spread and the 
natural logarithm of the average bid–ask spread (Anderson et al., 2009), which are reported 
as Opacity 1, Opacity 2 and Opacity 3 respectively in the Table 3.12. My main results remain 
mostly unchanged. 
I also alternate other control variables. For example, instead of a size variable, I use the 
log of market value (the market capital is share price multiplied by the number of ordinary 
shares in an issue). 62  I also include liquidity in the explanatory variables, because the 
decreased liquidity of bank assets might increase banking instability and the externalities 
associated with banking failures as shown in Wagner (2007). Varying control variables has 
not resulted in any significant change in my main results. 
To further test the robustness of my empirical findings, I reran my analysis using a smaller 
sample of banks with non-zero guarantees (Table 3.14). I focus on this sub-sample, because 
this is a more homogenous sample that allows me to further investigate the effect of the 
magnitude of credit enhancements and liquidity provision on banks’ opacity, while holding 
the decision to be exposed to ABCP constant (as in Cheng et al., 2008).  
The main results discussed previously remain unchanged. Exposure to ABCP conduits 
significantly increases information opacity and decreases returns (Column 1 and 2 in Table 
3.14). However, it has no effect on returns volatility (Column 4 in Table 3.14). 
3.8! Conclusion 
Understanding the ABCP market is important to fully understand the recent financial 
crisis, because financial institutions, even with credible deposit insurance systems in place, 
are subject to runs via the ABCP programs (Gorton, 2007). The recent financial crisis was a 
great manifesto of how financial engineering made it virtually impossible to assess all off-
balance sheet risk to which BHCs were exposed. It also showed how government may be 
exposed to runs via off-balance sheet ABCP conduits because these conduits are supported 
by the banks that have access to the government safety net. 
                                                
62 This is a standard variable for the size of the firm in the finance (e.g. Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Rodriguez-
Moreno and Pena, 2012) and accounting literature (e.g. Bhen et al., 2008). 
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Research on the relationship between the complexity of economic transactions and 
investors’ understanding of these transactions remains limited. The evidence on costs (e.g. 
opacity, lower returns, higher returns volatility, increase in systemic risk) and benefits (e.g. 
capital arbitrage, diversification) from engaging in off-balance sheet activities is not 
conclusive. 
My study shows that, in the U.S. BHCs that were exposed to ABCP conduits, were 
perceived by investors as more opaque than BHCs that did not participate in the ABCP 
market. In particular, my results show that investors realized the risk of ABCP after the crisis 
started in August 2007, which before the crisis they had regarded as a very liquid and low 
risk security. This then prompted a general run on all conduits and may have brought down 
conduits that might have continued had investors had a clear understanding of each conduit’s 
asset composition and quality. This resulted from a lack of transparency in the ABCP 
structure that prevented investors from differentiating among ABCP conduits. 
Apart from the intensifying information asymmetry among market participants, exposure 
to ABCP conduits also decreased the returns of exposed BHCs. I also find that it was mainly 
exposure through liquidity provision that increased the volatility of returns. As for the 
systemic risk, I do not observe that exposure to ABCP through the guarantees would have 
significantly increased systemic risk. Information opacity, however, is positively correlated 
with systemic risk. This finding benefits practitioners and legislators who call for 
improvements in BHCs’ information transparency of BHCs. The increase in transparency is 
a desired policy for enhancing the efficiency of the financial system, i.e. eliminating 
unwanted by-products of financial innovation. In addition, I distinguish between the pre-
crisis and post-crisis period. I find that exposure to ABCP conduits had no effect on 
information opacity before August 2007, however, it had a statistically significant effect 
after the crisis, showing that investors could have been ignorant about the exposure of their 
banks before the crisis; but when the crisis erupted, they had become more aware about the 
riskiness that ABCP conduits posed to their BHCs which supported these ABCP programs, 
especially by providing liquidity lines. 
An important policy implication that stems from my results is that bank regulators and 
policymakers should develop risk reporting standards that contribute to a more transparent 
information environment for market participants. Banks’ trading activities need to be better 
regulated, banks’ risk taking requires additional screening and better disclosure. Greater 
information transparency is likely to have a positive impact on market discipline, which may 
further help to reduce bank failures. 
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Although I document that banks exposed to ABCP conduits were subject to greater 
information opacity, it is obvious that this is not a dichotomous yes-no issue. Securitization 
transactions can certainly vary significantly from each other with respect to the degree of 
subordination of ABS retained by an issuer on its balance sheet, the volume of ABS retained 
by an issuer, contractual recourse obligations (i.e., explicit recourse) and voluntary financial 
support of securitizations (i.e., implicit recourse). Also, my empirical analysis does not allow 
me to determine the exact source of information uncertainty. I cannot determine whether the 
increased opacity is the result of an increase in the inherent difficulty of assessing changes 
in banks’ risk caused by exposure to ABCP or is the result of insufficient disclosure about 
the impact of retained interests on banks’ financial risk. How market participants assess the 
implications of inherently complex economic transactions is a venue for future research. 
To conclude, I attempted to close the gap showing that the Modigliani-Miller style 
equivalence between BHCs exposed to ABCP and those not exposed to ABCP may hold: 
banks that set up ABCP conduits might have benefited from the regulatory capital relief 
associated with moving assets off balance sheet and from providing financing alternatives 
for their clients. However, setting up the ABCP conduits was also costly because the 
exposure to conduits increased information opacity, which in turn increased BHCs’ systemic 
risk. 
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Chapter 4! 
Breaking up Big Banks 
4.1! Introduction 
The evolution of U.S. financial legislation reflects a long-running public debate about the 
appropriate size and scope of banking firms. As noted in Barth et al. (2012), financial 
institutions have been continuously growing in size. The assets of the top 50 companies in 
2011 were roughly equal to total U.S. GDP, which represents about a four!fold increase in 
four decades. In the fourth quarter of 2011, the combined assets of the five biggest companies 
totaled about 60 percent of U.S. GDP. By contrast, in 1970 the corresponding figure was 
only 10 percent. For the top ten companies, the figures increased from 14 percent to 75 
percent.63 
The striking growth in size and importance of BHCs subsidiaries dates back almost 
entirely to the period after the passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act 1999, allowing the 
banks to engage in a broad range of financial activities in various states, including securities 
underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting, and merchant banking activities, all of 
which led to intensified competition in the banking industry. Banks have also faced increased 
competition in wholesale markets, due to increasingly deeper and more efficient financial 
markets (e.g., high-yield commercial debt, CP, equity finance) which have provided banks’ 
business customers with alternatives to traditional bank loans.  
Well-managed banks responded to these competitive pressures by becoming more cost 
efficient and more revenue-efficient, which aligns well with the classic economic theory that 
suggests that when banks grow in size, there might be a significant number of benefits 
accompanying such expansion, for example, increasing economies of scale and an increase 
in the banks’ bargaining power. This includes offering customers a wider range of new 
nontraditional fee-based products, selling increased amounts of existing fee-based products, 
pricing fee-based products more efficiently, improving the quality of fee-based products and 
services and minimizing costs by reducing the number of employees and introducing new 
technologies. 
                                                
63A historic perspective on "too big to fail" is provided in Barth et al. (2012)  
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There has been a secular trend in recent decades toward enlarging and contracting the 
allowable scope of BHC activities. In general, it seems that contraction in banking activities 
usually follows major crises, and expansion is favored in boom years. It is axiomatic to assert 
that the past couple of years after August 2007 were not the finest or easiest to the banks. 
For example, since the recent financial crisis there have been several proposals to impose 
caps on bank size and limit the scope of banking activities, such as the “Volcker rule” 
provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–
Frank Act) in the U.S. prohibiting BHCs from engaging in proprietary trading and limiting 
their investments in hedge funds, private equity and related vehicles. In particular, the recent 
financial crisis has brought forward concerns about banks that regulators deem “too big to 
fail” in the sense that their failure would pose serious systemic risks, which has prompted 
calls for regulatory limits on bank size (Reich, 2008; O’Driscoll, 2009). A Brussels proposal 
that attempts to break up big banks and hive off risky activities has recently been agreed by 
E.U. finance ministers (excluding the U.K.) as of June, 2015)). This has produced much 
discussion. 
Recent petitions to break up “too-big-to fail” banks and pass new laws similar to the last 
century’s Glass-Steagall Act have come in various shapes and flavors. 64  For example, 
Johnson and Kwak (2010: 214) argue that “no financial institution [s]hould be allowed to 
control or have an ownership interest in assets worth more than a fixed percentage of U.S. 
GDP” (they propose a 4 percent ownership ratio). Others suggest various alternatives 
including levies or progressively higher capital requirements on large banking firms to 
encourage them to shed assets. Big banks oppose efforts to break them up, reasoning that 
their larger size makes them more efficient. Also, the treatment of large banks as "too big to 
fail" could generate scale economies by lowering the risk premiums demanded by creditors 
of large banks, thereby giving them a funding advantage over smaller banks. 
The assessment of the extent of scale economies is important for a full analysis of the 
costs and benefits of any policy intervention to limit the size of banks. Policymakers should 
consider the loss of any scale benefits when determining the net benefit of limiting the size 
of banks. Although bankers often claim that banks can lower costs by expanding in size, 
                                                
64 For example, E. Warren’s calls on Congress to break up the big banks: “U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren on 
Wednesday called on lawmakers to break up big banks and change tax rules that benefit Wall Street. She said 
lawmakers should break big down and limit the U.S. Federal Reserve's ability to lend in a crisis so that big 
institutions cannot count on a bailout” (Reuters, April 15, 2015). 
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many policymakers and academics remain skeptical (e.g. Stern and Feldman, 2009; 
Greenspan, 2010; Haldane, 2010). 
A frequently mentioned rationale for splitting large banks is that larger banks can enjoy 
cheaper insurance premiums disconnected from their actual risk levels, and implicit 
government insurance, since government cannot allow huge banks to collapse. This means 
they can essentially gamble for resurrection and expect to be bailed out if things go wrong. 
That is, it is possible that operating costs are no lower in big banks, but simply that large 
banks benefit from implicit guarantees. However, it may be the case BHCs become more 
efficient as they grow in size and subsequently can reduce their operating costs which will 
have a positive effect on a wider society and bank fees decrease, consistent with the classic 
economic theory. In that case, government-mandated size limits are likely to be a deadweight 
loss and constitute an unnecessary or even unfair form of intervention in financial markets. 
In this chapter, I focus primarily on the costs which banks control internally. Thus, as far 
as banks’ operating costs are concerned, it is true that while banks cannot generally choose 
what regulations to comply with, as these are most often exogenous, they are free to choose 
their operating costs. I examine questions such as whether banks obtain more bargaining 
power as they grow in size and thereby can reduce their operating costs, or whether some 
costs increase proportionally with size or perhaps some costs grow more rapidly than the 
growth of banks’ assets. For example in Chapter 3, there exists some empirical evidence that 
size is positively correlated with opacity, and for that reason many of the banks’ costs might 
rise (e.g. audit, legal fees, FDIC premiums) as it is more difficult to evaluate banks’ exposure 
to various risks. On the other hand, postage and IT costs can decrease, as these may constitute 
monthly fixed costs which when spread over a larger sized entity will increase operating 
revenue or alternatively decrease efficiency ratios. This is important because banks typically 
pass on these costs to customers or shareholders. 
The recent financial crisis has not been solely an economic phenomenon, but a legal one 
as well. It has brought to light much of banks’ wrongdoing. A frequently mentioned but 
perhaps less pronounced feature of big banks is that for a long time they have been shielded 
from legal responsibility for their misconduct. As noted by some leading U.S. judges, some 
banks have become “too big to jail” (Rogoff, 2016). Term “too big to jail” was coined to 
describe the theory that certain financial institutions, even if they engage in criminal 
misconduct, should be considered immune from prosecution due to their sheer size and their 
influence on the economy. A mere look at the levels of the recent tsunami of legal settlements 
shows why politicians have been as active as ever in trying to break up big banks and 
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eliminate the incentive for banks to become simultaneously “too big to fail” and “too big to 
jail”. 65 
Litigation risk has been of paramount importance, especially after the mounting charges 
and litigation settlements related in particular to market manipulation litigation, U.S. 
mortgage-related issues, product mis-selling litigation, tax evasion litigation, U.S. embargo 
issues, misrepresentation litigation, and company-specific issues. The penalties for such 
behavior are sobering. For example, since 2009 litigation costs have grown four years in a 
row, and banks on both sides of the Atlantic have paid out a total of $178 billion in litigation 
costs; banks’ legal bills have also swelled with them (WSJ, 2014). During the first nine 
months of 2014, banks in the U.S. and the E.U. paid out $60 billion to settle legal claims. 
That was up from $46 billion in 2013, $44 billion in 2012 and $22 billion in 2011, as noted 
in the most recent research by Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and references in FT (2015). 
Even though U.S. banks have settled the bulk of claims arising from pre-crisis mortgages, 
BCG predicts that potential litigation risks remain substantial. For example, as of 2014 
JPMorgan Chase said that it was involved in legal proceedings on more than 20 fronts, 
including investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) into whether the bank 
bought car loans that had been priced according to the race and ethnicity of the borrower. 
The exact litigation costs vary based on data sources. For example, a British study came 
up with higher figures. According to the U.K. based CCP Research Foundation, the total 
post-crisis litigation cost aimed at the biggest global banks since 2010 hit $300 billion over 
a five-year rolling period (FT, 2015). Differences may come from various estimation 
techniques in quantifying losses, such as foregone profits or clients’ attrition, the order to 
keep higher capital requirements or the prohibition from involvement in some type of 
lending business; or damage to a bank’s reputation66  might constitute another form of 
penalty (i.e. the regulatory actions do not have to be material). 
Much of post-crisis litigation was mortgage related. For example, from 2010 through the 
end of third-quarter 2013, together the six "too big to fail" and "too big to jail" banks paid 
$85.75 billion in credit and mortgage-related settlement costs. Bank of America paid out 
                                                
65 Elaborate discussion on litigation issues are provided in ‘Litigation Handbook’ prepared by OCC, available 
at http:// www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/pub-ch-m-litigation-and-
other-legal- matters.pdf. 
66 Reputational risk is the potential that negative publicity regarding an institution's business practices, 
whether true or not, will cause a decline in the customer base, incur costly litigation, or revenue reductions. 
(SR 95-51). For instance, the “reputational penalty” is estimated to be 7.5 times the total amount of penalties 
imposed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the 585 firms subject to enforcement actions 
for financial misrepresentation between 1978 and 2002, as noted in Karpoff, et al. (2008).  
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$43.9 billion; JPMorgan Chase paid out $26.4 billion; Wells Fargo paid out $9.5 billion; 
Citigroup paid out $4.7 billion; Goldman Sachs paid out $920 million; and Morgan Stanley 
paid out over $329 million. In addition to settlement monies, since 2008 the six banks have 
also had to repurchase ("buyback") $98.9 billion worth of bad mortgages they stuffed into 
collapsed mortgage-backed securities they sold to investors around the globe (SEC, 2015). 
However, these elements of the credit crisis and mortgage-related settlements are not the 
only measure of banks' misbehavior. 
Reasons for other large recent fines include e.g. the manipulation of foreign-exchange 
markets. Bank of America paid $250 million to the OCC and has also agreed to pay $180 
million to settle a lawsuit by private investors who accused the bank and others of 
manipulating foreign-exchange rates. In turn, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan paid more than $1 
billion each in fines to various regulators. Bank of America is the third bank to settle investor 
claims related to the $5.3 trillion-a-day currency market. JPMorgan Chase & Co settled for 
$99.5 million in January, and Switzerland's UBS AG settled for $135 million in March. 
Another example of fines with U.S. regulators includes HSBC which settled a deferred 
prosecution agreement with the U.S. DoJ for $1.9 billion after the British bank facilitated 
money laundering. The amount included $655 million in civil penalties and $1.25 billion 
forfeiture, approved in July 2013. This has been the largest penalty placed on a bank for 
violating Bank Secrecy Act (hereafter BSA). A majority of sources (e.g. WSJ, FT) document 
that the majority of costs originate with U.S. regulators’ legal claims; typically banks in the 
U.S. face much higher costs compared to other countries and occurrences of banks suing 
each other is more rare. 
So far, it has been noted that the largest banks are balancing the risk of paying penalties 
while generating significant revenue from such wrongdoing. A glance at the frequency of 
litigation settlements (Table 4.2a and Table 4.3a in Appendix 4) may supports the notion 
that fines do not act as efficient deterrents against engaging in financial misconduct. 
Therefore, in the U.S. in particular, the regulatory authorities have increased their appetite 
to pursue litigation against banks. 
Litigation risk is of interest on its own. Litigation risk is different from other risks that 
banks may face. What distinguishes litigation risk from most other risks is that litigants lack 
a mechanism to dispose of litigation risk (Molot, 2009). Virtually any other risk that a 
business faces can be spread out or eliminated via the market by purchasing some form of 
insurance. Also, if a new business line is too costly or risky for a bank to pursue on its own, 
it can find a larger partner and undertake a joint venture, or it can raise capital for the project 
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through public or private markets, in the form of debt or equity. When it comes to litigation 
risk, however, a bank that is sued is generally stuck with this risk. Insurance companies do 
not sell after-the-event insurance policies for lawsuits that have already been filed and there 
does not exist a market in which litigants can trade away litigation risk. Neither the legal 
profession, nor the insurance industry or the capital markets have yet found a way to relieve 
litigants of risk. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) said that a $4.4 billion increase 
in legal expenses for a small number of large banks was the key factor in a 7 percent drop in 
the banking sector's earnings for the fourth quarter of 2014. FDIC-insured commercial banks 
and savings institutions reported aggregate net income of $36.9 billion in the quarter, which 
was down $2.9 billion from earnings of $39.8 billion for the same quarter in 2013, mostly 
due to the rise in litigation costs at the large banks, according to a statement. 
The motivation, contribution, originality and value of my study are the following. As for 
the contribution, I examine in detail BHCs’ operating costs. Given the mixed findings of 
previous studies on the economies of scale in the banking industry, I analyze "too big to fail" 
BHCs in the U.S. from the perspective of the economies of scale from 2001:Q2 to 2014:Q1. 
I explore this issue using a much larger universe of banks than that of the existing study by 
the Clearing House (CH, 2011) on the banks’ economies of scale. My sample is around two 
hundred times larger than that of CH and I use publicly available data from audited 
regulatory filings, as opposed to the proprietary internal management information used by 
the CH. I examine the extra costs citizens or shareholders will have to face if banks are 
broken into smaller banks and whether these costs are passed directly to bank customers or 
are translated into reduced firm value for shareholders. My choice is motivated by the 
paramount interest in the recent financial press in banks’ incentive to grow in size, in 
litigation risk, in marketing expenses and the consequences from the newly cooked 
regulations that will affect "too big to fail", "too big to jail" banks and their expenses. 
I also provide some fresh evidence on litigation charges. I compile a novel dataset on 341 
litigation charges, which to the best of my knowledge has not been used in any previous 
studies. It has been a significant effort to collect and classify expenses and I was the first to 
focus on banks’ litigation expenses. Thus, I am not are aware of any study which focuses on 
the characteristics of the banks and their litigation charges. This is surprising, given that the 
costs of litigation are colossal, especially once aggregated across the industry. More 
generally, my research also has implications for the literature on systemic risk. I test whether 
systemically more risky banks are also more likely to be involved in alleged financial 
wrongdoing. I also examine whether alleged financial wrongdoing is cyclical. I also shed 
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light on the banks’ advertising and marketing expenses (AME). I examine whether AME are 
also cyclical. I analyze these three topics separately and then I discuss them jointly because 
they are interrelated. 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. Section 4.2 presents an overview of the related 
literature on the economies of scale in the financial sector. It mainly focuses on the scale of 
economies from the perspective of banks’ operating costs. Then it presents the evidence on 
"too big to jail" and issues related to litigation. Subsequently, it touches on marketing 
expenses. It sheds light on bank marketing expenses and their impact on BHCs’ stock prices 
and profitability. Data, methodology and summary statistics are discussed in Section 4.3 and 
4.4. Section 4.5 discusses the results. Finally, robustness checks and conclusion are 
presented in Section 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. 
Before proceeding, one caveats is in order. First, I do not want to overstate my ambitions. 
In the litigation part of this chapter, my aim is to invite more discussion and provide avenues 
for future research in the area of banking litigation, as more data become available. 
4.2! Related Literature 
4.2.1! Economies of scale and “too big to fail” 
Economies of scale permit larger firms to produce their products and provide their 
services at lower average costs per unit than smaller firms (Shepherd, 1979). That is, as firms 
produce more, they spread fixed input costs over a larger quantity of output, thus lowering 
per unit average costs. This ability to manufacture products and to provide services at a lower 
average cost should translate directly into higher profits, while also possibly creating 
significant barriers to entry into any industry in which economies of scale are present, as 
noted in Bain (1954). 
Advantages associated with increasing scale can be gained from a variety of factors 
(Scherer, 1980). For example, at the product or service level, expanding firms can invest in 
specialized and more efficient equipment, machinery, and technology, which lower per unit 
production costs. Firms also have incentives to further improve the speed and efficiency of 
these resources, and engage in efforts that further enhance the efficiency of their production 
processes and increase output. Increasing output also allows employees to specialize in their 
tasks and gain proficiency; as a result, increasing scale also produces experience or learning 
effects, which have been found to exist in nearly all industry settings (Wright, 1936; Asher, 
1956; Shepherd, 1979; Rosenberg, 1982). 
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Overall, studies on economies of scale in the banking industry produced mixed findings. 
Studies have confirmed the existence of economies of scale and diseconomies of scale. The 
earliest studies of scale economies in the banking industry, estimated during an era when 
U.S. banking organizations were on average much smaller than today, found evidence of 
modest economies of scale. For example, Mitchell and Onvural (1996) document that 
increasing levels of production in large banks is usually cost efficient; but they also found 
that there is relatively little to gain by increasing the scale of production. Thus, their study 
provides additional confirmation that the minimum efficient scale can be achieved in 
relatively modest-sized banks and that the average cost curve for most banking institutions 
is relatively flat. In contrast, in a study of commercial banks and savings and loan 
associations, using data from the 1960s, Benston (1972) found consistent economies of 
scale, indicating that larger banks and financial institutions enjoy significant cost 
advantages. Kim (1986) found that credit unions exhibit modest economies of scale, 
especially in their mortgage lending and investment activities. In an extensive review of the 
literature on economies of scale in financial institutions published prior to 1988 Clark (1988) 
concludes that smaller financial firms may be at a cost disadvantage compared to larger, 
more diversified banking firms. Others, using more flexible cost functions, found that these 
scale economies were only limited to small banks (Benston et al., 1982; Berger and 
Humphrey, 1991,1992; Peristiani, 1997), which would support the idea of breaking up big 
banks. 
A number of studies, however, find evidence of scale economies even among the largest 
banking firms Feng and Serletis, 2010; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Hughes and Mester, 
2013). These findings, in contrast to the previous evidence, oppose limits on the size of 
banks that would undercut economies of scale in banking. 
The first systematic effort to examine and quantify the benefits that large banks provide 
to consumers, companies, and governments, as well as the U.S. economy as a whole is that 
by the Clearing House (CH, 2011). This study, which relies on proprietary data from a 
relatively low number of institutions, documents that large U.S. banks provide benefits for 
companies, consumers, and governments totaling an estimated $50 billion to $110 billion 
annually. Banks larger than $500 billion provide over half of the total benefit. It is also noted 
in the CH report that large banks spur innovation and economic growth, which could not be 
achieved if big banks were broken into smaller entities. For example, as noted in CH (2011), 
sophisticated and costly IT platforms allow large banks to provide global reporting and 
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compliance, helping investors monitor and analyze their positions. However, this innovation 
may also lead to costly future litigation. 
Smaller banks could not generate the volumes needed to make worthwhile the investment 
necessary to develop such reporting systems and global compliance expertise. Dedicated 
platforms and broad regulatory experience allow large custodians to undertake these 
activities much more efficiently and expertly than even large customers might on their own. 
This study estimates total annual benefits from large banks spreading innovation to be 
around $15 billion to $30 billion. CH analysis estimates that aggregate benefits from online 
bill payment, debit cards, credit cards, wire transfers, automated clearing house, check 
processing, and trade processing economies of scale associated with these seven services are 
$10 billion to $25 billion per year. This is not surprising. Many innovations require a large 
customer base to succeed, which is either impossible to achieve for small banks or will 
require many small banks to act together to capture the benefits of innovation.67 
Furthermore, as noted in several Uniform Bank Performance Reports (hereafter UBPR),68 
large banks tend to have lower efficiency ratios (i.e. banks are more efficient) because they 
generate more non-interest income compared to smaller banks. It is also noted that cost 
efficiencies are usually the underlying rationale for mergers and acquisitions. Costs savings 
in personnel expenses, occupancy expense, goodwill impairment, intangible amortization 
and other expenses are the main drivers of bank mergers and acquisitions. However, large 
banks are also perceived as having deep pockets and therefore attract greater levels of 
litigation69. 
In contrast to studies that find positive effects stemming from banks as they grow in size, 
many studies have concluded that expanding banks will eventually reach a point where 
average costs stop decreasing and start to increase. Benston et al. (1982) modeled a translog 
cost function to estimate U-shaped average cost curves, and their analysis found that the 
largest banks face significant diseconomies of scale. In a comparable study, Clark (1996) 
concluded that the average cost curve for banks is relatively flat with diseconomies of scale 
found only among the smallest and largest banks. Clark (1996) also notes that a lower 
efficiency ratio would generate higher ROA. In other words, the more efficient banks are 
                                                
67 Innovations include: ATMs, Online bill pay, DealerTrack, Fraud prevention, ACH, Wire, Check imaging. 
68 UBPR reports were retrieved from http://www.ffiec.gov/ubpr.htm on June 6, 2015. 
69 Author is grateful to Prof. Simon Wolfe for raising this comment. 
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not necessarily more profitable, because banks’ concentration on reducing costs may 
actually contribute to poor investment decisions and increased risk taking. 
As far as other reasons behind banks’ operating costs are concerned, it has also been 
frequently mentioned in the literature that firms are operating inside their production 
possibilities frontier because of agency conflicts, management problems, or other 
inefficiencies, so-called X-inefficiencies 70  (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Berger et al., 
1993). 
Overall, from around 220 articles71 discussing large banks, 47 percent discuss the risk of 
large banks, 21 percent focus on the market effects, 12 percent examine the internal 
efficiencies of large banks (including economies of scale) and the remaining 20 percent 
focus on the scope of products and services. As for the views on costs versus benefits 71 
percent of the studies on risk hold a view that large banks are more risky with the remaining 
29 percent claiming the opposite. As for the internal efficiencies, 52 percent of the studies 
find negative effects stemming from the larger size of the banks, while 48 percent find that 
as banks grow in size they are actually becoming more internally efficient. As for scope, 
approximately 88 percent of the studies analyzed find large benefits to the general economy 
stemming from large banks. Large banks provide a broad set of products and services that 
smaller banks cannot provide at all, or at least cannot provide in an equally integrated and 
comprehensive manner. 
In conclusion, the literature provides mixed evidence on the relationship between bank 
size and the various aspects of bank performance. Broader economic consequences of 
imposing caps on bank size are also not clear. 
4.2.2! Litigation overview 
There is a relative scarcity of economic studies on litigation settlements in the banking 
industry. The majority of existing literature focuses on market reaction to the announcement 
of the litigation charges, providing mixed findings. Another strand of the literature focuses 
on corporate governance of the banks that have faced litigation charges (e.g. board 
independence or the characteristics of CEOs of those banks). The lack of studies is primarily 
because data on litigation settlements have been confidential for a relatively long time. In 
                                                
70 The concept of X-inefficiency was introduced by Harvey Leibenstein (1966). 
71 These 220 academic articles are relevant articles from the past three years published in a selection of top 
economics and finance journals and articles cited in FSOC report and the Independent Commission on 
Banking: Vickers Report (2011). 
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what follows, I present an overview on bank enforcement actions and several facts from 
recent industry publications and the financial press. 
Enforcement actions can take one of two forms: (1) informal understandings between 
banks and their supervisors; (2) more formal actions, which are enforceable in the courts. 
Prior to 1989, however, the public never learned about the vast majority of enforcement 
actions, with which supervisors used to bring banks into compliance with consumer 
regulations and safety and soundness standards. In 1989, despite objections from various 
supervisory agencies in the US, Congress mandated disclosure of the most serious formal 
actions, cease-and-desist orders. Soon after, the Congress expanded disclosure requirements, 
directing that the public be notified about all formal enforcement actions. 
For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC)  did require 
depository institutions, with publicly traded stock, to disclose enforcement actions deemed 
“material.” In addition, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (hereafter OCC)—on 
a limited, case-by-case basis—disclosed the facts surrounding its enforcement actions 
(Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in the Nation’s Financial Institutions (OCC, 
1989). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA) and the Crime Control Act of 1990 required supervisory agencies for the first 
time to publicly disclose final, formal enforcement actions as well as any modifications or 
terminations of the actions (Gilbert and Vaughan, 2001). In the debate over FIRREA, the 
House of Representatives questioned the secrecy about enforcement actions, noting that 
bank supervisors were alone among federal regulators in keeping civil enforcement actions 
confidential (FIRREA 1989: 470). The House also asserted that confidentiality served only 
to perpetuate banker misconduct and exacerbate the problems of troubled institutions. 
Disclosure, in contrast, would inform taxpayers about the effectiveness of the bank 
regulatory system, warn depository institutions about the types of conduct that would not be 
tolerated and the financial community about particular problem banks (OCC, 1989).72 It is 
also supposed to strengthen market discipline because an announcement that a supervisor 
had imposed a formal action warns depositors that serious regulatory compliance or safety 
and soundness issues exist in the affected institution. That is, from 1990 onwards supervisors 
have begun to announce publicly the imposition of formal enforcement actions. 
                                                
72 A concise summary of financial firms’ litigation matters is available at 
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/pub-ch-m-litigation-and-other-
legal-matters.pdf. 
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The changes in 1990 in publicly announcing enforcement actions provides a quasi-
experimental setting to test whether putting confidential supervisory information in the 
public domain will spark bank runs or whether it will enhance depositor discipline. Gilbert 
and Vaughan (2001) measure depositor reaction to 87 Federal Reserve announcements of 
enforcement actions. They compare deposit growth rates and yield spreads before and after 
the announcements at the sample banks and a control group of peer banks. Their findings do 
not show any evidence of unusual deposit withdrawals or spread increases at the sample 
banks following the announcements of enforcement actions. These results suggest that 
depositors were not sensitive to enforcement actions, nor did they alter their behavior when 
formal actions were announced. 
In contrast, Cummins et al. (2006) show in their analysis, which covers all publicly 
reported banking and insurance operational risk events which affected a total of 403 bank 
and 89 insurance company events in the U.S. from 1978 to 2003, and which caused 
operational losses of at least $10 million, a strong, statistically significant negative stock 
price reaction to announcements of operational loss events. Other studies also reveal that 
operational loss events have a strong, statistically significant negative stock price impact on 
announcing firms (Cummins et al., 2005; Perry and de Fontnouvelle, 2005). 
My study relates partly to recent research on personal liability for financial misconduct, 
as well as the effects of misconduct on CEO compensation and on the determinants and 
economics of corporate misconduct. 
For example, Karpoff et al. (2008) examine the fortunes of all 2,206 individuals identified 
as responsible parties for all 788 SEC and DoJ enforcement actions for financial 
misrepresentation from January 1, 1978 through September 30, 2006. They report that 93 
percent lost their jobs by the end of the regulatory enforcement period. Most were certainly 
fired. The likelihood of redundancies increases with the cost of the misconduct to 
shareholders and the quality of the firm's governance. This is motivated by prior research 
which shows that firm shareholders endure large losses when their firms are accused of 
misconduct; but there is little evidence on whether the individual perpetrators suffer direct 
financial costs for the damages they caused. 
As for the factors related to the propensity to engage in financial misconduct, extant 
literature has pointed to a lack of monitoring by the board (Beasley, 1996; Agrawal and 
Chadha, 2005; Chidambaran et al., 2012; Hegde and Zhou, 2014; Khanna et al., 2014) 
outside investors (Wang et al., 2010), or various other parties (Dyck et al., 2010; Kedia and 
Rajgopal, 2011). Hence, the literature primarily studies litigation and fraud from the 
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perspective of corporate governance on the role and design of corporate boards (e.g., Adams 
et al., 2010; Coles et al., 2012, 2014; Field et al. 2013; Minton et al., 2014; Hagendorff et 
al., 2015a, 2015b). My study is also partly related to the studies on governance and risk 
taking in the banking industry (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Adams and Ragunathan, 2013; 
Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Minton et al., 2014). Relative to other bank risk measures studied 
in the literature, enforcement actions provide a suitable identification of the effectiveness of 
internal governance. This is because enforcement actions provide an unambiguous external 
indicator of undesirable conduct in the industry. 
A number of studies link fraud to the compensation of executives (e.g., Johnson et al., 
2009). The often-mentioned misconduct by CEOs documented in the literature has been 
manipulating short-term performance to enjoy higher payouts. Persons (2006), who 
examines the impact of fraud and lawsuit revelations on U.S. top executive turnover and 
compensation, shows that out of all financial firms involved in fraud only a small number 
reduced their executive cash compensation and only a tiny percentage changed their top 
executives. 
Apart from questions related to financial misconduct and whether the bank board matters 
for firm outcomes, it was misconduct in the mortgage markets that received much attention 
following the recent financial crisis, primarily in the legal literature, and to a lesser extent in 
the financial literature. Much of the literature examines the main legal issues that will play 
an important role in the extensive litigation in the residential mortgage market including a) 
the Rule 10b-5 class-action lawsuits that have already been filed against the banks pending 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (1974) (ERISA) litigation, b) the causes-of-
action available to mortgage-backed security (hereafter MBS) and collateralized debt 
obligation (CDO) purchasers, and c) litigation against the rating agencies (see Bethel et al., 
2008). 
In contrast to the existing literature, my key question is the following. Which observable 
bank characteristics, are most closely correlated with bank propensity to face litigation? In 
particular, I analyze “too big to jail” issue and whether it is observed in the data that large 
banks were more often involved in financial misconduct and whether litigation charges had 
any impact on the banks’ probability of insolvency. Certainly, the quality of the board is the 
missing variable in my analysis, but I hope to capture this omitted variable by including 
fixed effects in my regressions. 
Some evidence points to the fact that until recently the federal government shielded big 
banks from criminal prosecution. The government was concerned that convictions may 
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damage the financial system. One of the top Federal Reserve officials explicitly 
acknowledged this practice, which was long denied by the Obama administration.73 Both 
Republican and Democratic lawmakers have long suspected that federal prosecutors did not 
pursue guilty pleas because they were afraid of the consequences, i.e. that the potential 
unraveling of a giant bank would endanger the global economy. For example, in 2012 the 
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder posited that it becomes difficult for the DoJ to prosecute 
financial institutions that have become so large that criminal charges would “have a negative 
impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.” Certain charges, such 
as money laundering, could potentially cut a bank off from existing pools of investors such 
as pension funds and ultimately cost the bank its charter to operate in the United States. 
Holder’s testimony sparked criticism that just as the federal government had deemed some 
banks “too big to fail” during the financial crisis, so too had the DoJ determined that some 
banks were “too big to jail.” Holder later denied his previous comments after a public outcry 
in March 2013. Another statement: “We were not willing to find those firms guilty before, 
because we were worried that if we found them guilty, that could somehow potentially 
destabilize the financial system,” was made by the president of Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York William Dudley.74 For that reason, it has been reported that corporations are 
sometimes able to agree with the Department of Justice (hereafter DoJ) to have an offshore 
entity take the hit and enter the guilty plea. Such was the case in 2012, when UBS agreed to 
pay about $1.5 billion to settle LIBOR rigging charges, and a unit in Japan, where much of 
the wrongdoing occurred, pleaded guilty to criminal fraud. 
There exist other media and government reports that found widespread regulatory failures 
at the Federal Reserve, specifically at Dudley’s branch in New York. Former New York Fed 
employee Carmen Segarra also released tapes showing higher-ups at the New York Fed 
ordering lower-level regulators to go easy on Goldman Sachs.75 
However, I am not aware of any empirical studies that examine this issue of “too big to 
jail”, nor of any analysis that would examine the effect of criminal charges against large 
financial institutions on the global economy or systemic risk, potentially undermining a key 
DoJ argument for why the world’s biggest banks have escaped indictment. 
                                                
73 The notion that government shielded big banks from prosecution has been addressed in Huffington Post on 
21 November, 2014, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/21/fed-too-big-to-
jail_n_6201476.html. 
74 Ibid. 
75Tapes were retrieved from http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/536/the-secret-
recordings-of-carmen-segarra on 6 June, 2014. 
 103 
Putting the “too big” rhetoric aside, the obvious fact is that no corporate entity can literally 
be “jailed.” If for example the DoJ does pursue criminal charges against an entity, a common 
outcome is a settlement coupled with large fines. For instance, in 2012, HSBC agreed to a 
deferred prosecution agreement with the DoJ to settle allegations of money laundering. In 
that settlement, HSBC was required to pay $1.92 billion in forfeiture and fines, but avoided 
actual criminal indictment. All the above motivates me to examine whether large banks were 
more actively engaged in wrongdoing and how litigation settlements related to the size of 
the banks. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I found that large banks had higher systemic risk, were more opaque 
and securitized more often. In this chapter, I want to examine whether large banks have 
lower operating costs and whether they were involved in financial misconduct and faced 
litigation charges more frequently than smaller banks. 
4.3! Data and Variables Construction 
The data, in particular, FR-9YC forms, are retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago via WRDS. The core sample is a panel of all publicly traded U.S. BHCs that report 
on form FR-9YC,76 which is filed quarterly on a consolidated basis by all U.S. BHCs with 
over $150 million in assets ($500 million after 2006). I examine BHCs with over $500 
million in total assets because BHCs with total consolidated assets of less than $500 million 
are generally not required to file FR-9YC forms. 
The FR-9YC reports contain detailed consolidated financial statements and other data for 
U.S. BHCs. As noted earlier, in March 2006, the minimum reporting size for BHCs was 
increased from $150 million to $500 million. This significantly skews the sample. To 
overcome this problem, I delete all the observations that do not reach the minimum reporting 
threshold over the sample period. I do this in order to make sure that banks that began 
reporting prior to 2006 have continued reporting since the threshold was raised from $150 
million to $500 million in 2006. I adjust the threshold of $500 million for price level per 
quarter with base March 2006. This method of deleting the observations ensures that they 
are not deleted randomly, and helps to preserve all BHC observations that once started 
reporting and continue to do so even after a temporary drop in their total assets. I delete 
                                                
76BHCs are companies that own or control one or more commercial banks. Most banks in the U.S. are owned 
by BHCs. Currently, about 84 percent of commercial banks in the U.S. are part of a BHC structure. 
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approximately 50 observations per quarter. My data set covers the period from 2001:Q2 to 
2013:Q4. 
I use the detailed information on the vast range of BHCs’ non-interest expenses filed by 
BHCs in the memoranda of their quarterly regulatory FR-9YC filings. Since 2001, more 
than one-third of total non-interest expenses are classified in the FR-9YC as part of a broad 
“other non-interest expenses” category. The category “other non-interest expenses” 
represents more than one-third of industry non-interest expenses. The 11 standardized 
memoranda categories are: (i) data processing expenses; (ii) advertising and marketing 
expenses; (iii) directors' fees; (iv) printing, stationery and supplies; (v) postage; (vi) legal 
fees and expenses; (vii) FDIC insurance assessments; (viii) accounting and auditing 
expenses; (ix) consulting and advisory expenses; (x) ATM and interchange expenses; (xi) 
telecommunications expenses (see FR-9YC Schedule HI Memorandum Item 7). In addition, 
space is provided for BHCs to report additional “write-in” expense items that were not 
captured by the standardized fields and where the expense item exceeds 10 percent of total 
other non-interest expenses. This can be travel expenses, payments to insurance holders, 
software development, litigation settlements or even meals, as was reported by some smaller 
BHCs. BHCs record items for amounts greater than $25,000 that also exceed 3 percent of 
total other non-interest expenses. Note that non-interest expenses do not include loan losses 
due to defaults, trading losses, gains and losses on owned securities, or taxes; these are 
recorded in other parts of the income statement. 
As for the three biggest other non-standardized fields, they pose some difficulties. It is 
particularly challenging to classify and analyze items recorded in the write-in expense fields, 
because they are reported using non-standardized language by each BHC. Therefore, I 
manually examined more than 30,000 text strings in the Schedule HI of FR-9YC. This 
involved manually skimming through about 5,500 individual “write-in” text fields reported 
by individual BHCs. That is, I examine more than 5,000 various expenses, manually typed 
by BHCs. I search for words which include settlements actions, litigation and alike. Banks 
do not use uniform names and there are significant numbers of typos. Some reported write-
in items are difficult to interpret. For instance, while I can easily infer that litigation means 
litigation, other expenses may be less straightforward. In the end I am left with 341 litigation 
occurrences where expenses are first, second or third as identified in “Other non-interest 
expenses”, which constitute more than 10 percent of other expenses. I drop ambiguous 
observations. I identify 130 “clean” occurrences where banks face litigation costs as the first 
highest item, 123 as second highest, and 90 as third highest. Text usually appeared as 
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“INCOME ON LITIGATION SETTLEMENT”, “RECOVERY ON LEGAL EXPENSES”, 
“LAWSUIT SETTLEMENT”, “INCOME FROM LITIGATION SETTLEMENT”, 
“LITIGATION SETTLEMENT”, or “LEGAL SETTLEMENT”. Sometimes I observe the 
reason for the payment, e.g. “LAWSUIT TO A SOFTWARE VENDOR & THIS IS 
SETTLEMENT” or “IRS SETTLEMENT EXPENSES TO BE PAID”. Note on the legal 
expenses: I do not aggregate legal fees and litigation settlement here. Some part of this 
finding may reflect the fact that small banks may lack internal legal teams, for which legal 
expenses would be recorded as part of compensation, and thus have higher external legal 
fees. 
Although some data on the charges faced by institutions and chief executive officers 
(hereafter CEOs) or chief financial officers (hereafter CFOs) are available on the SEC 
website,77 there is no central database that includes all of the litigation charges faced by 
banks. Bank regulators, specifically the Fed, the OCC, and the New York Department of 
Financial Services (NYDFS) are the main bodies dealing with banks’ wrongdoing and some 
data are available. Also, the FDIC’s Legal Division provides some aggregate information. 
However, the institution does not report PLC cost and recovery information by individual 
institution. Thus, that information cannot be used it. 
Quantifying all the litigation settlements is difficult as a single event may lead to 
numerous overlapping investigations and proceedings, either by multiple federal and state 
agencies and officials in the U.S., or in some instances by regulators and other governmental 
officials in non-U.S. jurisdictions (e.g. Citigroup in Japan). Therefore, for analysis of the 
litigation settlements, I rely entirely on the FR- 9YC forms only. 
I proceed by eliminating observations with missing, negative or zero values for total 
assets, and observations where the loans to assets ratio exceeds 100 percent. Observations 
that report zero equity capital are also removed. Approximately 50 observations are deleted 
per quarter. In turn, I winsorize the independent and dependent variables at the 1 percent 
level to account for data errors and limit the effect of potential outliers, which is a standard 
procedure in similar studies. 
As far as the independent variables (efficiency ratios and detailed expenses) in the first 
part of this essay are concerned, I proceed as follows. Typically, BHCs enter expenses with 
a positive sign, while some entries have a negative sign, thus I use my judgment and convert 
                                                
77Limited data on the charges faced by institutions and their CEOs and CFOs are available on the SEC 
website http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml. 
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them into positive or leave those observations as missing. In total, I have changed the sign 
for 67 entries where expenses are written with a negative sign, because the majority of BHCs 
write expenses in positive terms, understanding that these are the expenses. It is reasonable 
to believe that a typo in the sign may have occurred.  
Subsequently, to analyze stock prices and returns, I link FR-9YC forms with CRSP. I 
used the FRBNY link 78  to match regulatory identification numbers (RSSD ID) to the 
PERMCO, used by the CRSP. The RSSD ID is a unique identifier assigned to commercial 
banks or BHCs by the Federal Reserve. The dataset yields 769 PERMCO-RSSD links from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2013. 
4.3.1! Dependent variables 
Just as in calculating the efficiency ratio, where I divide non-interest expenses by net 
income (interest plus non-interest income), I calculate ratios for all the expenses dividing the 
expenses by the bank’s net income. Thereby, I obtain 14 separate efficiency measures that 
are used as dependent variables. 
4.3.2! Control variables 
Apart from the main variable of interest such as the logarithm of total assets or the size, 
the control variables in the first specification include BHCs’ non-performing loans (a proxy 
for credit risk), capital level (Tier 1) and profitability; relative profitability (the bank’s 
financial performance relative to its peers over the past three years (RELROE) is also used 
as a proxy for the quality of its management,79 a variable used by DeYoung and Rice (2004) 
to approximate for management quality. The aim is to relax the omitted variable bias, if the 
quality of the bank’s management correlates with both size and expenses. Apart from the 
standard control variables mentioned above. I also control for the asset shares held in various 
types of loans and assets. For instance, I include trading assets, securities, cash, fixed assets. 
I also include bank revenue composition. Copeland (2012) finds that there is a positive 
relationship between the relative importance of nontraditional income sources and asset size. 
                                                
78 FRBNY link is available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html. 
79 RELROE equals bank i’s ROE minus the median ROE among the banks in bank i’s asset class, calculated 
each year from t-3 through t-1 and then averaged. I used five asset classes: less than $100 million; $100 
million to $500 million; $500 million to $1 billion; $1 billion to $10 billion; and more than $10 billion, all 
measured in 2001 dollars. I note that RELROE may reflect things other than bank management quality, such 
as the local competitive, economic, and regulatory conditions faced by the bank during the past three years. 
However, I expect that the time dummies and state dummies in my regressions should absorb much of this 
variation. 
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Copeland (2012) classifies income into three types: traditional, securitization, and 
nontraditional. These categories are constructed so that income earned from new financial 
services would fall into either the securitization or nontraditional category. The traditional 
category contains the classic sources of income that most banks have relied upon over time, 
such as interest and fee income on loans, service charges on deposit accounts, fees for 
providing payment services, and income from fiduciary activities. Nontraditional income 
comes from five sources: a) net interest income from trading assets; b) venture capital 
revenues; c) investment banking; d) insurance income; and e) trading revenues. The 
securitization category captures income related to creating, servicing or selling securitized 
assets, while the nontraditional category contains sources of income related to the capital 
markets. 
Following previous research (deYoung and Rice, 2003), I include the share of income 
that banks derive from interest income, investment banking income, trading income and 
fiduciary income (including insurance activities related income), three of which constitute a 
lion’s share of revenue composition. I also include other income (e.g. safe deposit box rent, 
income and fees from ATMs, income and fees from the printing and sales of checks and 
miscellenous income) among the control variables. I also include the ratio of deposits to total 
assets because banks still heavily rely on deposits, including those banks that are regarded 
as severely diversified banks. I also include the amount of securitized assets. 
Furthermore, following DeYoung (2014), I include the ratio of full-time-employees-to-
total assets as a proxy for personalized service or as a proxy for human error in the 
workplace. I significantly vary a number of control variables to capture various aspects of 
banks’ performance. I also include banks’ foreign loans to capture their exposure to foreign 
individuals, firms and governments. I also control for BHC complexity using the complexity 
indicators from the Fed database. The FED categorizes BHCs into various complexity 
categories.80 Finally, I normalize control variables by dividing them by the size of the BHC. 
                                                
80As noted on the FRB’s website, for small BHCs with total consolidated assets of $5 billion or less, 
attributes rows with date starting on or after 01/01/2002 must use values from 3 to 8 for complex institutions. 
A value of 2 should be used for any size company to indicate noncomplex institutions, unless there are 
factors that indicate complexity and that have been overridden by supervisory judgment, in which case a 
value of 9 should be used. The complexity indicators are the following: 3 = Complex: Nonbank Financial 
Factors. Nature and scale of non-bank activities warrant designation as complex for supervisory purposes; 4 
= Complex: High Risk Activities. Company engages, either directly or through its subsidiaries, in significant 
non-banking activity having an inherently high-risk profile. Examples include securities broker/dealer 
activities, insurance underwriting and merchant banking; other activities may also trigger this designation if 
identified by the supervisory Reserve Bank as high-risk in nature; 5 = Complex: Public Debt. Company 
issues significant debt to the general public such that unsophisticated investors may be at risk of loss; 6 = 
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In one subsection where I analyze bank litigation, I also use the systemic risk measure 
MES from VLab linking it with the BHCs’ data set from the Fed. 
4.4! Summary Statistics 
4.4.1! Non-interest expenses 
Summary statistics for the main variables used in this study are reported in Table 4.1. In 
what follows, I present the distinguishing features of the BHCs’ non-interest expenses. 
I observe that compensation constitutes the highest non-interest expense, followed by 
other expenses on fixed assets and premises, data processing, and advertising and marketing 
expenses. For banks which report other “first highest”, “second highest” and “third highest” 
expenses, these expenses can be as high as banks’ expenditure on compensation. I sort other 
non-interest expenses and observe the following. In general, univariate findings show that 
litigation expenses are high in total magnitude, and they predominantly appear on the FR-
9YC forms of the largest BHCs. The highest non-standardized other non-interest expenses 
are those of METLIFE, INC. in the amount of $35, 257.253 for “POLICY BENEFITS ON 
INSURANCE PRODUCTS”. Metlife dominates the highest expenses. This seems natural 
because this is an insurance-based industry, and thus their expenses are likely to appear in 
other non-classified expenses. 
Among the other highest expenses for large banks when not divided by bank size, I find 
that merger and acquisition, and restructuring costs constitute a significant part of all 
expenses for the Bank of America. Also, foreclosure expenses, operating losses and travel 
expenses are frequently mentioned by large and small banks. 
Other significant “highest expenses” are those of American Express where card member 
rewards constitute a company’s other highest expenditure. However, when I scale the above 
expenses by operating revenue, other ratios appear to dominate the overall picture of the 
highest expenses. I present the ratios because from the whole economy’s perspective 
especially when one considers litigation settlements that accrue to the regulatory agencies 
                                                
Complex: Management Factors. Management practices such as the nature of inter-company transactions or 
centralized risk management policies and procedures warrant designation as complex for supervisory 
purposes; 7 = Complex: Multiple Factors. Company meets two or more criteria for the complex designation, 
more than one of which are material in the judgment of the supervisory Reserve Bank. While the intensity of 
the supervisory approach may not differ from other complex companies, this designation alerts examiners to 
the presence of more than one factor; 8 = Complex: Supervisory Judgment. Company does not appear to be 
complex as described in SR 02-01, however, at the discretion of the supervisory Reserve Bank, it is 
designated as a complex organization for supervisory purposes. 
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or are repaid as compensation to victims of financial crime, while the ratios might be more 
interesting for inter-bank comparisons. 
When I examine the expense ratios, I observe that for some BHCs among highest “other 
expenses” are underwriting and distribution expenses, death claims, travel expenses and 
entertainment, fraud losses, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (hereafter OCC) fund, 
supervisory examination fees, reserves, compliance, charitable contributions; marketing and 
servicing fees on payday loans are also listed among the highest expenses. Among “other 
expenses”, acquisitions fees, provision for government investigations and loss provision, and 
state franchise tax are also frequently mentioned. 
Data on expenses also provide an insight into the occurring trends from 2001 to 2014. 
For example, I note that the number of full-time employees per dollar of operating income 
has fallen precipitously over time, while industry-wide labor expenses have declined only 
marginally and have actually increased at the average bank. These conflicting trends provide 
evidence that new banking products and production methods require a more highly skilled 
work force and, hence, higher salaries and benefits to attract and retain these workers. For 
example, while low-wage bank tellers have become less necessary due to ATMs and online 
banking, high-wage finance and information professionals have become more necessary to 
manage these systems and the growing array of products offered around them. 
Data also reveal a stable upward trend in AME scaled by bank total assets from 2001 to 
2014. I observe that during and after the 2007–2009 crisis in contrast to the number of 
employees and compensation or litigation expenses, AME have not exhibited any cyclical 
behavior, i.e. AME have not undergone any drastic cuts, and have been been relatively stable 
over the entire sample period with only a moderate decrease during the crisis. AME have 
been steadily climbing since the third quarter of 2009. Data show that AME of the BHCs 
with more than $10 billion of assets reached around 3 percent of net revenue in 2013. Once 
again, banks are reaching heights observed at the peak of the last decade. Over 2001–2014 
average ratio of marketing expenses to total assets was around 1 percent. For example, Citi 
spent $451 million on brand advertising in 2007, while $30 million went toward launching 
the “Let’s Get It Done” slogan. Citi says it expects to spend another $20–30 million on their 
refreshed “Citi Never Sleeps” campaign. 81  AME vary between banks, but the average 
spending of the industry is pretty stable across the years. 
                                                
81 Citi spending plans are available at http://thefinancialbrand.com/446/citi-never-sleeps/. 
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As far as the complexity indicator is concerned, the majority of BHCs in my sample are 
classified as non-complex institutions, i.e. 171,908 observations are of Complexity=2; 5,895 
are Complexity=9; 2,179 are BHCs which have Complexity=6; 978 are Complexity= 8; 
1,084 are Complexity=7. 
Among other features, univariate statistics show significant differences between small 
and large banks. For example, small BHCs received over 60 percent of their nontraditional 
income from investment banking. In contrast, medium and large BHCs relied upon trading 
revenue, investment banking and insurance income to roughly the same extent. Further, net 
interest income from trading assets is substantially higher for medium and large BHCs 
relative to small ones. I also find that the MES was higher for larger banks. 
4.4.2! Litigation 
Summary statistics for banks involved in litigation and those which were not involved in 
litigation are presented in Table 4.2. In Table 4.1b I observe that 2004 was a relatively 
litigious year in terms of the magnitude of litigation settlements. Then from 2004 onward up 
to the financial crisis, there was relatively little litigation followed by a boom of litigation 
after 2008. In particular, I observe an unprecedented average litigation amount from 2010 
onward. Recent evidence in the press shows that 2014 has been even more litigious; however 
my data sample ends at 2014. What I do observe in Table 4.2a is that some banks face 
litigation settlements continuously over many quarters. 
As for the litigation sample, I have 341 litigation occurrences with 118 BHCs involved 
in them. One limitation on carrying out a more thorough analysis is that FR-9YC forms do 
not reveal why some litigation settlements have occurred; only two or three entries provide 
such specific information. I also note that in my analysis I focus only on monetary costs 
because it is impossible to capture other costs (e.g. prohibition for banks to pay out dividends 
or any other non-monetary punishment or losses from pending litigation that may also 
prevent banks from engaging into profitable businesses or raising debt). 
Hence, I have 118 banks that paid litigation settlements one or more times and which 
were a significant, i.e. more than 10 percent of other highest non-interest expenses, amount 
of their expenses and thus were reported in 9-YC forms, BHCs that appear to be continuously 
facing significant litigation settlements include: Discover Financial Services, Goldman 
Sachs, First Bancorp of Durango, Chinatrust Corp. or CTBC Capital Corp., Synovus 
Financial Corp., CIB Marine Bancshares Inc., International Bancshares Corp., Citigroup 
 111 
Inc., Bank of America Corp. (primarily claims from the financial crisis tied to the sale of 
mortgage-backed securities that defaulted) and JPMorgan Chase&CO.  
4.5! Methodology 
To examine the relationship between banks’ size and their operating costs, I estimate 
regressions with BHC-fixed effects, and time dummies. Thus I examine only changes in size 
within BHCs. I use fixed effects to capture characteristics specific to the banks that are fixed; 
for example, a bank’s culture. I also cluster error terms at the BHC level to allow for 
correlation in the error terms within the BHCs. I also follow previous studies (e.g. Stiroh, 
2006; Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; Casu et al., 2011) and have my explanatory variables 
lagged one period to relax potential problems of endogeneity. 
The model specification is as follows: 
ExpenseRatio$,( =)i(Size)i,(-1+ )*(Controls)$,(-1 +qt+vi+ +$,(,   (4.1.) 
I begin with standard control variables and then I control for more factors such as the 
composition of BHC assets, the composition of revenue, funding structure, concentration 
and banks’ complexity. 
I then proceed to the litigation regressions. 
I estimate several probit and logit regressions to examine the likelihood that banks with 
certain characteristics will engage in more wrongdoing and be detected. 
Pr(Litigation=1) = )i(Size)i,(-1+ )j(Controls)$,(-1 +qi,t+ +$,t    ( 4.2) 
I also run simple panel regressions with BHC-fixed effect and time dummies clustered at 
BHC level to see whether litigation settlements increase with bank size. 
LitigationAmount$,( =)i(Size)i,(-1+ )j(Controls)$,(-1 +qi,t+ vi,t + +$,(,,,(4.3) 
My control variables include banks’ size, profitability, leverage, credit risk, capital level, 
portfolio risk (risk-weighted assets), auditing fees as higher expenditures in auditing may 
diminish litigation risk, employees to total assets ratio, compensation in banks, because more 
workers are likely to reduce strategic errors and better paid workers may have more 
incentives to exert more effort, and opacity levels and complexity levels. I also include 
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foreign loans since dealing in foreign jurisdictions can significantly affect legal risk.82    
Among other variables, I include securitized assets because they have been at the center of 
the recent litigation debate surrounding mortgage markets. 
I examine banks’ characteristics and examine whether the negative change in some of 
them stimulates banks to engage in financial wrongdoing as a means of boosting their 
performance. For instance, the corporate fraud literature suggests that a firm’s risk might 
relate to a firm’s tendency to commit wrongdoing. Many cases of misconduct are discovered 
when bank fundamentals indicate increased risk. For example, Povel et al. (2007) argue that 
CEOs of high-growth firms that exhibit a downturn are more likely to commit financial 
misconduct. Thus, I control for portfolio risk and systemic risk. In addition, some studies 
document that more systemically risky BHCs or banks with higher returns volatility or stock 
turnover may induce supervisors to monitor these banks more closely (Wang, 2013); thus I 
include stock returns and returns volatility to account for the probability of higher detection. 
In addition, I estimate other regressions that may provide some further insight into bank 
litigation issues. For example, it has been noted that litigation and uncertainty surrounding 
potential liability may depress a bank’s stock price. Therefore I regress BHC stock prices on 
their litigation settlements. 
Finally, I perform some simple analysis to gain an insight into banks’ advertising and 
marketing expenses (hereafter AME). I run fixed effects panel regressions to observe 
whether higher AME increased banks’ returns and whether higher AME actually attracted 
more deposits. 
4.6! Results 
4.6.1! Economies of scale 
In Table 4.4 the coefficient of non-interest expense is negative and statistically 
significant, which which shows that there are significant economies of scale for large banks.  
In particular, when I disaggregate expenses, I find that larger BHCs enjoy lower 
Compensation, Expenses on Premises and Fixed Assets, Data Processing Expenses, 
                                                
82 Legal risk is subsumed in operational risk. Examples of operational risk events include the Nasdaq odd-
eighths pricing scandal in 1994, the 1995 bankruptcy of Barings Bank due to a rogue trader, the brokerage 
firm conflict of interest scandal in 2002, and the 1990s fines and lawsuits against Prudential Financial for 
misleading sales presentations. In response to these and other events, major institutions have been developing 
sophisticated operational risk measurement and management systems. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision has also incorporated a new minimum capital charge for operational risk as part of the Basel II 
Capital Accord (Basel Committee, 2001), and major ratings firms have begun to consider operational risk in 
assigning corporate financial ratings (Moody’s Investors Service, 2003). 
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Directors Fees, Postage Expenses, Accounting and Auditing Expenses, Consulting and 
Advisory Expenses and Legal fees (all coefficients are negative and statically significant). 
   Some results are intuitive. For example, large BHCs can enjoy lower postage expenses, 
consulting or auditing, or data processing, because large BHCs are able to spread the fixed 
component of these costs over a larger total base of operating revenue or total assets. As for 
legal expenses, many large BHCs have their own legal departments and thus it is normal that 
their expenses are lower compared to those of smaller BHCs that have to use external legal 
services. The negative coefficient on compensation is however surprising. Large banks enjoy 
economies of scale in compensation that is a significant part of the total non-interest 
expenses. I did not expect to observe economies of scale on compensation. 
   As for other results, I observe diseconomies of scale in the following areas: amortization 
and goodwill expenses, FDIC deposit insurance assessments, printing and stationery 
supplies and AME. For the first two categories, I do not have any economic interpretation 
of why this might be the case. However, for FDIC insurance premiums assessments, it is 
possible that FDIC takes into account the possible contagion risk stemming from the large 
banks, implicit “too big to fail” guarantees and relaxed market monitoring of large banks, 
resulting in higher premiums being charged to these banks. This however changes once I 
include deposits (the estimated coefficient remains negative although not statistically 
significant). This coefficient is likely to shrink further if my regression specification includes 
a control for the fraction of insured deposits, rather than total deposits. As for AME, the fact 
that larger banks have higher AME may be because reputation may play a huge stake and 
thus big banks choose to have expensive billboards and flashy logos. 
To conclude, I observe significant economies and diseconomies of scale for large BHCs 
once I split expenses into sub-categories. Overall, I cannot conclude that bank expenses will 
skyrocket if large banks are split into smaller banks. These results remain robust after I 
include more control variables (Tables 4.5 and 4.6). 
I emphasize that a number of caveats apply to my results. My reduced form of statistical 
correlations supports the existence of significant economies of scale in the banking sector. 
Caution, however, should be exercised when drawing a causal interpretation from them. 
Although my regressions control for a wide range of BHC characteristics, firm size may still 
correlate with omitted variables that are also associated with lower expenses, such as the 
quality of management, since above average profitability might not fully capture the quality 
of management. This caveat however also seems to apply more generally to the existing 
literature on scale economies in banking. 
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4.6.2! Litigation 
I find that larger BHCs are more often involved in litigation settlements. Regarding 
BHCs’ characteristics and litigation, I find that size is the only variable which would be 
associated with the probability of facing litigation charges as well as higher litigation 
settlement amounts, and it is robust across all specifications (probit and logit and OLS 
regressions in Tables 4.7- Table 4.9). 
That is, in contrast to the legal fees, which decrease as banks grow in size, I find that 
litigation settlements relate positively to bank size, which means that large banks face larger 
penalties. This contradicts the statements that larger banks continuously avoid charges or 
face lower punishment. Certainly, to examine this issue in more detail and address Dudley’s 
statements that large banks often could avoid all charges for all their wrongdoing, I would 
need to have data on the reasons why banks faced these charges. Regrettably, this is limited 
by data availability as only a small number of banks fill this information into “other 
expenses” on FR-9YC forms. 
In turn, in Table 4.7 (Column 3), I also find that systemic risk is positive and statistically 
significant in litigation regressions. That is, more systemically risky banks are also more 
likely to be involved in misconduct.  
In Table 4.9, I also find that a higher foreign loans ratio increases the litigation amount 
(Column 4 and Column 5). This may suggest that banks lending to other banks are exposed 
to the rules of foreign jurisdictions and naturally face higher uncertainty. I also observe that 
the litigation amount significantly increases with investment banking income and insurance 
related activities such as fiduciary income (Table 4.8 and Table 4.9). This is intuitive as 
investment banking and insurance activities are more complex activities than for example 
simple deposit taking and thus they carry more legal risk. Interestingly and contrary to my 
expectations, opacity (the bid–ask spread) is not significant in litigation regressions (Table 
4.8). This result is a venue for future study. 
I also observe that banks that have a higher credit risk (i.e. non-performing loans) have 
higher litigation costs, which may be an indication that banks that have a higher credit risk 
engage in more wrongdoing (Column 2 in Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9). This may seem intuitive 
if for example banks that have more non-performing loans anticipated that these non-
performing loans would turn into charge-offs and banks are trying to engage in some 
activities to generate higher revenues to cover potential future losses. I also find that BHCs 
with more employees have a lower risk of facing litigation charges. This may indicate that 
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more workers reduce human error or that more employees may provide better monitoring 
and better discipline within the bank; consequently, the bank faces fewer litigation charges. 
In addition, higher compensation is also negatively correlated with litigation settlement 
amounts, which from the perspective of operational risk suggests that more workers and 
better paid workers may reduce errors in the bank and reduce the amount of litigation 
settlements (Table 4.8 Column 4). 
I also observe that when small banks face litigation charges these are usually smaller than 
charges faced by large banks, possibly indicating that small BHCs engage in less severe 
wrongdoing since they do not have the “too big to jail” implicit cover; high fines may force 
them straight into terminating their businesses (Column 4 in Tables 4.7 and 4.8). In addition, 
I find that higher legal fees correlate negatively with litigation settlements, which suggests 
that it may be worth hiring more expensive lawyers (Column 4 in Table 4.7); however, 
results are not persistent across different specifications. Overall, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that litigation is the new cost of doing business and it is important to account for it 
when considering the design of new financial regulations. 
4.6.3! Advertising and marketing expenses 
I find that higher AME increase banks’ returns and attract more bank deposits (Tables 
4.10 and 4.11). However, based on the economics magnitude of the coefficient, one may 
infer that may have more to do with the reputation and the company's brand positioning than 
with anything else. I also find that AME are fairly constant and vary little with the economic 
cycles. Finally, systemically more risky banks spend less on AME (Table 4.12) than banks 
which are less systemically risky.  
4.7! Robustness Checks 
The efficiency ratio may be distorted in periods when net operating income is temporarily 
low, such as for example during the 2007–2009 crisis. Therefore, I test the sensitivity of my 
results to other normalizations of non-interest expenses, for example, by dividing the 
expenses by the level of capital. However, the results remain unchanged. 
As for the litigation section of this chapter, my major concern is the sample selection bias 
and the assumption that the detection of bank misconduct is perfect. That is, I can only 
observe the detected misconduct (once an enforcement action has been issued), but not the 
population of all committed cases of misconduct. This has also been pointed out by Zingales 
et al. (2010). They note that by focusing on discovered frauds, two biases are introduced. 
First, I do not observe frauds that were committed but which were never detected. Second, I 
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do not observe fraud which was detected but which never entered the public domain. Also, 
since the data available are only about the cost of the litigation, I cannot draw any 
conclusions as to whether banks were punished proportionately to the severity of their 
committed crime. However, Zingales et al. (2010) note that the intense public scrutiny of 
large U.S. firms, the ability to go back in time and sue based on past wrongdoing, and the 
strong incentives to sue by plaintiff lawyers is likely to diminish this problem. Therefore, 
there is so much one can do about it other than rely on efficiency of plaintiff lawyers and on 
the intense public scrutiny and hope that the detection of the bank misconduct is nearly 
perfect. 
Finally, I drop the 67 observations from my sample that have negative entries for 
expenses and rerun the regressions. This procedure does not result in significant changes in 
the coefficients of interest (Table 4.14).  
4.8! Conclusion 
Legislative changes over the past decades have been conducive to BHCs becoming more 
complex by expanding in size and scope, as well as to increased engagement in cross-border 
and cross-state businesses. 
Following the recent financial crisis, there is still widespread concern that large banking 
firms remain “too big to fail”. There is no consensus, however, among the bank researchers 
on the optimal size of banks, and no clear evidence as to what effect imposing a cap on bank 
size will have on bank operating revenues. 
Control of expenses remains a high priority as regulatory costs continue to rise. Therefore, 
in this chapter I describe the typical structure of BHCs non-interest expenses and examine 
the areas in which large banks enjoy significant economies of scale. These are the benefits 
that could be lost if limits on bank size are imposed. 
My findings show that overall, large banks enjoy economies of scale. In particular, 
significant economies of scale are found in auditing, consulting and legal fees, as well as 
expenses on fixed assets and premises, compensation and data processing. These economies 
of scale are likely to be lost once banks are split up. I also show that not all costs decrease 
as banks grow in size. Therefore, the argument that breaking up big banks will result in 
skyrocketing operating costs may be exaggerated. In addition, I observe diseconomies of 
scale in amortization expenses, goodwill, FDIC insurance premiums, printing and stationery 
supplies and AME. 
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What seems very evident is that technological progress and investment in technologies 
may face difficult times. This is because it was predominantly large banks that invested in 
innovation because they had a large client base and resources to invest. If large banks are 
split into parts, technological progress might be more challenging to achieve. 
Limiting the size of banks could be an appropriate policy goal, but only if the benefits of 
doing so exceeded the attendant reductions in scale economies, e.g. if systemic risk is 
significantly reduced. 
Another important aspect in this discussion is whether this loss in economies of scale 
would constitute a deadweight economic loss. Unfortunately, this is a challenging aspect to 
evaluate. There is a possibility that large banking firms have a greater bargaining power vis-
à-vis their suppliers and employees. Thus, they can enjoy lower operating costs. If cost 
differences are due only to bargaining power effects, then limiting the size of the largest 
BHCs would not necessarily generate deadweight economic loss, but would rather simply 
constitute a redistribution of resources from banks to the employees or external suppliers of 
banking services. 
As far as litigation risk is concerned, litigation costs play an important role in the 
discussion of breaking up “too big to jail” BHCs. My findings indicate that large banks face 
a higher probability of litigation risk, however, it is too early to affirm that litigation risk 
will decrease if the banks are broken up into bits. 
Misconduct in banking undermines the general public’s confidence in the safety and 
soundness of the banking sector. Thus, it seems rational to make those who were ultimately 
responsible for what went wrong in the bank personally liable for their mistakes so that the 
tab is not simply picked up by shareholders. In other words, instead of breaking up big banks, 
it seems more rational to impose harsher individual penalties for bankers to discipline them 
and generally to encourage more integrity in the banking sector until more data is gathered. 
In addition, personal liability is likely to reduce banks’ legal fees if bankers who are guilty 
for the financial misconduct of the banks had to pay these fees out of their own pockets. 
In general, the determinants of a bank’s misconduct is an important topic, which has wider 
implications for the broader economy. It would be interesting to examine whether various 
litigation charges and settlements have been proportionate to the severity of the misconduct, 
and whether large banks have been treated more favorably than smaller banks. As noted by 
Judge Rakoff (2015), there is usually a lack of proportionality between the fine imposed and 
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the company’s annual profits. That topic is an avenue for future research when data becomes 
available. 
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Chapter 5! 
5.1! Conclusion 
This thesis addresses key issues that were brought to light during the recent financial 
crisis. In particular, the financial crisis revealed how closely interconnected were many of 
the world's largest financial institutions through a web of short-term loans, ABS, ABCP, 
credit guarantees, and liquidity provision to SPVs, and also how legal frameworks and 
regulatory loopholes facilitated the financial crash. 
In particular, I focus on banks’ securitization activities, liquidity, and credit 
enhancements to ABCP conduits, banks’ opacity and returns volatility, as well as systemic 
risk. I focus on these issues primarily because existing literature provides mixed findings in 
this area. Empirical studies provide no conclusive evidence on the effect of securitization on 
banks’ credit risk, profitability and capital levels. While securitization and credit risk transfer 
techniques allow banks to move risks outside their balance sheet as well as to achieve 
portfolio diversification more efficiently it could also lead banks to engage in excessive risk 
taking by using the liquidity obtained from securitization to issue new riskier credits. 
Consequently, banks may end up with a higher credit risk because banks keep the junior 
tranche in securitization and because they extend guarantees to own and third parties’ SPVs.  
My analysis shows a positive relationship between securitization and credit risk. My 
results also show that securitization decreases BHCs’ profitability, particularly since the 
crisis. In turn, securitization increased BHCs’ capital levels. This aligns well with regulatory 
capital arbitrage because banks did not have to hold regulatory capital for the securitized 
assets. However, I find evidence that some banks might have been risk averse or if they had 
understood the risk of the securitization activities, they chose to increase their capital buffers 
above the level required by the regulators. 
In the third chapter, I examine opacity in the banking sector stemming from their exposure 
to the ABCP market. It is documented both in theoretical and empirical literature that 
securitization transactions are so complex that their disclosure generates disagreements even 
among security analysts with similar levels of expertise and provides a level of worldliness 
that is challenging even for sophisticated institutional investors. The existing literature 
mainly focuses on the benefits of ABCP programs. For example, it emphasizes that the 
ABCP market has been very competitive compared to other money market instruments 
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because it provides a high-quality credit profile as well as exemption from registering with 
the SEC. It also allowed banks to increase their capital levels and diversify their assets. 
I build on these studies and investigate some other issues, in particular the effect of 
financial innovation on banks’ information opacity. Given that many financial innovations 
(e.g., securitization, derivatives, hybrid securities, etc.) extensively rely on inherently 
complex structures, it is important to investigate how investors understand them is important. 
Thus, I address the costs that stem from the exposure to ABCP. Negative externalities from 
increased opacity are abundant. For example, increased opacity raises concerns about bank 
stability due to the lack of information surrounding a bank’s assets, increases in the volatility 
of returns, increases in a bank’s funding cost, or an increase in the volatility of returns, which 
in turn may significantly increase systemic risk. Hence, even though the vast majority of 
ABCP programs have credit ratings from major rating agencies, the specific assets held in 
the programmes are not widely known. That is, asset holdings of ABCP conduits are not 
transparent and thus it is difficult to assess the risk profile of the banks exposed to ABCP. 
My results show that it was difficult for investors to understand fully the risks of their 
banks being exposed to various credit and liquidity support mechanisms of ABCP programs. 
These guarantees also contributed to a higher returns volatility for these BHCs. In addition, 
although I do not find evidence that guarantees to ABCP conduits exert a direct effect on the 
accumulation of systemic risk, I do find evidence that it was the opacity and bank size which 
significantly increased systemic risk. 
From an economic standpoint, conduits are less regulated but they still have recourse to 
fully regulated banks through various guarantees which have access to government safety 
nets funded by taxpayers. It is likely that without such guarantees conduits, which are 
important for efficient risk sharing in the economy, may not survive adverse economic times. 
The main policy implication from the second chapter is that eliminating uncertainty and 
making complex transactions more transparent, rather than constraining the scope of banks’ 
activities may be a step toward a more robust and safer financial system. Certainly, 
transparency is not free and involves a delicate cost‒benefit tradeoff (Kohn, 2011), however, 
it appears that more disclosure, as opposed to prohibiting banks to engage in some activities, 
is a better tool to fix financial markets. 
In the fourth chapter, I examine two phenomena: the “too-big-to fail” and “too big to jail” 
incentives for banks to grow in size. To address these issues, I focus on banks’ operating 
costs. Again, while the majority of the existing literature focuses on the negative effects of 
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big banks, such as increased systemic risk, I look at the positive side and the benefits large 
banks can offer to their clients and shareholders. For example, operating costs of large banks 
are often smaller, as banks, for example, exhibit economies of scale, and can also offer 
cheaper products. That is, when evaluating the consequences of breaking up big banks, it is 
important to examine the benefits that large banks bring to the economy. 
My findings that large banks have higher systemic risk and are more opaque are consistent 
with most of the recent literature. However, the research that suggests that limits on bank 
size could increase the costs of providing banking services is not conclusive. I am the first 
to examine all the non-interest expenses and conclude that operating costs go down, ceteris 
paribus, as banks grow in size. That is, banks enjoy economies of scale, but not in all areas. 
To elaborate, expense ratio regression results indicate that while regulatory limits on the size 
of banks may be justified to limit the number of institutions deemed too big to fail, such 
limits could raise the cost of providing banking services by preventing banks from exploiting 
economies of scale, in particular in the technology sector. A consequence is that this can 
slow down innovation. In addition, it is worth noting that securitization programs have been 
structured primarily by large banks because of the high initial costs to set up SPVs. 
Therefore, if large banks are broken up, it will be more challenging to revitalize 
securitization markets. All in all, the problem of “too big to fail” is more complex than it 
seems. 
Government’s support for “too big to fail” banks during the crisis has taken different 
forms, from loan guarantees to direct injections of public funds into banks. The expectation 
of that support constitutes an implicit public subsidy to large banks because it allows banks 
to borrow at cheaper rates than they would if the possibility of that support did not exist. The 
cost of such government support to the taxpayers is very high. For example, the IMF notes 
that in 2012, the implicit subsidy given to global systemically important banks represented 
up to $70 billion solely in the United States. 
“If the crisis has taught a single lesson, it is that the too-big-to-fail problem must be 
resolved,” declared U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in 2010 when testifying 
before the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. He noted that “despite efforts to end 
too-big-to-fail, the financial markets believe that the government will bail out major 
financial institutions should they falter”. 
It has to be noted, however, that the idea that some financial institutions are too big to fail 
is not new. These issues were mentioned long before the crisis of 2007 (e.g. Freixas, 1997). 
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However, it is only since the recent crisis that policymakers have actually addressed the 
incentive for banks to grow too large and too systemically risky. 
Although it is true that large banks are more opaque, as shown in the third chapter of this 
thesis, my results in the third chapter indicate that breaking up big banks might induce a 
significant loss of economies of scale. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to address the 
incentive of banks to become “too big to fail”, by replacing the expectation of bailouts with 
a clearly structured policy of how regulators would go about liquidating insolvent banks 
including large systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), without causing any 
damage to the broader economy. In addition, introducing revised capital requirements that 
involve contingent capital and capital charges based on the firm’s contribution to systemic 
risk would allow successful banks to grow to whatever is truly their most efficient and 
unsubsidized size. 
Some of these issues have already been addressed by the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, which 
imposes new rules and oversight over banks and other financial firms, and which also aims 
to end "too big to fail" by creating a new process for resolving failures of large financial 
firms in a way that subjects the creditors of such firms to losses. 
The phenomenon that has not been addressed in the regulations though is the one of “too 
big to jail”. That is, there exists some evidence that large banks have been enjoying bailouts 
but also were essentially shielded from criminal prosecutions. As shown in the fourth 
chapter, large banks more often engage in financial misconduct. I observe multiple 
occurrences of the same big banks being punished, which may indicate that current measures 
of misconduct prevention may not be effective enough to deter banks from engaging in 
wrongdoing. Certainly, larger banks may be more complex and thus are more likely to 
commit errors. Controlling for complexity, however, I find that this is not the case, and that 
there must be some other reasons why large banks are more often not complying with the 
regulations such as for example the implicit guarantee from the government, i.e. where banks 
anticipate that government may shield them from costly litigation. Overall, I cannot exclude 
the possibility of the “too big to jail” phenomenon. This has to be weighed in the discussion 
about breaking up big banks. 
In conclusion, it seems that more supervision and disclosure and the elimination of 
overreliance on government support, might be a more appropriate measures for preventing 
future financial crises rather than breaking up big banks. In other words, since as noted in 
CH (2011) confidentiality served only to perpetuate banker misconduct and exacerbate the 
problems of troubled institutions, higher transparency is likely to increase bankers’ 
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misconduct, warn the financial community about serious regulatory compliance or safety 
and soundness issues that exist in the affected institutions, reduce opacity, decrease systemic 
risk and strengthen market discipline. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1-1 - Balance sheet structure 
1 2 
Balance Sheet Structure 
Total Assets BHCK2170 
Liquidity Ratio: Liquid Assets/Total Assets  (BHCK0081 + BHCK0395 + BHCK0397 + BHCK1754 + BHCK1773)/BHCK2170 
Loan Ratio: Loans/Total Assets  BHCK 2122/BHCK2170 
Trading Ratio: Trading Assets/Total Assets  BHCK3545/BHCK2170 
Deposit Ratio: Deposits/Total Assets  (BHCK3517+ BHCK3404)/BHCK3368 
Capital Ratio: Equity Capital/Total Assets  BHCK3210/BHCK2170 
Real Estate Loan Ratio: Real Estate Loans/Total 
Loans  BHCK1410/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123) 
C&I Loan Ratio: Commercial And Industrial 
Loans/Total Loans  
(BHCK1763 + BHCK1764)/(BHCK2122 + 
BHCK2123) 
Consumer Loan Ratio: Consumer Loans/Total 
Loans  
(BHCKB538 + BHCKB539 + 
BHCK2011)/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123) 
Other Loan Ratio: Other Loans/Total Loans  
(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123 - BHCK1410 - 
BHCK1763 - BHCK1764 - BHCKB538 - 
BHCKB539 -BHCK2011)/(BHCK2122 + 
BHCK2123) 
Regulatory Capital: Tier I Leverage Ratio  BHCK7204 
Regulatory Capital: Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio  BHCK7206 
Regulatory Capital: Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio  BHCK7205 
Interest Income/ Net Operating Revenue  BHCK4074/(BHCK4074 + BHCK4079) 
Interest Margin: Net Interest Income/Total Assets  BHCK4074/BHCK3368 
Return On Equity (ROE): Net Income/Equity 
Capital  BHCK4340/BHCK3519 
Return On Assets (ROA) Net Income/Total Assets  BHCK4340/BHCK3368 
RWATA Ratio: Risk-Weighted Assets/Total Assets  BHCKA223/BHCK2170 
NPL Ratio: Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans  (BHCK5525 + BHCK5526 - BHCK3506 - BHCK3507)/BHCK3516 
Charge-Off Ratio: Net Charge-Offs/Total Loans  (BHCK4635 - BHCK4605)/BHCK3516 
Loan Loss Provision Ratio: Quarterly Provision For 
Loan Losses/Total Loans  BHCK4230/BHCK3516 
Loan Loss Allowance Ratio: Allowance For Loan 
Losses/Total Loans  BHCK3123/BHCK3516 
Securitization Ratio: Securitized Assets/Total 
Assets  
(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + 
BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + 
BHCKB711)/BHCK2170 
Credit Enhancement Ratio Credit 
Enhancements/Total Assets  
(BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 + 
BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 + BHCKB717 + 
BHCKB718 + BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + 
BHCKC395 + BHCKC396 + BHCKC397 + 
BHCKC398 + BHCKC399 +BHCKC400 + 
BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 + BHCKC403 + 
BHCKC404 + BHCKC405 + 
BHCKC406)/BHCK2170 
Credit Enhancement/Securitization Ratio: Credit 
Enhancements/Securitized Assets  
(BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 + 
BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 + BHCKB717 + 
BHCKB718 +BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + 
BHCKC395 + BHCKC396 + BHCKC397 + 
BHCKC398 + BHCKC399 + 
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1 2 
Balance Sheet Structure 
Credit-Enhancing Interest-Only Strip Ratio Credit-
Enhancing Interest-Only Strips/Total Assets  
(BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 + 
BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 + BHCKB717 
+BHCKB718)/BHCK2170 
Subordinated Security Ratio Subordinated 
Securities/Total Assets  
(BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + BHCKC395 + 
BHCKC396 + BHCKC397 + BHCKC398 + 
BHCKC399)/BHCK2170 
Subordinated Securities/Securitized Assets  
(BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + BHCKC395 + 
BHCKC396 + BHCKC397 + BHCKC398 + 
BHCKC399)/ 
Standby Letter Of Credit Ratio: Standby Letters Of 
Credit/Total Assets  
(BHCKC400 + BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 + 
BHCKC403 + BHCKC404 + BHCKC405 + 
BHCKC406)/BHCK2170 
Standby Letter Of Credit/Securitization Ratio: 
Standby Letters Of Credit/Securitized Assets  
(BHCKC400 + BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 + 
BHCKC403 + BHCKC404 + BHCKC405 + 
BHCKC406)/ 
Liquidity Provision Ratio: Liquidity Provision 
Commitments/Total Assets  
(BHCKB726 + BHCKB727 + BHCKB728 + 
BHCKB729 + BHCKB730 + BHCKB731 + 
BHCKB732)/BHCK2170 
Liquidity Provision/Securitization Ratio: Liquidity 
Provision Commitments/Securitized Assets  
(BHCKB726 + BHCKB727 + BHCKB728 + 
BHCKB729 + BHCKB730 + BHCKB731 + 
BHCKB732)/(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + 
BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + 
BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
Seller’s Interest Ratio: Seller's Interest/Total Assets  
(BHCKB761 + BHCKB762 + BHCKB763 + 
BHCKB500 + BHCKB501 + 
BHCKB502)/BHCK2170 
Seller's Interest/Securitized Assets  
(BHCKB761 + BHCKB762 + BHCKB763 + 
BHCKB500 + BHCKB501 + 
BHCKB502)/(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + 
BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + 
BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
Chargeoffsec Ratio: Net Charge-Offs On 
Securitized Assets/Securitized  
(BHCKB747 + BHCKB748 + BHCKB749 + 
BHCKB750+ BHCKB751 + BHCKB752 + 
BHCKB753 - BHCKB754 - BHCKB755 - 
BHCKB756 - BHCKB757 - BHCKB758 - 
BHCKB759 - BHCKB760)/(BHCKB705 + 
BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + 
BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
Liquidity Provision Commitments To Other 
Institutions' Securitizations/Total Assets 
BHCKB783 + BHCKB784+ BHCKB785+ 
BHCKB786+ BHCKB787+ BHCKB788 + 
BHCKB789)/BHCK2170 
The Maximum Contractual Credit Exposure 
Remaining For Conduits Sponsored By The Bank 
Or Bank Affiliate  
BHCKB806 
Maximum Contractual Credit Exposure Remaining 
For Conduits Sponsored By Other Institutions  BHCKB807 
Unused Facilities For Liquidity Protection For 
Conduits Sponsored By The Bank Or Affiliate  BHCKB808 
Unused Liquidity Facilities For Conduits 
Sponsored By Other Institutions  BHCKB809 
Net Operating Revenue: Net Interest Income+ Non-
Interest Income BHCK4074 + BHCK4079 
Trading Revenue  BHCKA220 
Fiduciary Income  BHCK4070 + BHCKC887 + BHCKC385 + BHCKC387 
Investment Banking Income  BHCKB491 + BHCKC886 + BHCKC888 
Service Charges On Deposit Accounts In Domestic 
Offices  BHCK4884 
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1 2 
Balance Sheet Structure 
Net Servicing Fees (Incl. Income From Servicing 
Real Estate Mortgages, Credit Cards, And Other 
Financial Assets Held By Others)  
BHCKB492 
Non-Interest Expense  BHCK4093 
Compensation (Salaries And Employee Benefits)  BHCK4135 
Premises And Fixed Assets  BHCK4217 
Amortization Expense (Incl. Impairment Losses 
For Other Intangible Assets  BHCKC232 
Goodwill Impairment  BHCKC216 
Data Processing Expenses  BHCKC017 
Advertising And Marketing Expenses  BHCK0497 
Directors’ Fees  BHCK4136 
Printing, Stationery, And Supplies  BHCKC018 
Postage  BHCK8403 
Legal Fees  BHCK4141 
Fdic Deposit Insurance Assessment  BHCK4146 
Accounting And Auditing  BHCKF556 
Consulting And Advisory  BHCKF557 
Atm And Interchange  BHCKF558 
Telecommunications Expenses  BHCKF559 
Description Of The “Write-In” Components Of 
Other Non-Interest Expenses Reported In Schedule 
Hi: Memoranda Of The Fr -9yc, which Exceed 10 
Percent Of Total Other Non-Interest Expenses. 
 
Other Expenses  BHCK8565 
Other Expenses  BHCK8566 
Other Expenses  BHCK8567 
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Appendix 2  
Systemic risk 
2.1 Systemic risk83 
This appendix provides definitions for measures of systemic risk. In the expressions 
below, Crisist:t+T is as an indicator variable that defines if there is a financial crisis between 
dates t and t + T. The expected capital shortfall of bank i in case of such a crisis is defined 
as: -#$,(:(+1 = 3(−1 6"$,1 −7$,1|-9$&$&(:(+1 ,
It measures how much capital would be needed for that bank as to be correctly capitalized 
after the crisis. It should be noticed that if the resulting capital shortfall is very large, one 
obtains a link with the notion of too big to fail, which remains a source of concern for 
governments and regulators. 
The expected capital shortfall can be rewritten in terms of parameters that are measured 
from the balance sheet or estimated econometrically: -#$,(:(+1 = 6 :$,( − 1 − 1−6 1−:;<3#$.(:(+1 7$,(,
In this expression Li,t = Ai,t⁄Wi,t is the financial leverage and LRMESi,t:t+T is the long-run 
marginal expected shortfall of the bank, i.e., the sensitivity of its equity return to the 
evolution of the world market in case of a financial crash. The market capitalization (Wi,t) 
and the financial leverage (Li,t) are readily available from market and accounting data, 
respectively. What remains to be estimated is LRMES. 
2.2. Long-run Marginal Expected Shortfall 
LRMES is defined as the sensitivity to a (hypothetical) 40% semiannual market decline: :;<3#>,?:?@A = −3?BC ;>,?:?@A|;D,?:?@? ≤ −40%  
where T = 6 months and cumulative returns are defined as: 
                                                
83 Based on the notes and related documents available at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk/. 
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;$,(:(+1 = IJK 9$,(+*1*=1 − 1,
And 
;D,?:?@A = IJK 9D,?@LALMC − 1 
with ri,t and rM,t the daily log-return of firm i and the daily log-return of the market at date 
t, respectively. 
LRMES is particularly difficult to estimate because it corresponds to an extremely rare 
event. We had only three 40 percent market crashes over the last century (1929, 2000 and 
2008). Brownlees and Engle (2010) advocated for two complementary approaches to 
estimate the LRMES: 
The first (direct) approach consists of estimating LRMES as the expected return of the 
firm in case of a 40 percent semi-annual decline in the market return. Directly estimating the 
LRMES relies on simulation of the model over T periods using all information available at 
date t. It is estimated by: 
:;<3#>,?:?@A = ;>,?:?@A(O)QOMC + R ;D,?:?@A(O) ≤ −40%R ;D,?:?@A(O) ≤ −40%QOMC ,
where Ri,t:t+T(s) and RM,t:t+T(s) are simulated by the model described below, and (x) = 1 if 
x is true and 0 otherwise. This approach will provide accurate estimates of the true 
expectation provided the number of simulated data is sufficiently large. I use S = 50 000 
draws. 
In the second (indirect) approach, LRMES is based on the expected return of the firm in 
case of a (relatively modest) 2 percent decline in the daily market return, which is then 
extrapolated to match a ‘once-per-decade” crisis. The sensitivity to a 2 percent daily world 
market decline, called short-run MES (SRMES) is defined as: #;<3#>,? = −3? ;>,?@C|;D,?@C ≤ −2% ,
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Then under some (not too straightforward) assumptions, the LRMES can be approximated 
by: :;<3#>,?:?@A = 1 − IJK −',#;<3#>,? ,
The parameter k has been estimated via extreme value theory. For T = 6 months, it was 
found to be k = 18. This approximation allows a much faster estimation of the risk measures, 
but does not allow a multifactor approach. 
The worldwide systemic risk measures from NYU Stern’s Volatility Lab are based on the 
indirect approach. A single factor (the World market) is used to estimate the LRMES. 
(Volatility Lab also reports risk measures based on the direct approach for U.S. financial 
institutions, assuming a single factor approach). 
2.3. Systemic Risk of Financial Institutions 
I define the systemic risk of bank i as the expected capital shortfall when it is positive: #;R#T>,?:?@A = UVJ -#>,?:?@A, 0 ,
Having a negative capital shortfall means that the firm has more equity than required by 
the prudential ratio θ, so that the firm is not at risk. 
An important property of the SRISK measure is that it allows aggregation. MES of a 
given country or the entire financial system can be defined as: :;<3#W,?:?@A = −3?BC ;W,?:?@A|;D,?:?@A ≤ −40% ,
where RF,t:t+T denotes the cumulative return of the financial industry between t and t + T. 
As the return of the industry is just the value-weighted sum of the return of the N financial 
institutions(RF,t:t+T = ∑i=1Nwi,tRi,t:t+T, with wi,t = Wi,t⁄∑i=1NWi,t), the marginal contribution of a 
given institution to the overall LRMES is simply the LRMES of the institution. The aggregate 
MES is therefore obtained by aggregation: 
:;<3#W,?:?@A = X>,?:;<3#>,?:?@AY>MC ,
Similarly, the systemic risk of the entire financial system is: 
 130 
#;R#TW,?:?@A = X>,?Y>MC #;R#T>,?:?@A,
SRISK is based on the assumption that the book value of the (long-term) debt Dit of the 
bank will remain constant over the six-month horizon while its market Capital MVit will 
decrease by its six-month return in a crisis, called the LRMES. SRISK of bank i at time t is 
defined by where Rmt+h is the return of the market index from period t to period t + h (h = 
6 months), k is the prudential capital ratio (8% for US financial firms), and LRMESit = -
Et(Rit+h|Rmt+h ≤ -40%). Compared to other market-based measures of systemic risk like 
the CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) or the Distress Insurance Premium of Huang 
et al., (2012), an interesting feature of SRISK is that it is a function of size and leverage 
which are two characteristics that the regulator finds particularly relevant when measuring 
the solvency risk of banks. 
#;R#T>?= 3? ' Z>?@[ + <\>?@[ − <\>?@[|;]?@[ ≤ −40%= 'Z>? − 1 − ' ∗ <\>? ∗ 1 − :;<3#>? ,
 The SRISK can be written as a function of size, leverage and risk and is defined as: #;R#T>? = <\>? ' :_`>? − 1 − 1 − ' 1 − :;<3#>? ,
where Lvgit is the quasi-market leverage defined as the ratio of quasi-market assets to 
market Capital (Lvgit = (MVit + Dit)=MVit). Therefore, the capital shortfall of a bank will 
be large if the bank is large, highly leveraged and highly sensitive to an aggregate shock as 
measured by LRMESit. 
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Appendix 3 
Figure 3-1 - Systemic risk from 2000 to 2012 
 
Note: Bank codes are provided in Table 4.1a. 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on statistical analysis of FR -9YC data. 
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Appendix 4 
Table 4-1a - BHCs used in systemic risk regressions 
1 2 
Ticker BHC Name 
BAC Bank Of America Corp 
BBT B B & T Corp 
BK Bank New York Inc 
C Citigroup Inc 
CBH Commerce Bancorp Inc Nj 
CMA Comerica Inc 
HBAN Huntington Bancshares Inc 
HCBK Hudson City Bancorp Inc 
JPM J P Morgan Chase & Co 
KEY Keycorp New 
MI Marshall & Ilsley Corp New 
MTB M & T Bank Corp 
NCC National City Corp 
NTRS Northern Trust Corp 
NYB New York Community Bancorp Inc 
PBCT Peoples United Financial Inc 
PNC P N C Financial Services Grp Inc 
RF Regions Financial Corp New 
SNV Synovus Financial Corp 
STI Suntrust Banks Inc 
UB Unionbancal Corp 
USB U S Bancorp Del 
WB Wachovia Corp 2nd New 
WFC Wells Fargo & Co New 
ZION Zions Bancorp 
AMP Ameriprise Financial Inc 
AXP American Express Co 
BEN Franklin Resources Inc 
CBSS Compass Bancshares Inc 
COF Capital One Financial Corp 
FITB Fifth Third Bancorp 
SEIC S E I Investments Company 
ETFC E Trade Financial Corp 
GS Goldman Sachs Group Inc 
MS Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co 
SCHW Schwab Charles Corp New 
TROW T Rowe Price Group Inc 
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Table 4-2a - Frequency of BHCs involved in litigation 
1 2 3 4 
Legal name Freq. Legal name Freq. 
1ST Centennial Bancorp 2 Heartland Financial USA, Inc. 1 
Access National Corporation 6 Heritage Oaks Bancorp 2 
ACNB Corporation 2 High Country Financial Corporation 2 
Alliance Financial Services, Inc. 8 Hometown Community Bancorp, Inc. 3 
Amboy Bancorporation 7 HSBC North America Inc. 2 
Americorp 1 HSBC USA Inc. 2 
Amsouth Bancorporation 2 International Bancshares Corporation 5 
ANB Corporation, The 1 J.P. Morgan Chase & co. 2 
Associated Banc-Corp 5 JPMorgan Chase & co. 26 
Banctrust Financial Group, Inc. 2 K Capital Corporation 2 
Bank of America Corporation 14 Mackinac Financial Corporation 1 
Bank of Commerce Holdings 2 Mercantile Bancorp, Inc. 2 
Belmont Bancorp 6 Mid-America Bancorp 3 
Beverly Hills Bancorp Inc. 1 Mountain National Bancshares, Inc. 2 
BOH Holdings, Inc. 1 National Bancorp, Inc. 1 
Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. 1 National Bancshares, Inc. 3 
Bostonfed Bancorp, Inc. 1 National City Corporation 4 
Bremer Financial Corporation 2 National Commerce Financial Corporation 4 
Business Bancshares, Inc. 2 NB Holdings Corporation 2 
Capital Bank Financial Corp. 1 New Century Bancorp, Inc. 2 
Capital One Financial Corporation 3 Northeast Bancorp 3 
Centennial First Financial Services 3 Northern Trust Corporation 1 
Central Bancorp, Inc. 3 Old National Bancorp 1 
Central Bancshares, Inc. 1 Pacific City Financial Corporation 2 
Chinatrust Capital Corporation 8 Pacwest Bancorp 1 
CIB Marine Bancshares, Inc. 5 Pontotoc Bancshares Corp. 2 
Citicorp 3 Provident Financial Services, Inc. 1 
Citigroup Holdings Company 3 Pulaski Financial Corp. 4 
Citigroup Inc. 16 R&G Financial Corporation 4 
Citizens Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 1 Raymond James Financial, Inc. 3 
Comerica Incorporated 3 Regions Financial Corporation 4 
Commerce Bancshares, Inc. 1 Riggs National Corporation 2 
Commerce National Financial Services, Inc. 1 Saehan Bancorp 7 
Community Bancshares, Inc. 2 Santander Holdings USA, Inc. 2 
Community West Bancshares 3 Simmons First National Corporation 4 
Coppermark Bancshares, Inc. 4 Simplicity Bancorp, Inc. 1 
CU Bank Shares, Inc. 1 South Financial Group, Inc., The 4 
CVB Financial Corp. 1 Southern Illinois Bancorp, Inc. 1 
Discover Financial Services 8 Southern Michigan Bancorp, Inc. 1 
Drew Bancshares, Inc. 1 State Financial Services Corporation 1 
Enterprise Financial Services Corp. 1 State Street Corporation 1 
Evergreenbancorp, Inc. 1 Sterling Financial Corporation 1 
Fidelity D&D Bancorp, Inc. 1 Stifel Financial Corp. 1 
Financial Investors of the South, Inc. 1 Summit Financial Group, Inc. 1 
First Bancorp 1 Synovus Financial Corp. 6 
First bancorp. of durango, Inc. 12 Taunus Corporation 1 
First Citizens Bancorp 3 Taylor Capital Group, Inc. 3 
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1 2 3 4 
Legal name Freq. Legal name Freq. 
First Commonwealth Financial Corporation 1 Tri City Bankshares Corporation 3 
First National Bancshares, Inc. 1 U.S. Bancorp 2 
First National Community Bancorp Inc. 1 U.S. Trust Corporation 1 
First National Of Nebraska, Inc. 1 UCBH Holdings, Inc. 2 
First Regional Bancorp 1 UMB Financial Corporation 1 
FNB United Corp. 1 Umpqua Holdings Corporation 5 
FSB Mutual Holdings, Inc. 3 Wachovia Corporation 2 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., The 4 Washington Trust Bancorp, Inc. 4 
Grand Bankshares, Inc. 3 Webster Financial Corporation 3 
Great Southern Capital Corporation 1 West Coast Bancorp 1 
Harris Bankcorp, Inc. 3 Westamerica Bancorporation 3 
Harris Financial Corp. 2 Total 341 
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Table 4-3a - BHCs significantly involved in litigation settlements during 2001‒2014 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Year 
Frequency 
of 
Litigation 
Average 
Litigation 
Settlement 
($m) 
S.D. Median Min Max 
2001 17  64,685   28,700.00   54,686.00   5,111.00   150,000.00  
2002 32  72,231   14,338.00   79,876.00   19,898.00   89,779.00  
2003 17  4,960   2,320.00   6,765.00   200.00   7,059.00  
2004 41  919,539   97,877.00   988,997.00   62,999.00   999,978.00  
2005 13  666,190   130,988.00   666,890.00   34,002.00   878,999.00  
2006 6  5,654   970.00   4,674.00   1,389.00   6,787.00  
2007 16  23,542   16,876.00   20,548.00   1,002.00   57,657.00  
2008 51  8,751   2,100.00   8,788.00   1,201.00   9,876.00  
2009 8  30,563   5,600.00   32,569.00   14,560.00   34,565.00  
2010 32  883,612   502,320.00   912,022.00   345,983.00   998,787.00  
2011 33  1,058,921   60,898.00   1,098,921.00   9,800.00   220,001.00  
2012 42  1,073,620   67,677.00   1,073,550.00   1,789.00   250,505.00  
2013 33  2,181,125   89,009.00   2,198,600.00   1,890.00   300,911.00  
Source: Author’s calculations, based on statistical analysis of FR-9YC data. 
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Appendix 5 
Tables 
Chapter 2 Tables 
Table 2-1a - Global Securitisation Issuance in 2011 (€ Billions) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 2011:Q1 2011:Q2 2011:Q3 2011:Q4 Total 
US 118.5 115.3 86.2 77 397 
Europe 16.4 24.5 9.7 20.5 71 
Asia 10.2 19.9 13.1 14.9 58 
Total 145.1 159.6 108.9 112.4 526 
Source: Dealogic , 2012 
 
Table 2-1b - European and US Securitisation Issuance (€ Billions)1 
Source: Bloomberg, Dealogic, Thomson Reuters, SIFMA 
  1 Note: historical data for the Asian markets was not available. 
  
1 2 3 
Year US Europe 
2000 1,088.00 78.2 
2001 2,308.40 152.6 
2002 2,592.70 157.7 
2003 2,914.50 217.3 
2004 1,956.60 243.5 
2005 2,650.60 327 
2006 2,455.80 481 
2007 2,147.10 453.7 
2008 933.6 711.1 
2009 1,358.90 414.1 
2010 1,276.70 382.9 
2011 1,013.70 367.2 
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Chapter 2 Tables  
Table 2-1 - Summary Statistics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total Assets ($million) 51797 11208.82 87527.71 5.670409 2010457 
Size 51797 6.9646 1.365825 1.735261 14.51387 
Leverage 50704 .0914207 .0829077 0 12.46 
Liquidity Ratio 50517 .2434069 .1237085 0 .9641692 
Profitability 51793 .0047919 .0128509 -.2526283 1.590221 
Charge-off Ratio 51752 .0037013 .0088443 -.0165576 .4626626 
NPL Ratio 41891 .0193815 .3439997 0 70.10714 
Efficiency 51793 .6971697 .5697971 0 104.2148 
Loan Ratio 51797 .667493 .1359254 0 .9727224 
Real Estate Loan Ratio 51639 .7268647 .1686279 0 1 
Consumer Loan Ratio 51639 .065387 .0929127 0 1 
Commercial Loan Ratio 51639 .156215 .102705 0 1 
Other Loan Ratio 51793 .2328314 .286721 0 17.04168 
Sec.Residential 51797 .0083474 .1187858 0 8.389473 
Sec.Home Equity 51797 .0001805 .0036998 0 .2198979 
Sec. Credit Cards 51797 .0012652 .0303578 0 1.586849 
Sec. Auto Loans 51797 .0002483 .0046506 0 .2202682 
Sec. Commercial 51797 .0001707 .0038248 0 .5279339 
Sec. Other 51797 .001396 .0413102 0 3.410772 
Third Party Credit Enh. Ratio 51797 .0003074 .0052552 0 0.1262455 
Third Party Liquidity Prov. Ratio 51797 .00003 .0008538 0 0.0090673 
Note: This table reports the variable’s name, mean, standard deviation, minimum- and maximum 
value of the individual bank time-series averages, and number of observations. The sample period 
is from 2001Q2 to 2013 Q1. The sample contains 1718 BHCs. The variables are reported in the 
$ millions. Variables are winsorized at 1% and definition of the variables are provided in the 
Appendix 1. 
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Table 2-2 - Summary statistics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Non-securitizers Securitizers 
Variables N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max Difference 
Total Assets ($million) 42078 2255153 15807.62 5670409 673258.2 9718 49978.37 194691.2 1514452 2010457 2116.19% 
Size 42078 6705206 .9600697 1735261 1341988 9718 8087742 2097511 5020224 1451387 20.62% 
Leverage 41250 1173971 3615802 3290556 3236246 9452 1212761 3905444 3290556 3236246 3.30% 
Capital Ratio 41250 .1255117 .0440338 .0245 .3278 9452 .1206075 .0448628 .0245 .3278 -3.91% 
Liquidity Ratio 41102 .2458106 .1202668 .0352983 .6056811 9414 .2325863 .1176384 .0352983 .6056811 -5.38% 
Profitability 40902 .1617221 .3268365 -1772282 .7996585 9448 .1802781 .3269352 -1772282 .7996585 11.47% 
RWATA Ratio 41250 .7271226 .1141493 .3861856 .9793449 9452 .7273649 .1166916 .3861856 .9793449 0.03% 
Charge-off Ratio 40849 .1514844 .2976703 -.0648922 18718 9446 .1871332 .3209441 -.0648922 18718 23.53% 
NPL Ratio 33901 -4925533 140892 -8988984 -2312795 7989 -4696984 1209251 -8988984 -2312795 -4.64% 
Efficiency 42074 .6905404 .1710661 .3590868 1526493 9718 .6790775 .166846 .3590868 1526493 -1.66% 
Loan Ratio 42078 .6726463 .1290071 .204754 .900983 9718 .6498939 .13946 .204754 .900983 -3.38% 
Real Estate Loan Ratio 41950 .7391402 .1556766 .1121248 .9898053 9688 .6777965 .1936344 .1121248 .9898053 -8.30% 
Consumer Loan Ratio 41950 .0583395 .068634 .0002593 .4091289 9688 .0805341 .0911376 .0002593 .4091289 38.04% 
Commercial Loan Ratio 41950 .153409 .0972814 .0013215 .5290162 9688 .1618466 .0944183 .0013215 .5290162 5.50% 
Other Loan Ratio 41950 .0450097 .0679336 0 .4181471 9688 .0673518 .088965 0 .4181471 49.64% 
Non-interest Income 42074 .2177203 .1264514 -.0148132 .8109758 9718 .30659 .1729796 -.0148132 .8109758 40.82% 
Sec.Residential 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0372347 .1491731 0 1475278 . 
Sec.Home Equity 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0009047 .0073445 0 .131932 . 
Sec. Credit Cards 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0066227 .0673503 0 1315795 . 
Sec. Auto Loans 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0012796 .0098796 0 .1657618 . 
Sec. Commercial 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0007964 .0053467 0 .070414 . 
Sec. Other 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0050435 .0312801 0 .4357904 . 
Credit Enh. Ratio 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0016322 .0118354 0 .3820765 . 
CEI Ratio 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0004559 .0032891 0 .0580378 . 
SUB Ratio 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0005518 .0035607 0 .0578376 . 
SLC Ratio 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0007485 .0106116 0 .3820765 . 
Liquidity Prov. Ratio 42099 0 0 0 0 9718 .0001593 .0019518 0 .0588027 . 
Third Party Credit Enh. Ratio 42099 .0001428 .0028396 0 .1262455 9718 .0002115 .0022472 0 .0766659 48.13% 
Third Party Liquidity Prov. Ratio 42099 3.240 .0001342 0 .0090673 9718 .0001119 .0018352 0 .0547001 3353.77% 
Note: This table reports the variable’s name, mean, standard deviation, minimum- and maximum value of the individual bank time-series averages, and number of 
observations. This is done per observation, grouped by banks which securitize and which do not securitize at any point in time in the sample period of 2001Q2 to 2013 Q1. 
The sample contains 1718 BHCs, of which 299 BHCs securitize their assets. The variables are reported in the $ millions. Variables are winsorized at 1% and definition of 
the variables are provided in the Appendix 1. The mean differences in percentage terms between banks that securitize and those that do not securitize are also reported.  
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Table 2-3 - Correlation matrix 
Note: The table reports pairwise correlations between the main regression variables. * indicates significance at 1%. Definition and construction of the variables are 
provided in Appendix 1.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Variables 
Securitiz
ation 
dummy 
Sec.Resid
ential 
Sec.Hom
e Equity 
Sec. 
Credit 
Cards 
Sec. Auto 
Loans 
Sec. 
Commer
cial 
Sec. 
Other RWATA 
Non-
performi
ng loans 
Profitabi
lity Capital Size 
Credit 
Enh. 
Ratio 
Liquidity 
Prov. 
Ratio 
Third 
Party 
Credit 
Enh. 
Ratio 
Third 
Party 
Liquidity 
Prov. 
Ratio 
Securitizatio
n dummy 1.0000                
Sec.Resident
ial 0.3610* 1.0000               
Sec.Home 
Equity 0.1815* 0.4049* 1.0000              
Sec. Credit 
Cards 0.1452* 0.0070 0.0006 1.0000             
Sec. Auto 
Loans 0.1907* 0.0099 0.0083 0.0308* 1.0000            
Sec. 
Commercial 0.2189* 0.0399* 0.1437* 0.1230* 0.0199* 1.0000           
Sec. Other 0.2366* 0.0597* 0.0987* 0.1401* 0.0044 0.0393* 1.0000          
RWATA 0.0113 -0.0141* -0.0019 0.0652* 0.0263* -0.0201* 0.0533* 1.0000         
Non-
performing 
loans 
0.0032 0.0058 0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0023 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0095 1.0000        
Profitability 0.0175* 0.0062 0.0022 0.0230* 0.0555* 0.0027 0.0159* -0.0508* -0.3802* 1.0000       
Capital -0.0100 -0.0078 -0.0186* 0.0078 0.0806* -0.0312* 0.0323* -0.1902* -0.0021 -0.3216* 1.0000      
Size 0.4833* 0.2108* 0.1517* 0.1274* 0.0725* 0.1521* 0.1125* -0.0368* 0.0024 -0.0056 -0.0173* 1.0000     
Credit Enh. 
Ratio 0.2139* 0.0845* 0.1471* 0.0476* 0.0209* 0.1271* 0.0727* -0.0066 0.0002 0.0033 -0.0189* 0.2908* 1.0000    
Liquidity 
Prov. Ratio 0.0925* 0.0184* 0.1324* 0.0297* 0.0248* 0.0803* 0.1384* -0.0028 -0.0006 0.0017 -0.0102 0.1140* 0.0578* 1.0000   
Third Party 
Credit Enh. 
Ratio 
0.2331* 0.1000* 0.0434* 0.0946* 0.0202* 0.0535* 0.0813* -0.0288* 0.0001 0.0027 -0.0204* 0.3353* 0.6124* 0.1265* 1.0000  
Third Party 
Liquidity 
Prov. Ratio 
0.1874* 0.0264* 0.0474* 0.0458* 0.0349* 0.0253* 0.0835* -0.0152* -0.0003 0.0009 -0.0164* 0.2487* 0.3416* 0.3635* 0.4660* 1.0000 
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Table 2-4 - Treatment effect model. Securitization and BHCs’ performance measures  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy NPL Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Capital 
Loan ratio -0.653 0.518*** -0.657 -1.369*** -0.468 0.598 4.020*** -0.0899 -1.016* -0.148*** (0.602) (0.037) (0.596) (0.280) (0.430) (0.470) (0.692) (0.069) (0.558) (0.022) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
0.574* -0.04*** 0.562* 2.520*** 0.179** 0.131** 0.127* 0.029*** 0.448 -1.17*** 
(0.306) (0.007) (0.329) (0.704) (0.071) (0.005) (0.067) (0.002) (0.278) (0.232) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
9.587** -0.0740 9.643** -2.349 6.432*** -5.370** 4.017*** 0.0826 10.37** -0.0672*** 
(4.674) (0.146) (4.523) (1.489) (1.573) (2.516) (1.311) (0.234) (4.169) (0.023) 
Seller’s 
Interest 
3.505*** 0.133*** 3.800*** -0.875 1.191** -0.0694 2.032*** 0.312*** 3.644*** -0.0305*** 
(1.312) (0.040) (1.333) (0.567) (0.515) (0.320) (0.682) (0.058) (0.921) (0.010) 
Third Part. 
Credit 
Enhancements 
0.057 -0.026 0.057 -0.104 0.011 0.043 0.836 -0.005 -0.063 -0.030 
(0.204) (0.043) (0.147) (0.206) (0.124) (0.115) (0.708) (0.028) (0.170) (0.021) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
2.374 0.307*** 2.342 -2.445*** 2.087** -1.950** 4.437*** 0.176 1.626 -0.146*** 
(2.918) (0.041) (2.802) (0.624) (0.822) (0.825) (0.719) (0.159) (2.075) (0.017) 
Size 0.236*** 0.0043** 0.234*** 0.026 0.125*** -0.026 0.311*** 0.013*** 0.212*** -0.0082*** (0.048) (0.002) (0.048) (0.016) (0.027) (0.019) (0.030) (0.003) (0.042) (0.007) 
Profitability -0.056 -0.0056* -0.066 0.170** 0.490*** -0.719*** 0.142*  -0.604*** 0.0015 (0.088) (0.003) (0.083) (0.077) (0.059) (0.046) (0.076)  (0.068) (0.001) 
Liquidity -1.735** -0.020 -1.696** -0.036 -0.351 -0.577 -1.257* -0.034 -1.645*** 0.021 (0.698) (0.035) (0.683) (0.266) (0.483) (0.480) (0.664) (0.070) (0.623) (0.021) 
Expenses -0.327 -0.0056 -0.347 0.179 -0.490*** 0.436*** 0.456** -0.759*** -1.313*** -0.023*** (0.224) (0.009) (0.218) (0.132) (0.161) (0.124) (0.187) (0.021) (0.224) (0.005) 
Non-
performing 
loans 
0.122*** 0.00085 0.119*** 0.0650*** 0.793***  0.0284 -0.0386*** 0.0709* 0.000360 
(0.041) (0.001) (0.040) (0.011) (0.027)  (0.028) (0.002) (0.041) (0.001) 
Capital 1.315 -1.011*** 1.044 0.782 0.166 1.183 27.38*** 0.184 -0.218  (1.447) (0.099) (1.349) (0.793) (0.945) (0.865) (1.211) (0.134) (1.252)  
Non-interest 
income 
1.178*** 0.0277** 1.114*** -0.501*** 0.863*** -0.481** 0.456* 0.355*** 1.277*** 0.000939 
(0.309) (0.014) (0.294) (0.129) (0.233) (0.208) (0.245) (0.034) (0.274) (0.007) 
Secdummy  0.0216*  -0.258*  1.659***  -0.292***  0.0396***  (0.012)  (0.138)  (0.040)  (0.030)  (0.001) 
Fad 0.0139***  0.0141***  0.00631***  0.00475***  0.0102***  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  
Constant -2.108** 0.579*** -2.029** -0.0978 2.227*** -5.609*** -11.71*** 0.513*** -0.565 0.366*** (0.851) (0.052) (0.842) (0.438) (0.598) (0.589) (0.842) (0.089) (0.793) (0.022) 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy NPL Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Capital 
Observations 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,216 47,216 47,296 47,305 47,305 47,296 
Clusters 1506 1506 1506 1506 1508 1508 1506 1508 1508 1506 
Wald ChiSq 18195 18195 2630 2630 17279 17279 6983 12393 12393 6983 
Rho -0.116 -0.116 0.0575 0.0575 -0.892 -0.892 -0.897 0.588 0.588 -0.897 
ChiSq H0: 
Rho = 0 3,471 3,471 5,503 5,503 2562 2562 548.1 49.89 49.89 548.1 
P-val H0 0.0624 0.0624 0.0190 0.0190 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables are lagged one quarter. I also 
include quarter dummies, which are not reported. “Fad” is also lagged one quarter. Credit risk (RWATA and NPL), profitability, and Capital are not included in their own 
respective outcome regressions. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the likelihood ratio test 
against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) reported in parentheses***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2-5 - Treatment effect model. Securitization and credit risk 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA Secdummy RWATA Secdummy RWATA Secdummy RWATA Secdummy RWATA 
Sec. residential    -0.00966      -0.0179    (0.025)      (0.030) 
Sec. home 
equity 
   -0.571      -1.083 
   (0.592)      (0.733) 
Sec. credit card    0.0860***      0.0277    (0.030)      (0.036) 
Sec. auto loans    1.083***      1.122***    (0.384)      (0.280) 
Sec. commercial    -1.068      -2.180    (1.597)      (1.90) 
Sec. other    0.739***      0.590***    (0.121)      (0.070) 
Loan ratio -0.563 0.528*** -0.641 0.521***       (0.612) (0.046) (0.602) (0.031)       
Size 0.248*** 0.00432** 0.236*** 0.00481*** 0.248*** -0.00723*** 0.248*** -0.00722*** 0.241*** -0.00638*** (0.047) (0.001) (0.048) (0.001) (0.048) (0.001) (0.048) (0.001) (0.049) (0.001) 
Profitability -0.0426 -0.00546 -0.0510 -0.00540* -0.0723 -0.0104*** -0.0729 -0.0105*** -0.0804 -0.00975*** (0.088) (0.003) (0.088) (0.003) (0.081) (0.003) (0.081) (0.003) (0.083) (0.003) 
Liquidity -1.621** -0.00981 -1.679** -0.00550 -1.114** -0.473*** -1.114** -0.473*** -1.133** -0.461*** (0.702) (0.038) (0.686) (0.026) (0.471) (0.025) (0.471) (0.024) (0.469) (0.019) 
Expenses -0.292 -0.00533 -0.320 -0.00336 -0.278 -0.0381*** -0.279 -0.0383*** -0.304 -0.0344*** (0.225) (0.009) (0.223) (0.008) (0.224) (0.011) (0.224) (0.011) (0.225) (0.009) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.135*** 0.000533 0.124*** 0.000637 0.135*** 0.00203* 0.134*** 0.00200* 0.121*** 0.00221** 
(0.041) (0.001) (0.041) (0.001) (0.042) (0.001) (0.042) (0.001) (0.041) (0.001) 
Capital 1.306 -1.005*** 1.139 -1.066*** 0.873 -1.201*** 0.873 -1.202*** 1.119 -1.266*** -1.466 (0.117) -1.373 (0.079) -1.443 (0.133) -1.441 (0.132) -1.414 (0.089) 
Non-interest 
income 
1.371*** 0.0295** 1.158*** 0.0188 1.218*** -0.0363*** 1.214*** -0.0367*** 1.082*** -0.0394*** 
(0.304) (0.014) (0.301) (0.012) (0.302) (0.013) (0.302) (0.013) (0.300) (0.013) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
-3.15**   0.563*   -5.05***   0.570* 
  (0.306) (1.22)     (0.311) (1.52) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
-0.244   9.505**   -0.130   9.659** 
(0.209)   (4.619)   (0.205)   (4.037)  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA Secdummy RWATA Secdummy RWATA Secdummy RWATA Secdummy RWATA 
Third Part. 
Credit 
Enhancements 
          
  0.0521 (0.202) 
-0.0180 
(0.032)     
0.0811 
(0.174) 
-0.0343 
(0.038) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
2.360 0.328***     2.141 0.324***   
(2.972) (0.034)     (2.831) (0.046)   
Secdummy  0.0305**    0.0179  0.0163  0.00840  (0.011)    (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.012) 
Fad 0.0143***  0.0140***  0.0153***  0.0154***  0.0148***  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Securitized 
assets 
    0.0987***      
    (0.032)      
Loans: real 
estate 
    -0.199*** 0.597 -0.191*** 0.594 -0.200*** 1.066 
    (0.718) (0.069) (0.719) (0.069) (0.837) (0.061) 
Loans: 
commercial 
    -0.0207 -0.200 -0.0175 -0.208 -0.0218 0.354 
    (0.816) (0.077) (0.815) (0.077) (0.916) (0.065) 
Loans: 
consumer 
    -0.199** 1.429 -0.213*** 1.422 -0.200** 1.737 
    (1.0450 (0.082) -1.045 (0.082) (1.131) (0.066) 
Loans: other     1.441 -0.215*** 1.436 -0.214*** 1.936* -0.212***     (1.047) (0.069) -1.044 (0.069) -1.114 (0.066) 
Constant -2.278*** 0.568*** -2.095** 0.581*** -3.261*** 1.368*** -3.255*** 1.367*** -3.737*** 1.365*** (0.845) (0.065) (0.853) (0.044) -1.006 (0.084) (1.006) (0.083) (1.084) (0.069) 
Observations 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,295 47,295 47,295 47,295 47,295 47,295 
Clusters 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 
Wald ChiSq 7874 7874 19252 19252 7003 7003 7009 7009 18753 18753 
Rho -0.167 -0.167 -0.129 -0.129 -0.0766 -0.0766 -0.0716 -0.0716 -0.0494 -0.0494 
ChiSq H0: Rho 
= 0 7.018 7.018 2.865 2.865 1.019 1.019 0.878 0.878 0.528 0.528 
P-val H0 0.00807 0.00807 0.0905 0.0905 0.313 0.313 0.349 0.349 0.467 0.467 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables are lagged one quarter. I also 
include quarter dummies, which are not reported. “Fad” is also lagged one quarter. Credit risk (RWATA and NPL), profitability, and Capital are not included in their own 
respective outcome regressions. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the likelihood ratio test 
against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) reported in parentheses***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2-6 - Treatment effect regressions: credit risk taking (ΔRWATA) and securitization 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA 
Sec. residential      0.119    0.104      (0.260)    (0.283) 
Sec. home 
equity 
     -1.963    -0.154 
     (4.565)    (4.911) 
Sec. credit card      0.199    0.435      (0.908)    (0.955) 
Sec. auto loans      2.072    2.595      (1.746)    (2.190) 
Sec. commercial      -5.042    -2.254      (5.128)    (5.893) 
Sec. other      -0.198    0.472      (0.614)    (0.808) 
Loan ratio -0.570 -1.372*** -0.571 -1.383*** -0.656 -1.389***     (0.598) (0.272) (0.598) (0.273) (0.596) (0.284)     
Size 0.245*** 0.0208 0.245*** 0.0200 0.234*** 0.0260 0.245*** 0.0509*** 0.238*** 0.0576*** (0.047) (0.015) (0.047) (0.015) (0.048) (0.016) (0.048) (0.016) (0.048) (0.016) 
Profitability -0.0610 0.172** -0.0611 0.173** -0.0666 0.169** -0.0767 0.193** -0.0842 0.189** (0.082) (0.077) (0.082) (0.077) (0.083) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) 
Liquidity -1.584** -0.0588 -1.585** -0.0732 -1.696** -0.0424 -1.116** 1.154*** -1.141** 1.180*** (0.679) (0.262) (0.679) (0.264) (0.682) (0.271) (0.468) (0.170) (0.466) (0.172) 
Efficiency -0.323 0.180 -0.324 0.181 -0.347 0.178 -0.287 0.254** -0.312 0.249* (0.217) (0.132) (0.217) (0.132) (0.218) (0.132) (0.219) (0.129) (0.221) (0.129) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.130*** -0.0655*** 0.130*** -0.0652*** 0.119*** -0.0650*** 0.134*** -0.0706*** 0.121*** -0.0696*** 
(0.040) (0.011) (0.040) (0.011) (0.040) (0.011) (0.041) (0.011) (0.041) (0.011) 
Capital 0.966 0.864 0.966 0.873 1.045 0.709 0.813 1.707** 1.114 1.567* (1.349) (0.781) (1.349) (0.782) (1.349) (0.812) (1.418) (0.808) (1.414) (0.821) 
Non-interest 
income 
1.273*** -0.542*** 1.273*** -0.540*** 1.114*** -0.508*** 1.173*** -0.275** 1.059*** -0.262** 
(0.290) (0.129) (0.290) (0.129) (0.294) (0.130) (0.286) (0.132) (0.289) (0.133) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
    0.562* 1.92   0.559* 2.73* 
    (0.329) (1.31)   (0.320) (1.47) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
    9.650** -2.157   9.690** -2.273 
    (4.526) (1.372)   (3.978) (1.760) 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA 
Third Part. 
Credit 
Enhancements 
    0.0573 -0.0681   0.0814 0.0159 
    (0.147) (0.219)   (0.152) (0.219) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
    2.342 -2.459***   2.132 -2.047*** 
    (2.802) (0.615)   (2.775) (0.619) 
Secdummy  -0.283**  -0.260*    -0.231  -0.253  (0.129)  (0.135)    (0.145)  (0.168) 
Fad 0.0147***  0.0147***  0.0141***  0.0159***  0.0152***  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Securitized 
assets           
Loans: real 
estate 
      0.531 0.891* 1.027 0.756 
      (0.697) (0.467) (0.815) (0.483) 
Loans: 
commercial 
      -0.346 0.947* 0.266 0.797 
      (0.750) (0.494) (0.870) (0.508) 
Loans: 
consumer 
      1.297 0.664 1.671 0.529 
      (0.996) (0.480) (1.102) (0.492) 
Loans: other       1.352 0.309 1.907* 0.185       (1.007) (0.516) (1.095) (0.538) 
Constant -2.180*** -0.0755 -2.179*** -0.0611 -2.029** -0.0660 -3.129*** -2.659*** -3.653*** -2.533*** (0.832) (0.426) (0.832) (0.427) (0.842) (0.442) (0.962) (0.580) (1.045) (0.599) 
Observations 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,295 47,295 47,295 47,295 
Clusters 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 
Wald ChiSq 2196 2196 2203 2203 2703 2703 2205 2205 2745 2745 
Rho 0.0561 0.0561 0.0537 0.0537 0.0575 0.0575 0.0507 0.0507 0.0575 0.0575 
ChiSq H0: Rho 
= 0 6.550 6.550 5.790 5.790 5.308 5.308 4.122 4.122 3.771 3.771 
P-val H0 0.0105 0.0105 0.0161 0.0161 0.0212 0.0212 0.0423 0.0423 0.0521 0.0521 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables are lagged one 
quarter. I also include quarter dummies, which are not reported. “Fad” is also lagged one quarter. Credit risk (RWATA and NPL), profitability, and Capital 
are not included in their own respective outcome regressions. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit 
indicator, as is the likelihood ratio test against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) reported in parentheses***, 
**, * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2-7 - Treatment effect regressions: credit risk (NPL) and securitization 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy NPL Secdummy NPL Secdummy NPL Secdummy NPL Secdummy NPL 
Sec. residential      0.255    0.179      (0.166)    (0.158) 
Sec. home 
equity 
     3.172    3.465 
     (2.554)    (2.195) 
Sec. credit card      1.050***    1.823***      (0.398)    (0.517) 
Sec. auto loans      -1.253    -2.421**      (1.443)    (1.200) 
Sec. commercial      1.040    3.328      (3.323)    (3.782) 
Sec. other      -0.651    -0.604      (0.425)    (0.456) 
Loan ratio -0.416 0.576 -0.415 0.606 -0.485 0.633     (0.418) (0.464) (0.420) (0.463) (0.438) (0.471)     
Size 0.131*** -0.0310 0.132*** -0.0318* 0.125*** -0.0263 0.132*** -0.0337** 0.129*** -0.0321* (0.026) (0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016) 
Profitability 0.493*** -0.714*** 0.490*** -0.715*** 0.487*** -0.721*** 0.483*** -0.721*** 0.474*** -0.728*** (0.058) (0.045) (0.058) (0.045) (0.059) (0.045) (0.056) (0.045) (0.058) (0.045) 
Liquidity -0.290 -0.603 -0.271 -0.558 -0.394 -0.541 0.0614 -1.027*** 0.0140 -1.028*** (0.475) (0.478) (0.476) (0.478) (0.497) (0.479) (0.296) (0.233) (0.306) (0.233) 
Expenses -0.477*** 0.443*** -0.484*** 0.439*** -0.498*** 0.431*** -0.465*** 0.420*** -0.485*** 0.405*** (0.159) (0.124) (0.160) (0.124) (0.163) (0.124) (0.157) (0.118) (0.162) (0.118) 
Capital 0.145 1.185 0.107 1.159 0.280 1.224 -0.0595 1.022 0.179 1.103 (0.915) (0.855) (0.916) (0.858) (0.971) (0.864) (0.941) (0.871) (0.997) (0.868) 
Non-interest 
income 
0.933*** -0.512** 0.919*** -0.525** 0.872*** -0.482** 0.836*** -0.441** 0.799*** -0.435** 
(0.229) (0.208) (0.229) (0.209) (0.238) (0.208) (0.214) (0.181) (0.220) (0.182) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
    0.179*** 8.49   0.177*** 3.08 
    (0.067) (9.04)   (0.064) (8.33) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
    6.629*** -5.378**   6.515*** -4.349*** 
    (1.555) (2.532)   (1.273) (1.542) 
Third Part. 
Credit 
Enhancements 
    0.0139 0.0273   -0.00548 0.0600 
    (0.130) (0.128)   (0.112) (0.110) 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy NPL Secdummy NPL Secdummy NPL Secdummy NPL Secdummy NPL 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
    2.045** -1.852**   1.362 -0.580 
    (0.819) (0.778)   (0.987) (0.589) 
Secdummy  1.661***  1.636***    1.644***    (0.039)  (0.040)    (0.038)   
Non-performing 
loans 
0.796***  0.794***  0.791***  0.797***  0.791***  
(0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  
Fad 0.00646***  0.00648***  0.00632***  0.00676***  0.00661***  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Securitized 
assets 
   0.290**       
   (0.135)       
Loans: real 
estate 
      -1.852** 2.909*** -1.635** 2.992*** 
      (0.743) (0.871) (0.811) (0.888) 
Loans: 
commercial 
      -2.290*** 2.877*** -2.036** 2.964*** 
      (0.776) (0.897) (0.851) (0.912) 
Loans: 
consumer 
      -1.865** 3.654*** -1.596* 3.744*** 
      (0.864) (0.927) (0.924) (0.922) 
Loans: other       -1.393 2.394** -1.132 2.529**       (0.919) (1.005) (0.996) (1.028) 
Constant 2.134*** -5.557*** 2.123*** -5.576*** 2.220*** -5.645*** 3.700*** -7.913*** 3.456*** -8.019*** (0.581) (0.583) (0.585) (0.581) (0.604) (0.588) (0.822) (0.901) (0.884) (0.917) 
Observations 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,216 47,215 47,215 47,215 47,215 
Clusters 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 
Wald ChiSq 6421 6421 6440 6440 17712 17712 6841 6841 18501 18501 
Rho -0.893 -0.893 -0.893 -0.893 -0.891 -0.891 -0.892 -0.892 -0.891 -0.891 
ChiSq H0: Rho 
= 0 2613 2613 2586 2586 2538 2538 2616 2616 2541 2541 
P-val H0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables are lagged one quarter. I also 
include quarter dummies, which are not reported. “Fad” is also lagged one quarter. Credit risk (RWATA and NPL), profitability, and Capital are not included in their own 
respective outcome regressions. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the likelihood ratio test 
against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) reported in parentheses***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2-8 - Treatment effect regression: profitability and securitization 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Profitability 
Sec. 
residential 
   0.131***      0.153*** 
   (0.031)      (0.031) 
Sec. home 
equity 
   -0.0963      0.432 
   (0.520)      (0.497) 
Sec. credit 
card 
   0.125**      0.192*** 
   (0.058)      (0.073) 
Sec. auto 
loans 
   1.017      0.636 
   (1.226)      (1.090) 
Sec. 
commercial 
   1.024      0.938 
   (0.944)      (0.945) 
Sec. other    0.0768      -0.0297    (0.115)      (0.120) 
Loan ratio -0.917* -0.0733 -1.015* -0.0767       (0.552) (0.068) (0.550) (0.069)       
Size 0.223*** 0.0141*** 0.212*** 0.0132*** 0.232*** 0.0129*** 0.232*** 0.0124*** 0.225*** 0.0118*** (0.042) (0.003) (0.042) (0.003) (0.041) (0.003) (0.041) (0.003) (0.041) (0.003) 
Liquidity -1.573** -0.0118 -1.663*** -0.0169 -0.844** 0.0150 -0.874** 0.0243 -0.859** 0.0204 (0.615) (0.068) (0.617) (0.070) (0.415) (0.030) (0.414) (0.030) (0.408) (0.031) 
Expenses -1.274*** -0.759*** -1.314*** -0.760*** -1.186*** -0.737*** -1.181*** -0.738*** -1.228*** -0.739*** (0.221) (0.021) (0.220) (0.021) (0.226) (0.021) (0.220) (0.021) (0.218) (0.021) 
Non-
performing 
loans 
0.0811** -0.0387*** 0.0711* -0.0389*** 0.0805* -0.0391*** 0.0834* -0.0396*** 0.0711* -0.0399*** 
(0.041) (0.002) (0.040) (0.002) (0.043) (0.002) (0.043) (0.002) (0.042) (0.002) 
Capital -0.152 0.171 -0.227 0.177 0.221 0.257** 0.269 0.239* 0.394 0.264** (1.230) (0.134) (1.244) (0.133) (1.298) (0.128) (1.296) (0.129) (1.283) (0.131) 
Non-interest 
income 
1.435*** 0.356*** 1.299*** 0.349*** 1.300*** 0.305*** 1.326*** 0.295*** 1.219*** 0.292*** 
(0.271) (0.034) (0.273) (0.034) (0.267) (0.034) (0.265) (0.034) (0.267) (0.034) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
  0.458 2.34***     0.457* 2.50*** 
  (0.279) (2.19)     (0.275) (2.30) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
  10.50*** 0.0578     10.81*** 0.143 
  (4.067) (0.259)     (3.706) (0.273) 
Third Part. 
Credit 
Enhancements 
  -0.0665 -0.00730     -0.00615 -0.000462 
  (0.167) (0.030)     (0.169) (0.029) 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Profitability 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
  1.613 0.234     1.314 0.201 
  (2.004) (0.149)     (1.974) (0.141) 
Secdummy  -0.303***    -0.287***  -0.307***    (0.030)    (0.032)  (0.029)   
Profitability -0.594***  -0.604***  -0.598***  -0.595***  -0.608***  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.068)  
Fad 0.0107***  0.0100***  0.0118***  0.0117***  0.0109***  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Securitized 
assets 
       -0.173***   
       (0.029)   
Loans: real 
estate 
    0.907 0.162 0.928 0.176* 1.418* 0.209* 
    (0.648) (0.112) (0.639) (0.106) (0.734) (0.110) 
Loans: 
commercial 
    0.257 0.192* 0.263 0.211* 0.863 0.247** 
    (0.720) (0.116) (0.711) (0.110) (0.804) (0.114) 
Loans: 
consumer 
    1.828** 0.515*** 1.836** 0.533*** 2.204** 0.557*** 
    (0.918) (0.124) (0.913) (0.119) (1.012) (0.121) 
Loans: other     2.015** 0.416*** 2.025** 0.440*** 2.572*** 0.479***     (0.919) (0.125) (0.915) (0.117) (0.963) (0.122) 
Constant -0.742 0.490*** -0.553 0.498*** -2.664*** 0.207* -2.667*** 0.193* -3.144*** 0.160 (0.773) (0.087) (0.782) (0.089) (0.873) (0.124) (0.865) (0.117) (0.922) (0.121) 
Observations 47,305 47,305 47,305 47,305 47,304 47,304 47,304 47,304 47,304 47,304 
Clusters 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 1508 
Wald ChiSq 4173 4173 12868 12868 4110 4110 4165 4165 12694 12694 
Rho 0.586 0.586 0.594 0.594 0.576 0.576 0.583 0.583 0.592 0.592 
ChiSq H0: 
Rho = 0 51.32 51.32 55.87 55.87 44.14 44.14 52.36 52.36 57.84 57.84 
P-val H0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables are lagged one quarter. I also 
include quarter dummies, which are not reported. “Fad” is also lagged one quarter. Credit risk (RWATA and NPL), profitability, and Capital are not included in their own 
respective outcome regressions. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the likelihood ratio test 
against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) reported in parentheses***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2-9 - Treatment effect regression: capital level (Tier 1) and securitization  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy Capital Secdummy Capital Secdummy Capital Secdummy Capital Secdummy Capital 
Sec. residential      0.0047    0.00714*      (0.004)    (0.004) 
Sec. home 
equity 
     -0.237    -0.175 
     (0.147)    (0.161) 
Sec. credit card      0.0199**    -0.00724      (0.008)    (0.019) 
Sec. auto loans      0.161    0.159      (0.131)    (0.153) 
Sec. commercial      -0.636**    -0.509*      (0.307)    (0.276) 
Sec. other      0.122**    0.186**      (0.055)    (0.093) 
Loan ratio 3.954*** -0.144*** 3.956*** -0.143*** 4.014*** -0.147***     (0.797) (0.024) (0.797) (0.024) (0.708) (0.020)     
Size 0.320*** -0.00843*** 0.321*** -0.00844*** 0.316*** -0.00797*** 0.227*** -0.00543*** 0.225*** -0.00491*** (0.030) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) 
Profitability 0.132* 0.00184 0.131* 0.00181 0.149* 0.00170 0.0615 0.00364** 0.0819 0.00365** (0.077) (0.001) (0.077) (0.001) (0.076) (0.001) (0.075) (0.001) (0.075) (0.001) 
Liquidity -1.294* 0.0244 -1.279* 0.0249 -1.099 0.0229 -4.880*** 0.156*** -4.674*** 0.157*** (0.724) (0.023) (0.719) (0.024) (0.670) (0.020) (0.322) (0.006) (0.318) (0.006) 
Expenses 0.470** -0.0245*** 0.467** -0.0245*** 0.475** -0.0231*** 0.251 -0.0169*** 0.262 -0.0155*** (0.193) (0.005) (0.193) (0.005) (0.185) (0.004) (0.198) (0.005) (0.188) (0.004) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.0325 0.000314 0.0313 0.000300 0.0286 0.000371 0.0302 0.000322 0.0225 0.000429 
(0.027) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) 
Leverage ratio 0.207*** -0.00687*** 0.206*** -0.00686*** 0.202*** -0.00686*** 0.203*** -0.00681*** 0.198*** -0.00679*** (0.014) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
Non-interest 
income 
0.585** -0.00184 0.576** -0.00199 0.373 -0.000622 0.0563 0.0145** -0.119 0.0153** 
(0.229) (0.007) (0.228) (0.007) (0.244) (0.007) (0.227) (0.006) (0.230) (0.006) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
    0.129** -1.37***   0.0942 -7.82*** 
    (0.059) (2.69)   (0.058) (2.607) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
    4.255*** -0.0812***   6.157*** -0.143*** 
    -1.235 (0.030)   -1.363 (0.042) 
Third Part. 
Credit 
Enhancements 
    0.824 -0.0251   0.712 -0.0215 
    (0.622) (0.017)   (0.561) (0.015) 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy Capital Secdummy Capital Secdummy Capital Secdummy Capital Secdummy Capital 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
    4.310*** -0.145***   4.959*** -0.160*** 
    (0.732) (0.016)   (1.004) (0.025) 
Secdummy  0.0395***  0.0392***  0.0389***  0.0431***  0.0391***  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Capital 27.33***  27.31***  26.21***  27.15***  26.14***  (1.252)  (1.251)  (1.292)  (1.181)  -1.223  
Fad 0.00492***  0.00494***  0.00491***  0.00567***  0.00557***  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Securitized 
assets           
Loans: real 
estate 
      2.360** -0.0576* 2.868*** -0.0715** 
      (0.960) (0.030) (0.997) (0.030) 
Loans: 
commercial 
      3.357*** -0.107*** 3.988*** -0.122*** 
      (1.016) (0.032) (1.017) (0.031) 
Loans: 
consumer 
      2.755** -0.0562* 3.173*** -0.0728** 
      (1.147) (0.033) (1.159) (0.031) 
Loans: other       3.308*** -0.0762** 3.533*** -0.0904***       (0.987) (0.032) -1.057 (0.033) 
Constant -11.70*** 0.365*** -11.70*** 0.365*** -11.57*** 0.363*** -9.807*** 0.273*** -10.19*** 0.283*** (0.947) (0.025) (0.946) (0.025) (0.859) (0.021) (1.068) (0.032) -1.109 (0.032) 
Observations 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,295 47,295 47,295 47,295 
Clusters 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 1506 
Wald ChiSq 2914 2914 2916 2916 7276 7276 3156 3156 7468 7468 
Rho -0.899 -0.899 -0.899 -0.899 -0.895 -0.895 -0.903 -0.903 -0.899 -0.899 
ChiSq H0: Rho 
= 0 534.5 534.5 534.8 534.8 572.0 572.0 609.7 609.7 651.3 651.3 
P-val H0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables are lagged one quarter. I also 
include quarter dummies, which are not reported. “Fad” is also lagged one quarter. Credit risk (RWATA and NPL), profitability and Capital are not included in their own 
respective outcome regressions. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the likelihood ratio test 
against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. Robust standard errors (clustered at the bank level) reported in parentheses***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2-10 - Treatment effect regressions. Sub-periods. Credit risk and securitization 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA1 Secdummy RWATA2 Secdummy RWATA3 Secdummy RWATA4 
Loan ratio -0.647 0.372*** -1,343 0.398*** -1,042 0.556*** -1.056 0.533*** (0.888) (0.044) (1.186) (0.040) (0.745) (0.043) (1.086) (0.053) 
Size 0.266*** 0.00198 0.0473 0.00470* 0.163** 0.00485* 0.290*** 0.00457* (0.076) (0.002) (0.081) (0.002) (0.069) (0.002) (0.072) (0.002) 
Profitability 0.128 0.00504 -0.255 0.0375*** -0.00781 -0.0170*** -0.127 0.00527 (0.290) (0.007) (0.321) (0.011) (0.092) (0.004) (0.114) (0.004) 
Liquidity -1.517 -0.0777** -0.795 -0.0481 -2.557*** 0.0145 -2.029* -0.0038 (0.954) (0.037) (1.083) (0.041) (0.762) (0.047) (1.14) (0.051) 
Expenses -1.334** 0.00332 -0.451 0.0158 0.0461 -0.0175 -0.427 0.0169 (0.576) (0.015) (0.552) (0.016) (0.213) (0.011) (0.323) (0.012) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.157** -0.000438 0.0843 -0.00219* 0.114** 0.00423*** 0.129* -0.00135 
(0.070) (0.001) (0.062) (0.001) (0.055) (0.001) (0.071) (0.002) 
Capital -0.106 -1.633*** -6.325 -1.702*** 3.307 -0.884*** -0.207 -0.747*** (2.925) (0.141) (6.17) (0.152) (2.35) (0.142) (1.407) (0.102) 
Leverage ratio 0.0153 -0.0192*** -0.0208 -0.0204*** 0.0149 -0.00710*** 0.00327 -0.00615*** (0.033) (0.001) (0.057) (0.002) (0.015) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
Non-interest 
income 
1.638*** 0.0205 0.251 0.0131 0.663* 0.0196 0.746* 0.0200 
(0.428) (0.016) (0.532) (0.018) (0.379) (0.018) (0.412) (0.021) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
5.283*** -0.0418 238.1*** -0.0620* 3.461*** -0.0110 115.9* -0.118*** 
(1.377) (0.029) (82.08) (0.032) (0.432) (0.038) (64.14) (0.021) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
8.896** -0.212 9.784** -0.114 428,395*** 0.329*** 480.7*** 0.877*** 
(3.661) (0.144) (3.988) (0.085) (31.772) (0.068) (93.84) (0.203) 
Third Part. Credit 
Enhancements 
11.43 -0.622*** -1.05 -0.172*** 0.324 -0.0263 -4.338** 0.0190*** 
(7.135) (0.045) (5.857) (0.032) (0.205) (0.040) (2.104) (0.007) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
-0.148 0.292*** 2.791 0.335*** -36.36 0.181 -54.77 2.403 
(1.463) (0.023) (4.267) (0.075) (25.73) (0.193) (48.24) (1.634) 
Secdummy  0.0484***  0.0433*  0.00938  0.0109  (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.016) 
Fad 0.00937  0.0200***  0.0201***  0.00494  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008)  
Constant -1,645 0.891*** 0.335 0.861*** -1.95 0.565*** -1.973 0.468*** (1.452) (0.069) (2.209) (0.070) (1.232) (0.057) (1.203) (0.064) 
Observations 12,470 12,470 12,760 12,760 11,322 11,322 10,744 10,744 
Clusters 1278 1278 1266 1266 1130 1130 1105 1105 
Wald ChiSq 4302 4302 4290 4290 2864 2864 3232 3232 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA1 Secdummy RWATA2 Secdummy RWATA3 Secdummy RWATA4 
Rho -0.321 -0.321 -0.393 -0.393 -0.0258 -0.0258 -0.0636 -0.0636 
ChiSq H0: Rho = 
0 8,116 8,116 3,14 3,14 0.0846 0.0846 0.593 0.593 
P-val H0 0.00439 0.00439 0.0764 0.0764 0.771 0.771 0.441 0.441 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables (including quarter dummies, not 
reported) are lagged one quarter. Credit risk, profitability, and Capital are not included in their own respective outcome regressions. A number 1 on the dependent variable 
denotes sub-period 1. A number 2 on the dependent variable denoted sub-period 2. A number 3 on the dependent variable denotes sub-period 3. A number 4 on the 
dependent variable denotes sub-period 4. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the likelihood ratio 
test against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
bank level are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2-11 - Treatment effect regressions. Sub-periods. Credit risk taking and securitization 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Variables Secdummy ΔRWATA1 Secdummy ΔRWATA2 Secdummy ΔRWATA3 Secdummy ΔRWATA4 
Loan ratio -1.168 -1.799*** -1.168 -1.618*** -0.773 -2.422*** -0.870 -0.592 (1.094) (0.448) (1.094) (0.538) (0.756) (0.627) (1.057) (0.617) 
Size 0.0325 0.00186 0.0515 0.00236 0.169** -0.0700** 0.306*** 0.179*** (0.098) (0.019) (0.084) (0.024) (0.068) (0.033) (0.065) (0.043) 
Profitability -0.560 0.0576 -0.360 0.0476 -0.0389 0.169 -0.0996 0.0764 (0.184) (0.237) (0.254) (0.237) (0.091) (0.128) (0.101) (0.110) 
Liquidity -1.104 0.00660 -1,104 0.00630 -2.001** 0.745 -2.035* 0.412 (1.014) (0.466) (1.014) (0.506) (0.798) (0.604) (1.104) (0.600) 
Efficiency -0.544 0.531 -0.569 0.477 -0.00684 -0.0441 -0.345 0.227 (0.533) (0.291) (0.525) (0.291) (0.223) (0.233) (0.283) (0.211) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.0994 -0.0668*** 0.0874 -0.0554*** 0.104** -0.0721*** 0.0990 -0.111*** 
(0.087) (0.023) (0.060) (0.016) (0.053) (0.026) (0.065) (0.028) 
Capital -3.222 0.438 -3,145 0.218 3,217 0.105 0.490 1,753 (3.058) (1.218) (3.058) (1.218) (2.106) (1.457) (1.432) (1.573) 
Leverage ratio -0.0119 0.00650 -0.0229 0.00740 0.0132 0.0322** 0.0104 0.00586 (0.022) (0.021) (0.033) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Non-interest 
income 
0.227 -0.684* 0.137 -0.514* 0.946*** -0.639** 0.712* -0.710*** 
(0.498) (0.321) (0.508) (0.271) (0.360) (0.289) (0.385) (0.211) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
235.2*** -0.142 229.2*** -0.139 0.290*** 3.31 10.70 5.11* 
(87.66) (0.112) (78.97) (0.222) (0.093) (103) (6.669) (2.63) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
8.44*** 0.441 10.45*** 0.351 385,701*** -6.186*** 549.1*** -10.33*** 
(3.444) (0.990) (3.503) (0.890) (32.249) (1.055) (77.06) (1.309) 
Third Part. Credit 
Enhancements 
-9.777 -0.279 -9,52 -0.197 0.283 0.0877 -0.423 -0.140 
(13.77) (0.199) (11.59) (0.163) (0.200) (0.185) (0.611) (0.411) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
4.998 -6.755*** 4.624 -6.396*** -46.79* -17.85*** -58.85 -20.90 
(4.994) (1.788) (4.063) (1.72) (26.43) (1.838) (45.11) (20.95) 
Secdummy  0.0311  0.0218  0.149  -0.598  (0.155)  (0.140)  (0.181)  (0.468) 
Fad 0.0287***  0.0225***  0.0192***  0.00454  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
Constant 0.0009 0.977 0.0108 0.949 -2.261* 1.703* -2.580** -2.861*** (1.886) (0.996) (1.733) (0.826) (1.198) (0.894) (1.194) (0.928) 
Observations 11,770 11,770 12,760 12,760 11,322 11,322 12,704 12,704 
Clusters 1266 1266 1266 1266 1130 1130 1134 1134 
Wald ChiSq 290.6 290.6 288.6 288.6 985.4 985.4 3183 3183 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Variables Secdummy ΔRWATA1 Secdummy ΔRWATA2 Secdummy ΔRWATA3 Secdummy ΔRWATA4 
Rho -0.0299 -0.0299 -0.0222 -0.0222 0.0210 0.0210 0.141 0.141 
ChiSq H0: Rho = 
0 0.450 0.450 0.399 0.399 0.835 0.835 2,667 2,667 
P-val H0 0.628 0.628 0.528 0.528 0.361 0.361 0.102 0.102 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables (including quarter dummies, not 
reported) are lagged one quarter. Credit risk, profitability, and Capital are not included in their own respective outcome regressions. A number 1 on the dependent variable 
denotes sub-period 1. A number 2 on the dependent variable denoted sub-period 2. A number 3 on the dependent variable denotes sub-period 3. A number 4 on the 
dependent variable denotes sub-period 4. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the likelihood ratio 
test against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
bank level are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2-12 - Treatment effect regressions. Sub-periods. Credit risk and securitization 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Variables Secdummy NPL1 Secdummy NPL2 Secdummy NPL3 Secdummy NPL4 
Loan ratio -0.314 0.814 -0.274 0.965 -0.480 0.546 -0.441 0.0394 (0.670) (0.712) (0.670) (0.682) (0.571) (0.483) (0.753) (0.651) 
Size 0.157*** 0.000466 0.127*** 0.000886 0.131*** -0.0374* 0.138*** -0.0429* (0.045) (0.028) (0.045) (0.018) (0.040) (0.022) (0.043) (0.025) 
Profitability 0.455** -0.640*** 0.755** -0.779*** 0.709*** -0.791*** 0.529*** -0.649*** (0.186) (0.162) (0.186) (0.262) (0.066) (0.046) (0.092) (0.056) 
Liquidity -0.554 0.182 -0.654 0.191 -0.432 -0.912* -0.172 -1.185* (0.695) (0.698) (0.696) (0.548) (0.572) (0.488) (0.832) (0.677) 
Expenses -0.415 -0.177 -0.415 -0.217 -0.0985 0.146 -1.241*** 0.948*** (0.376) (0.314) (0.376) (0.314) (0.156) (0.116) (0.241) (0.146) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.772***  0.772***  0.918***  1.025***  
(0.045)  (0.045)  (0.037)  (0.056)  
Capital 2.319 -0.645 2.307 -0.685 2.900* -1.557 -3.156** 2.199** (1.563) (1.587) (1.113) (1.507) (1.654) (1.199) (1.281) (0.855) 
Leverage ratio 0.0282 -0.0209 0.0992 -0.0287 0.0127 -0.00110 -0.0261*** 0.0271*** (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) 
Non-interest 
income 
0.725** -0.0130 0.225** -0.0330 0.833*** -0.679*** 0.894*** -0.636*** 
(0.320) (0.318) (0.258) (0.293) (0.289) (0.232) (0.298) (0.233) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
2.918*** -1.617*** 2.905*** -1.917*** 2.494*** -1.345*** 3.091*** -1.580*** 
(0.476) (0.328) (0.476) (0.328) (0.274) (0.251) (0.429) (0.252) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
4.882*** -4.100** 3.872*** -2.200** 253.76 -2.102*** 164.4*** -6.825*** 
(1.602) (1.994) (1.301) (1.742) 0 (0.698) (27.95) (1.931) 
Third Part. Credit 
Enhancements 
4.169 0.919* 3.269 0.819* 0.307*** -0.169** -0.278 0.147** 
(3.345) (0.497) (1.237) (0.003) (0.107) (0.081) (0.177) (0.057) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
0.800 -1.189* -5.082 -0.928 -4.081 -0.827 -3.425 8.511 
(0.537) (0.623) (0.989) (0.890) (7.094) (1.337) (34.24) (22.40) 
Fad 0.00260  0.00180  0.00609**  0.00237  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  
Secdummy  1.743***  1.385***  1.485***  1.316***  (0.060)  (0.053)  (0.043)  (0.050) 
Constant 1,263 -5.245*** 1.263 -5.245*** 2.227** -4.712*** 3.425*** -4.288*** (0.965) (0.978) (0.905) (0.898) (0.893) (0.640) (0.966) (0.796) 
Observations 12,389 12,389 12,500 12,050 11,321 11,321 10,741 10,741 
Clusters 1279 1279   1130 1130 1104 1104 
Wald ChiSq 1408 1408 2323 2323 3886 3886 1653 1653 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Variables Secdummy NPL1 Secdummy NPL2 Secdummy NPL3 Secdummy NPL4 
Rho -0.893 -0.893 -0.901 -0.901 -0.909 -0.909 -0.910 -0.910 
ChiSq H0: Rho = 
0 1256 1256 338.0 338.0 1030 1030 327.3 327.3 
P-val H0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables (including quarter dummies, not 
reported) are lagged one quarter. Credit risk, profitability, and Capital are not included in their own respective outcome regressions. A number 1 on the dependent variable 
denotes sub-period 1. A number 2 on the dependent variable denoted sub-period 2. A number 3 on the dependent variable denotes sub-period 3. A number 4 on the 
dependent variable denotes sub-period 4. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the likelihood ratio 
test against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
bank level are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2-13 - Treatment effect regressions. Sub-periods. Profitability and securitization 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Variables Secdummy Profitability1 Secdummy Profitability2 Secdummy Profitability3 Secdummy Profitability4 
Loan ratio -0.576 0.0291 -0.546 0.0299 -1.035 -0.352*** -1.847** -0.0611 (0.824) (0.067) (0.664) (0.067) (0.74) (0.119) (0.913) (0.136) 
Size 0.248*** -0.00617 0.248*** -0.00512 0.163** -0.0308*** 0.237*** 0.0305*** (0.075) (0.003) (0.087) (0.002) (0.069) (0.007) (0.056) (0.005) 
Profitability 0.0397  0.0417  0.0337  -0.581***  (0.452)  (0.332)  (0.127)  (0.111)  
Liquidity -1.644* 0.0343 -2.004* 0.0343 -2.533*** -0.125 -2.277** -0.0382 (0.907) (0.069) (0.922) (0.057) (0.757) (0.119) (0.941) (0.132) 
Expenses -1.193* -0.666*** -1.293* -0.668*** 0.0904 -0.692*** -1.284*** -0.702*** (0.618) (0.034) (0.618) (0.029) (0.235) (0.036) (0.289) (0.037) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.124** -0.008*** 0.119** -0.009*** 0.115** -0.119*** 0.0546 -0.0678*** 
(0.061) (0.002) (0.068 (0.001) (0.054) (0.006) (0.069) (0.006) 
Capital 0.214 0.114 0.204 0.119 3.201 0.348 -1.554 0.576*** (0.207) (0.153) (3.009) (0.153) (2.148) (0.299) (1.306) (0.165) 
Leverage ratio 0.011 -0.003* 0.0212 -0.003* 0.0152 -0.0118*** -0.019* -0.005*** (0.025) (0.001) (0.08) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) 
Non-interest 
income 
1.421*** 0.282*** 1.2522** 0.311*** 0.620* 0.253*** 0.660* 0.219*** 
(0.444) (0.032) (0.575) (0.045) (0.361) (0.063) (0.366) (0.049) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
5.226*** 0.0773 5.886*** 0.056 3.441*** -0.079 4.134*** 0.424*** 
(1.309) -(0.05) (1.779) (0.07) (0.412) (0.138) (1.003) (0.092) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
8.365** -0.273* 8.322** -0.273* 397.786*** -1.022*** 307.7*** 1.166** 
(3.490) (0.15) (3.88) (0.15) (32.448) (0.236) (97.91) (0.47) 
Third Part. Credit 
Enhancements 
3.254 -0.215*** 1554 -0.207*** 0.312* -0.0416 -0.781 0.0367* 
(3.267) (0.049) (3.889) (0.056) (0.18) (0.074) (0.501) (0.02) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
0.731 -0.176*** 0.981 -0.176*** -37.14 0.172 -35.22 -13.34*** 
(1.347) (0.056) (1.356) (0.056) (25.47) (0.358) (40.46) (4.438) 
Fad 0.0119**  0.0213**  0.0202***  0.00495  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Secdummy  0.00393  0.00844  0.0577  -0.385***  (0.037)  (0.027)  (0.059)  (0.034) 
Constant -1.687 0.573*** -1.68 0.646*** -1.978* 0.577*** -0.067 0.0955 (1.373) (0.091) (1.312) (0.091) (1.198) (0.163) (1.054) (0.165) 
Observations 12,474 12,474 12,01 12,010 11,322 11,322 10,744 10,744 
Clusters 1279 1279 1260 1260 1130 1130 1105 1105 
Wald ChiSq 1474 1474 1570 1570 2329 2329 1347 1347 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Variables Secdummy Profitability1 Secdummy Profitability2 Secdummy Profitability3 Secdummy Profitability4 
Rho -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.00199 -0.00199 -0.0509 -0.0509 0.678 0.678 
ChiSq H0: Rho = 
0 0.000938 0.000938 0.000738 0.000738 0.851 0.851 45 45 
P-val H0 0.976 0.976 0.84 0.84 0.356 0.356 0 0 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables (including quarter dummies, not 
reported) are lagged one quarter. Credit risk, profitability, and Capital are not included in their own respective outcome regressions. A number 1 on the dependent variable 
denotes sub-period 1. A number 2 on the dependent variable denoted sub-period 2. A number 3 on the dependent variable denotes sub-period 3. A number 4 on the 
dependent variable denotes sub-period 4. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the likelihood ratio 
test against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
bank level are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2-14 - Treatment effect regressions. Sub-periods. Securitization and capital levels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Variables Secdummy Capital1 Secdummy Capital2 Secdummy Capital3 Secdummy Capital4 
Loan ratio 5.053*** -0.155*** 5.001*** -0.122*** 2.734*** -0.122*** -4.821** -0.198*** (0.889) (0.020) (0.999) (0.030) (0.871) (0.020) -2,025 (0.041) 
Size 0.332*** -0.00701*** 0.435*** -0.00801*** 0.280*** -0.00712*** 0.123** -0.00140 (0.048) (0.000) (0.048) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.061) (0.001) 
Profitability 0.412** -0.00263 0.555** -0.00189 0.0735 0.00190 0.161 0.00767*** (0.200) (0.003) (0.190) (0.006) (0.079) (0.001) (0.109) (0.002) 
Liquidity -1.201 0.0210 -1.102 0.0450 -2.373*** 0.0182 -1,312 -0.0327 (0.846) (0.018) (0.998) (0.017) (0.730) (0.020) (1.949) (0.041) 
Expenses 0.508 -0.0267*** 0.908 -0.0178*** 0.194 -0.0102** -1.258*** -0.0467*** (0.423) (0.008) (0.873) (0.009) (0.196) (0.004) (0.336) (0.009) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.0725* -0.000339 0.2525* -0.000119 0.0455 -0.00160** 0.186*** 0.00445*** 
(0.039) (0.000) (0.069) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.056) (0.001) 
Capital 32.01***  34.05***  30.58***  -23.02***  (0.026)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.017)  
Non-interest 
income 
0.749** -0.00220 0.599** -0.00110 -0.0861 0.00897 0.377 0.0154 
(0.369) (0.008) (0.377) (0.008) (0.364) (0.009) (0.376) (0.009) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
3.054*** -0.0331*** 3.054*** -0.0399*** 2.217*** -0.0354*** 2.528*** 0.0487*** 
(0.592) (0.008) (0.892) (0.001) (0.360) (0.009) (0.525) (0.012) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
3.130** -0.0334* 3.129** -0.0399* 5.37 -0.0660* 203.1*** 0.358*** 
(1.458) (0.019) (1.668) (0.022) (2.708) (0.037) (36.18) (0.071) 
Third Part. Credit 
Enhancements 
11.03*** -0.269*** 11.03*** -0.304*** 1.219*** -0.0395*** -1.294** -0.00662 
(2.341) (0.009) (2.322) (0.009) (0.348) (0.009) (0.590) (0.006) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
1.906*** -0.0642*** 2.046*** -0.0644*** -0.824 -0.359*** -81.67* -3.243*** 
(0.692) (0.009) (0.512) (0.008) (9.68) (0.055) (42.58) (1.039) 
Fad 0.00398  0.005***  0.00863***  0.0001  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  
Secdummy  0.0342***  0.0342***  0.0389***  -0.0487***  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Constant -14.58*** 0.388*** -14.66*** 0.298*** -10.37*** 0.313*** 7.702*** 0.399*** (1.199) (0.022) (1.779) (0.011) (1.277) (0.021) (2.392) (0.044) 
Observations 12,470 12,470 11,970 11,970 11,322 11,322 10,744 10,744 
Clusters 1278 1278 1190 1190 1130 1130 1105 1105 
Wald ChiSq 2189 2189 1980 1980 1681 1681 1960 1960 
Rho -0.865 -0.865 -0.868 -0.868 -0.887 -0.887 0.875 0.875 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Variables Secdummy Capital1 Secdummy Capital2 Secdummy Capital3 Secdummy Capital4 
ChiSq H0: Rho = 
0 134.0 134.0 144.0 144.0 147.6 147.6 212.7 212.7 
P-val H0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the first-stage selection regression output. Control variables (including quarter dummies, not 
reported) are lagged one quarter. Credit risk, profitability, and Capital are not included in their own respective outcome regressions. A number 1 on the dependent variable 
denoted sub-period 1. A number 2 on the dependent variable denoted sub-period 2. A number 3 on the dependent variable denoted sub-period 3. A number 4 on the 
dependent variable denoted sub-period 4. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the likelihood ratio 
test against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
bank level are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2-15 - Treatment effect model. Securitization and BHCs’ performance measures (variables winsorized at 2.5%) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy NPL Secdummy Capital Secdummy Profitability 
Loan ratio -0.651 0.520*** -0.656 -1.343*** -0.478 0.588 -1.027* -0.155*** 4.019*** -0.0887 (0.601) (0.036) (0.576) (0.281) (0.431) (0.390) (0.557) (0.021) (0.688) (0.068) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
0.573* -0.406*** 0.561* 0.252*** 0.179** 0.131** 0.448 -0.111*** 0.127* 0.291*** 
(0.306) (0.737) (0.329) (0.071) (0.072) (0.051) (0.278) (0.002) (0.067) (0.017) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
9.587** -0.0740 9.643** -2.349 6.432*** -5.370** 10.37** -0.0672*** 4.017*** 0.082 
(4.674) (0.146) (4.523) (1.489) (1.573) (2.516) (4.169) (0.023) (1.311) (0.234) 
Third Part. 
Credit 
Enhancements 
0.0574 -0.0267 0.0572 -0.104 0.0113 0.0426 -0.064 -0.0300 0.836 -0.00511 
(0.204) (0.042) (0.139) (0.206) (0.114) (0.117) (0.171) (0.021) (0.708) (0.028) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
2.374 0.307*** 2.341 -2.444*** 2.088** -1.939** 1.627 -0.145*** 4.438*** 0.176 
(2.918) (0.040) (2.804) (0.624) (0.822) (0.825) (2.075) (0.017) (0.719) (0.159) 
Size 0.235*** 0.00428** 0.234*** 0.030 0.125*** -0.026 0.212*** -0.08*** 0.311*** 0.0130*** (0.048) (0.001) (0.048) (0.016) (0.027) (0.019) (0.042) (0.006) (0.030) (0.003) 
Profitability -0.0561 -0.00576* -0.0667 0.170** 0.490*** -0.720*** -0.604*** 0.016 0.142*  (0.088) (0.003) (0.083) (0.077) (0.059) (0.046) (0.068) (0.016) (0.076)  
Liquidity -1.735** -0.020 -1.696** -0.0362 -0.351 -0.577 -1.646*** 0.0212 -1.257* -0.035 (0.698) (0.035) (0.683) (0.266) (0.483) (0.480) (0.623) (0.021) (0.664) (0.070) 
Expenses -0.327 -0.051 -0.347 0.179 -0.490*** 0.436*** -1.313*** -0.0238*** 0.456** -0.759*** (0.225) (0.091) (0.218) (0.132) (0.161) (0.124) (0.224) (0.005) (0.187) (0.021) 
Non-
performing 
loans 
0.123*** 0.000485 0.119*** -0.0650*** 0.793***  0.0709* 0.000360 0.0284 -0.0386*** 
(0.041) (0.001) (0.040) (0.011) (0.027)  (0.041) (0.054) (0.028) (0.002) 
Capital 1.315 -1.011*** 1.045 0.782 0.166 1.183 -0.218  27.38*** 0.184 (1.447) (0.099) (1.349) (0.793) (0.945) (0.865) (1.252)  (1.211) (0.134) 
Non-interest 
income 
1.178*** 0.027** 1.114*** -0.501*** 0.863*** -0.481** 1.277*** 0.0939 0.456* 0.355*** 
(0.309) (0.014) (0.294) (0.129) (0.233) (0.208) (0.274) (0.007) (0.245) (0.034) 
Secdummy  0.0216*  -0.258*  1.659***  0.0396***  -0.292***  (0.012)  (0.138)  (0.040)  (0.001)  (0.030) 
Fad 0.0139***  0.0141***  0.00631***  0.0102***  0.00475***  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  
Constant -2.108** 0.579*** -2.029** -0.0979 2.227*** -5.609*** -0.565 0.366*** -11.71*** 0.513*** (0.851) (0.052) (0.842) (0.438) (0.598) (0.589) (0.793) (0.022) (0.842) (0.089) 
Observations 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,216 47,216 47,305 47,296 47,296 47,305 
Clusters 1506 1506 1506 1506 1508 1508 1508 1506 1506 1508 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy NPL Secdummy Capital Secdummy Profitability 
Wald ChiSq 18195 18195 2630 2630 17279 17279 12393 6983 6983 12393 
Rho -0.116 -0.116 0.0575 0.0575 -0.892 -0.892 0.588 -0.896 -0.896 0.589 
ChiSq H0: 
Rho = 0 3.471 3.471 5.503 5.503 2562 2562 49.89 548.1 548.1 49.88 
P-val H0 0.062 0.062 0.019 0.019 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: The table shows the results of the robustness tests where variables are winsorized at 2.5%. Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the 
first-stage selection regression output. Control variables (including quarter dummies, not reported) are lagged one quarter. Credit risk, profitability, and Capital are not 
included in their own respective outcome regressions. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the 
likelihood ratio test against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2-16 - Treatment effect model. Securitization and BHCs’ performance measures (variables winsorized at 5%) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy NPL Secdummy Capital Secdummy Profitability 
Loan ratio -0.652 0.520*** -0.656 -1.343*** -0.478 0.578 -1.028* -0.155*** 4.019*** -0.089 (0.601) (0.036) (0.576) (0.281) (0.431) (0.390) (0.557) (0.021) (0.688) (0.068) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
0.573* -0.406*** 0.561* 0.252*** 0.179** 0.131** 0.448 -0.111*** 0.127* 0.291*** 
(0.311) (0.737) (0.329) (0.071) (0.072) (0.051) (0.278) (0.002) (0.067) (0.017) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
9.587** -0.0740 9.643** -2.349 6.432*** -5.370** 10.37** -0.0672*** 4.017*** 0.082 
(4.674) (0.147) (4.523) (1.489) (1.573) (2.516) (4.169) (0.023) (1.311) (0.234) 
Third Part. 
Credit 
Enhancements 
0.0574 -0.0267 0.0572 -0.104 0.0113 0.0426 -0.064 -0.0300 0.836 -0.00511 
(0.204) (0.042) (0.139) (0.206) (0.114) (0.117) (0.171) (0.021) (0.708) (0.028) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
2.374 0.307*** 2.342 -2.448*** 2.088** -1.939** 1.627 -0.145*** 4.438*** 0.176 
(2.919) (0.040) (2.804) (0.624) (0.822) (0.825) (2.075) (0.017) (0.719) (0.159) 
Size 0.235*** 0.00428** 0.234*** 0.0256 0.125*** -0.026 0.212*** -0.08*** 0.311*** 0.0130*** (0.048) (0.001) (0.048) (0.016) (0.027) (0.019) (0.042) (0.006) (0.030) (0.003) 
Profitability -0.0561 -0.00576* -0.0667 0.170** 0.490*** -0.720*** -0.604*** 0.016 0.142*  (0.088) (0.003) (0.083) (0.077) (0.059) (0.046) (0.068) (0.016) (0.076)  
Liquidity -1.735** -0.020 -1.696** -0.0362 -0.351 -0.577 -1.646*** 0.0212 -1.257* -0.035 (0.698) (0.035) (0.683) (0.266) (0.483) (0.480) (0.623) (0.021) (0.664) (0.070) 
Expenses -0.327 -0.051 -0.347 0.179 -0.490*** 0.436*** -1.313*** -0.0238*** 0.456** -0.759*** (0.225) (0.091) (0.218) (0.132) (0.161) (0.124) (0.224) (0.005) (0.187) (0.021) 
Non-
performing 
loans 
0.123*** 0.000485 0.119*** -0.0650*** 0.793***  0.0709* 0.000360 0.0284 -0.0386*** 
(0.041) (0.001) (0.040) (0.011) (0.028)  (0.041) (0.054) (0.028) (0.002) 
Capital 1.315 -1.011*** 1.045 0.782 0.166 1.183 -0.218  27.38*** 0.184 (1.447) (0.099) (1.349) (0.788) (0.945) (0.865) (1.252)  (1.211) (0.134) 
Non-interest 
income 
1.178*** 0.027** 1.114*** -0.501*** 0.863*** -0.481** 1.277*** 0.093 0.456* 0.355*** 
(0.309) (0.014) (0.294) (0.129) (0.233) (0.208) (0.274) (0.007) (0.245) (0.034) 
Secdummy  0.0216*  -0.258*  1.659***  0.0396***  -0.292***  (0.012)  (0.138)  (0.040)  (0.001)  (0.031) 
Fad 0.0138***  0.014***  0.006***  0.010***  0.005***  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  
Constant -2.108** 0.579*** -2.029** -0.0979 2.227*** -5.609*** -0.566 0.368*** -11.71*** 0.513*** (0.851) (0.052) (0.842) (0.438) (0.598) (0.589) (0.793) (0.023) (0.842) (0.08) 
Observations 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,216 47,216 47,305 47,296 47,296 47,305 
Clusters 1506 1506 1506 1506 1508 1508 1508 1506 1506 1508 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy NPL Secdummy Capital Secdummy Profitability 
Wald ChiSq 18195 18195 2630 2630 17279 17279 12393 6983 6983 12393 
Rho -0.116 -0.116 0.0575 0.0575 -0.892 -0.892 0.588 -0.896 -0.896 0.589 
ChiSq H0: 
Rho = 0 3.471 3.471 5.503 5.503 2562 2562 49.89 548.1 548.1 49.88 
P-val H0 0.062 0.062 0.020 0.020 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: The table shows the results of the robustness tests where variables are winsorized at 5%. Securitization is the endogenous treatment variable. Secdummy shows the 
first-stage selection regression output. Control variables (including quarter dummies, not reported) are lagged one quarter. Credit risk, profitability, and Capital are not 
included in their own respective outcome regressions. A Wald test against the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is included as a goodness of fit indicator, as is the 
likelihood ratio test against the null hypothesis that rho is zero. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 2-17 - Instrumental Variable Analysis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy NPL Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Capital 
Loan ratio 0.987 0.320*** -1.956 0.484*** 0.384*** 0.880*** 0.170** 0.897** 0.970*** -0.205*** (0.601) (0.036) (2.856) (0.026) (0.02) (0.025) (0.082) (0.082) (0.025) (0.009) 
Credit 
Enhancements 
0.788* -0.406*** 0.561* 0.111*** 0.179** 0.989** 0.127* 0.291*** 0.448 -0.111*** 
(0.411) (0.737) (0.329) (0.019) (0.055) (0.023) (0.067) (0.017) (0.278) (0.002) 
Liquidity 
Provision 
0.987** -0.076 0.567** 0.298 -0.00539 -0.0486 0.417*** 0.082 0.935** -0.072*** 
(0.067) (0.147) (0.523) (0.889) (0.089) (0.143) (0.111) (0.234) (0.169) (0.023) 
Third Part. 
Credit 
Enhancements 
0.0574 -0.0267 0.0572 -0.104 1.124*** 0.0624 0.836 0.0462 0.0272 -0.0300 
(0.204) (0.087) (0.179) (0.306) (0.06) (0.143) (0.708) (0.137) (0.128) (0.021) 
Third Part. 
Liquidity 
Provision 
0.874 0.307*** 0.342 -2.448*** 2.088** -0.739** 0.438*** 0.068 0.056 -0.165*** 
(0.919) (0.040) (0.804) (0.624) (0.762) (0.025) (0.099) (0.143) (0.187) (0.017) 
Size 0.235*** 0.102** 0.989*** 0.0256 0.125*** -0.026 0.311*** 0.0009 0.212*** -0.08*** (0.048) (0.197) (0.009) (0.016) (0.027) (0.019) (0.030) (0.113) (0.042) (0.021) 
Profitability -0.078 -0.007 -0.987 -0.0135 0.901*** -0.880*** 0.982*  -0.804*** 0.786 (0.012) (0.001) (0.071) (0.085) (0.009) (0.096) (0.094)  (0.008) (0.026) 
Liquidity 0.0564** 0.954** 0.028 0.0697 -0.351 -0.577 -1.257* -0.035 -1.646*** 0.0212 (0.022) (0.227) (0.078) (0.089) (0.483) (0.480) (0.664) (0.070) (0.623) (0.021) 
Expenses -0.327 -0.051 -0.347 -0.00184 -0.490*** 0.436*** 0.456** -0.759*** -1.313*** -0.0238*** (0.225) (0.091) (0.218) (0.091) (0.161) (0.124) (0.187) (0.021) (0.224) (0.005) 
Non-
performing 
loans 
0.123*** 0.000485 0.119*** -0.000565 0.793***  0.0284 -0.0386*** 0.0709* 0.000360 
(0.041) (0.001) (0.040) (0.011) (0.028)  (0.028) (0.002) (0.041) (0.054) 
Capital 0.714*** -0.493*** 0.085 0.692 0.266 0.183 0.738 0.984 -0.118  (0.045) (0.058) (0.379) (0.988) (0.875) (0.965) (1.211) (0.534) (1.298)  
Secdummy  3.845***  -0.348***  0.603***  -0.607***  3.930***  (0.873)  (0.098)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.901) 
Fad 1.957***  3.057***  2.008***  0.687***  1.724***  (0.625)  (0.627)  (0.634)  (0.234)  (0.545)  
Constant -0.618 -9.398*** -0.840 -0.730 -10.17*** -0.049*** -0.616*** 0.0426* -0.617*** -0.0548*** (1.472) (2.264) (1.468) (1.469) (0.577) (0.003) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.013) 
Observations 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,296 47,216 47,216 47,296 47,305 47,305 47,296 
R squared 0.43 0.20 0.41 0.14 0.44 0.15 0.45 0.15 0.43 0.14 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 (First-stage) (Second-stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) (First-stage) 
(Second-
stage) 
Variables Secdummy RWATA Secdummy ΔRWATA Secdummy NPL Secdummy Profitability Secdummy Capital 
KP rank Wald 
LM Statistic 8.9  7.9  6.3  8.8  8.6  
KP rank Wald 
F Statistic 13.68  13.86  14.50  13.30  13.33  
Note: The table shows the results of the robustness tests. It presents a fixed effects IV estimation of the effect of securitization on bank credit risk, credit risk taking, 
profitability and capital levels. The first column reports the results of the first stage, where securitization decision is instrumented by a variable “fad” which captures peer 
pressure for other BHCs to securitize. The second column reports the results of the second stage of the estimation. Standard errors clustered at the BHC-level are reported 
in parentheses. *, **,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Chapter 3 Tables 
Table 3-1 - Summary statistics 
Note: This table reports the variable’s name, mean, standard deviation, minimum- and maximum value of the individual bank time-series averages, and number of 
observations. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Variables N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Size 18167 22946.49 135730.2 154.9316 2010457 
Bid-ask spread (Opacity) 18063 0.2079175 0.4234211 -1.689999 21.51 
Non-performing loans 18110 -4.729568 1.320777 -8.605924 -2.303523 
Liquidity 17826 0.2286671 0.1156221 0.0352983 0.6056811 
Profitability 17697 0.1543765 0.346202 -1.772282 0.7996585 
Efficiency 18167 0.6783338 0.1740417 0.3590868 1.526493 
Capital (Tier1) 17863 0.1233322 0.0387057 0.0245 0.3278 
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Table 3-2 - Summary Statistics 
 Note: This table reports the variable’s name, mean, standard deviation, minimum- and maximum value of the individual bank time-series averages, and number of 
observations. The statistics are reported for banks exposed to ABCP conduits and for the banks not exposed to ABCP conduits. The percentage difference and statistical 
significance are also presented (p-value). 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Exposed to ABCP Not exposed to ABCP 
Variables N Mean  Sd Min Max N Mean  Sd Min Max Difference  
Size 17413 7691.784 40036.97 154.9316 1020380 754 375241.1 526991.8 1825.36 2010457 4778.47% 
Size (ln) 17413 7.464538 1.303144 5.042984 13.83568 754 11.83736 1.5095 7.509533 14.51387 58.58% 
Non-
performing 
loans 
17357 -4.737027 1.324182 -8.605924 -2.303523 754 -4.557627 1.228012 -8.605924 -2.467341 -3.79% 
Liquidity 17073 .2271248 .113254 .0352983 .6056811 754 .2636361 1.1562443 .0352983 .6056811 16.08% 
Profitability 16966 .1512809 .347698 -1.772282 .7996585 754 .2262233 .300839 -1.772282 .7996585 49.54% 
Efficiency 17413 .6800459 .1751673 .3590868 1.526493 754 .6387946 .14003 .2590868 1.526493 -6.07% 
Leverage 17109 11.48435 3.075858 3.290556 32.36246 754 13.61497 2.77757 5.589715 24.8139 18.55% 
Capital 
(Tier1) 17109 .12443 0.0388647 .0245 .3278 754 0.0984218 .0238974 .0643 .2025 -20.90% 
Bid-ask 
spread 17380 -1.760032 9.194627 -97.105 113.25 754 -3.615575 3.057902 -29.02 -.1900001 105.43% 
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Table 3-3 - Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Variables Size Capital (Tier1) Liquidity 
Profitabilit
y 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Opacity 
CREDIT 
EXPOSUR
E own 
conduits 
LIQUIDIT
Y 
EXPOSUR
E: own 
conduits 
CREDIT 
EXPOSUR
E other 
conduits 
LIQUIDIT
Y 
EXPOSUR
E: other 
conduits 
Size 1.0000          
Capital (Tier1) -0.0774* 1.0000         
Liquidity 0.1292* 0.4017* 1.0000        
Profitability 0.0155 0.2309* 0.0973* 1.0000       
Non-
performing 
loans 
0.0708* -0.0628* -0.1624* -0.3728* 1.0000      
Opacity 0.0591* -0.0054 -0.0291* -0.0287* 0.0842* 1.0000     
CREDIT 
EXPOSURE 
own conduits 
0.5780* -0.0738* 0.0687* 0.0126 0.0337* 0.0302* 1.0000    
LIQUIDITY 
EXPOSURE: 
own conduits 
0.1080* -0.0333* 0.0092 0.0114 -0.0008 0.0164 0.0540* 1.0000   
CREDIT 
EXPOSURE 
other conduits 
0.7492* -0.0792* 0.0923* 0.0079 0.0307* 0.0341* 0.6095* 0.1201* 1.0000  
LIQUIDITY 
EXPOSURE: 
other conduits 
0.4517* -0.0640* 0.0894* 0.0098 0.0278* 0.0295* 0.3484* 0.3440* 0.4857* 1.0000 
Note: The table reports pairwise correlations between the main regression variables. * indicates significance at 1%. Definition and construction of the variables are 
provided in Appendix 1. 
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Table 3-4 - Opacity and credit enhancements and liquidity provision to ABCP 
conduits 
1 2 
Variables Opacity 
Non-performing loans 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
Credit exposure own conduits 
2.09 
(2.56) 
Credit exposure other conduits 
7.88** 
(3.25) 
Liquidity exposure: own conduits 
17.6*** 
(2.90) 
Liquidity exposure: other conduits 
6.08* 
(3.59) 
Size 
0.102*** 
(0.016) 
Profitability 
-0.045*** 
(0.008) 
Liquidity 
-0.082 
(0.063) 
Efficiency 
0.050*** 
(0.018) 
Capital 
0.048 
(0.132) 
Constant 
-0.983*** 
(0.137) 
Observations 17,031 
Number of entities 602 
R-squared 0.098 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of the bid-ask spread on the exposure to ABCP and 
other explanatory variables. Regressions include BHC-fixed effects and quarter-fixed effects 
(not reported). Standard errors are clustered by bank. Coefficients with statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard 
errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 3-5 - Opacity and credit enhancements and liquidity provision to ABCP 
conduits before and after the crisis 
1 2 3 
Variables Opacity Opacity 
Size 
0.109*** 0.227*** 
(0.026) (0.051) 
Liquidity 
0.0405 0.380*** 
(0.109) (0.141) 
Profitability 
0.0554* -0.0200 
(0.028) (0.015) 
Efficiency 
0.0343 0.0287 
(0.055) (0.049) 
Non-performing loans 
0.00109 0.130*** 
(0.007) (0.022) 
Capital 
0.438 1.112*** 
(0.312) (0.313) 
Non-interest income 
0.0838 -0.181 
(0.090) (0.112) 
Returns Volatility 
-2.226*** 0.0290* 
(0.633) (0.015) 
Guarantor after Crisis 
 0.1000** 
 (0.042) 
Guarantor before Crisis 
-0.0635  
(0.079)  
Constant 
-0.997*** -1.689*** 
(0.252) (0.411) 
Observations 4,036 3,343 
Number of entity 501 419 
R-squared 0.022 0.107 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of the opacity on the exposure to ABCP and other 
explanatory variables. Regressions include BHC-fixed effects and quarter-fixed effects (not 
reported). Standard errors are clustered by bank and by year. Coefficients with statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and 
standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 3-6 - Opacity and credit enhancements and liquidity provision to ABCP 
conduits before and after the crisis 
1 2 3 
Variables Opacity before crisis Opacity after crisis 
Credit exposure 
-2.93 5.79 
(4.00) (4.49) 
Credit exposure 
5.38e -2.13* 
(7.87) (1.23) 
Liquidity exposure: conduits 
sponsored 
9.32* 1.55*** 
(4.77) (4.47) 
Liquidity exposure: conduits 
sponsored 
6.23 1.57*** 
(1.48) (5.37) 
Non-performing loans 
-0.00319 0.0753*** 
(0.004) (0.011) 
Capital 
0.217 1.114*** 
(0.299) (0.277) 
Leverage ratio 
-0.00807** 0.00534*** 
(0.003) (0.001) 
Profitability 
0.0107 -0.0189* 
(0.020) (0.010) 
Size 
0.190*** 0.172*** 
(0.019) (0.033) 
Constant 
-1.583*** -1.440*** 
(0.178) (0.292) 
Observations 9,273 7,107 
R-squared 0.032 0.045 
Number of entity 531 441 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of the opacity on the exposure to ABCP and other 
explanatory variables. Regressions include BHC-fixed effects and quarter-fixed effects (not 
reported). Standard errors are clustered by bank and by year. Coefficients with statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and 
standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 3-7 - Returns volatility and credit enhancements and liquidity provision to 
ABCP conduits 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Variables Returns Volatility Returns Volatility Returns Volatility 
Size 
0.00121 -0.108*** 0.00148 -0.118*** 0.00137 -0.109*** 
(0.009) (0.025) (0.008) (0.020) (0.008) (0.019) 
Liquidity 
0.0999 -0.324* 0.0888 -0.322** 0.0986 -0.314** 
(0.07) (0.160) (0.068) (0.152) (0.068) (0.152) 
Efficiency 
0.045 0.084** 0.0421 0.0972** 0.0433 0.0970** 
(0.056) (0.041) (0.057) (0.043) (0.056) (0.042) 
Non-performing 
loans 
-0.00645 0.055*** -0.005 0.0511*** -0.00568 0.0490*** 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) 
Capital 
0.165 -0.889* 0.179 -0.236 0.0898 -0.264 
(0.306) (0.472) (0.316) (0.517) (0.302) (0.540) 
Leverage ratio 
-0.00483 0.000171 -0.00460 0.00270 -0.00506 0.00215 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Guarantor 
-0.029** 0.00387   -0.028** -0.00311 
(0.011) (0.025)   (0.011) (0.025) 
Opacity 
  -0.00165 0.0132*** -0.00155 0.0129*** 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Constant 
-0.0444 1.710*** -0.0475 1.640*** -0.0246 1.546*** 
(0.138) (0.307) (0.144) (0.256) (0.140) (0.251) 
Observations 15,088 15,089 15,089 15,090 15,088 15,089 
R-squared 0.021 0.074 0.019 0.148 0.023 0.143 
Number of entity 589 582 589 582 589 582 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of the returns and volatility on the exposure to 
ABCP and other explanatory variables. Regressions include BHC-fixed effects and quarter-
fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are clustered by bank and by year. Coefficients 
with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** 
respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 3-8 - Volatility and credit enhancements and liquidity provision to ABCP 
conduits 
1 2 3 
Variables Volatility Volatility 
Size 
0.0289*** 0.0285*** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Opacity 
0.0228*** 0.0228*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Liquidity 
-0.138*** -0.138*** 
(0.015) (0.014) 
Profitability 
-0.0364*** -0.0363*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Efficiency 
0.0101 0.0102 
(0.007) (0.006) 
Non-performing loans 
0.0226*** 0.0227*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Capital 
0.0795** 0.0826** 
(0.035) (0.035) 
Non-interest income 
0.0290** 0.0288** 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Guarantor 
-0.00569  
(0.007)  
Credit exposure own conduits 
 2.97 
 (3.01) 
Credit exposure other conduits 
 2.17 
 (2.92) 
Liquidity exposure: own 
conduits 
 4.01** 
 (1.56) 
Liquidity exposure: other 
conduits 
 -3.89 
 (3.38) 
Constant 
-0.00660 -0.00439 
(0.027) (0.027) 
Observations 15,394 15,394 
Number of entity 582 582 
R-squared 0.423 0.424 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of the volatility of returns on the exposure to 
ABCP and other explanatory variables. Regressions include BHC-fixed effects and quarter-
fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are clustered by bank and by year. Coefficients 
with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** 
respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 3-9 - Systemic risk and credit enhancements and liquidity provision to ABCP 
conduits 
1 2 3 
Variables MES MES 
Capital 
0.0619 0.0739 
(0.043) (0.046) 
Profitability 
-0.0290*** -0.0284*** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Non-performing loans 
0.00414*** 0.00462*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Size 
0.00781 0.00545 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Credit exposure own 
 7.48 
 (5.50) 
Credit exposure other 
 7.06 
 (8.12) 
Liquidity exposure own 
 2.62** 
 (9.62) 
Liquidity exposure other  
 
 
Guarantor 
 -1.31*** 
 (0.466) 
 
0.00197 
(0.081) 
 
Constant 
-0.0423 -0.0154 
(0.058) (0.050) 
Observations 976 976 
R-squared 0.239 0.261 
Number of permco 31 31 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of the systemic on the exposure to ABCP and other 
explanatory variables. Regressions include BHC-fixed effects and quarter-fixed effects (not 
reported). Standard errors are clustered by bank and by year. Coefficients with statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and 
standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 3-10 - Systemic risk and credit enhancements and liquidity provision to ABCP 
conduits 
1 2 3 
Variables SRISK SRISK 
Capital 
-0.0012 -0.0001 
(0.074) (0.074) 
Profitability 
0.00636 0.00637 
(0.014) (0.015) 
Non-performing loans 
0.08641* 0.08841* 
(0.046) (0.047) 
Size 
0.00982 0.00995 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Credit exposure own 
 0.000187 
 (0.000) 
Credit exposure other 
 -0.000840* 
 (0.000) 
Liquidity exposure own 
 7.920 
 (8.140) 
Liquidity exposure other 
 0.000675 
 (0.001) 
Guarantor 
0.0304  
(0.063)  
Constant 
0.0601 0.0601 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Observations 975 975 
R-squared 0.161 0.162 
Number of permco 31 31 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of the systemic on the exposure to ABCP and other 
explanatory variables. Regressions include BHC-fixed effects and quarter-fixed effects (not 
reported). Standard errors are clustered by bank and by year. Coefficients with statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and 
standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
  
 178 
Table 3-11 - Systemic risk and credit enhancements and liquidity provision to ABCP 
conduits 
1 2 3 
Variables MES MES 
Opacity 
 0.00199*** 
 (0.001) 
Credit exposure own 
7.910 9.010 
(5.900) (5.720) 
Credit exposure other 
1.090 1.140 
(0.886) (0.757) 
Liquidity exposure own 
2.450** 1.980** 
(1.070) (0.819) 
Liquidity exposure other 
-1.280* -1.010* 
(0.701) (0.539) 
Size 
0.00652 0.00490 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Profitability 
-0.0258*** -0.0245*** 
(0.007) (0.006) 
Liquidity 
-0.0216 -0.0183 
(0.028) (0.023) 
Efficiency 
0.00851 0.0125 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Non-performing loans 
0.00624*** 0.00525*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Capital 
-0.0195 0.0475 
(0.063) (0.064) 
Non-interest income 
0.00105 -0.00216 
(0.013) (0.010) 
Constant 
-0.0105 -0.0139 
(0.065) (0.050) 
Observations 976 976 
Number of entity 33 33 
R-squared 0.255 0.330 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of the systemic on the exposure to ABCP and other 
explanatory variables. Regressions include BHC-fixed effects and quarter-fixed effects (not 
reported). Standard errors are clustered by bank and by year. Coefficients with statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and 
standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 3-12 - Opacity and credit enhancements and liquidity provision to ABCP conduits 
1 2 3 4 
Variables Opacity 1 Opacity 2 Opacity 3 
Credit exposure own conduits 0.002 0.029 0.028 (0.004) (0.011) (0.002) 
Credit exposure other conduits 0.071* 0.008 0.008 (0.003) (0.043) (0.042) 
Liquidity exposure: own conduits 0.018 0.019*** 0.018*** (0.029) (0.009) (0.010) 
Liquidity exposure: other conduits 0.068** 0.077* 0.068*** (0.020) (0.001) (0.002) 
Size 0.222*** 0.102*** 0.103*** (0.008) (0.018) (0.019) 
Profitability -0.04*** -0.050*** -0.056*** (0.008) (0.092) (0.098) 
Liquidity -0.081 -0.078 -0.079 (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Non-performing loans 0.0149*** 0.023*** 0.031*** (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Capital 0.0478 0.087 0.098 (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) 
Constant -0.983*** -1.33*** -1.73*** (0.137) (0.127) (0.139) 
Observations 17,031 17,031 17,031 
Number of entities 602 602 602 
R-squared 0.089 0.076 0.076 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of different opacity measures on the exposure to ABCP and other explanatory variables. Regressions include BHC-fixed 
effects and quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by bank. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and 
*** respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 3-13 - Opacity, stock returns, volatility and systemic risk 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of returns, return volatility, and systemic risk on different opacity measures. Regressions include BHC-fixed effects and 
quarter-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by bank. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** 
respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Variables Returns Returns Returns Volatility Volatility Volatility MES MES MES 
Market Value 0.034 0.038 0.012 -0.190*** -0.191*** -0.189*** 0.091 0.089 0.089 (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.047) (0.056) (0.055) 
Liquidity 0.089 0.009 0.088 -0.445* -0.545* -0.444* -0.03*** -0.029*** -0.03*** (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Efficiency 0.044 0.059 0.0449 0.084** 0.087** 0.078** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** (0.062) (0.087) (0.056) (0.041) (0.041) (0.054) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) 
Non-performing 
loans 
-0.00645 -0.00645 -0.006 0.0554*** 0.0554*** 0.0554*** 0.00545 0.00545 0.00545 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.030) (0.003) 
Capital 0.165 0.165 0.165 -0.889* -0.889* -0.889* 7.480 7.480 7.480 (0.306) (0.306) (0.306) (0.472) (0.472) (0.472) (5.500) (5.500) (5.500) 
Guarantor -0.0288** -0.0288** -0.0288** 0.00387 0.00387 0.00387 0.262 2.620** 2.620** (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.090) (0.962) (0.962) 
Opacity 1 -0.026   0.0132***   0.031         (0.025)   
Opacity 2  -0.005   0.023***   0.033         (0.022)  
Opacity 3   -0.006   0.014***   0.039***   (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.046) 
Constant 0.094 0.894 0.054 1.780*** 1.872*** 1.987*** 1.985*** 1.562 1.710*** (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.307) (0.307) (0.307) (0.307) (0.307) (0.008) 
R-squared 0.022 0.025 0.027 0.087 0.074 0.079 0.098 0.089 0.079 
Number of entity 589 589 589 589 589 589 34 34 34 
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Table 3-14 - Opacity and credit enhancements and liquidity provision to ABCP conduits 
1 2 3 4 
Variables Opacity Returns Volatility 
Credit exposure own conduits 0.226*** 0.029 0.015 (0.001) (0.011) (0.025) 
Credit exposure other conduits 0.091* -0.008 0.008 (0.036) (0.043) (0.042) 
Liquidity exposure: own conduits 0.029** -0.019*** 0.018 (0.011) (0.009) (0.120) 
Liquidity exposure: other conduits 0.05*** -0.077* 0.068 (0.019) (0.001) (0.250) 
Size 0.222*** 0.102** 0.201** (0.008) (0.018) (0.019) 
Profitability -0.04*** -0.050*** -0.056*** (0.007) (0.092) (0.098) 
Liquidity -0.081 -0.078 -0.09 (0.062) (0.07) (0.08) 
Non-performing loans 0.021*** -0.023*** 0.031*** (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Capital 0.09 0.087 0.098 (0.132) (0.14) (0.198) 
Constant -0.977*** -1.33*** 1.73*** (0.137) (0.127) (0.139) 
Observations 875 875 875 
Number of entities 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.088 0.099 0.077 
Note: Results from fixed effects regressions of opacity, returns, return volatility, on exposure to credit and liquidity exposure for a smaller sample of banks with non-
zero guarantees. Standard errors are clustered by bank. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** 
respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Chapter 4 Tables 
Table 4-1 - Summary statistics expenses 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean ratio 
Compensation 75610 96440.25 950401.1 0 3.70e+07 .3641608 
Premises Fixed Assets 75604 21722.34 206761 0 8290000 .0933336   
Amortization 67987 4239.423 49875.96 0 2578000  .0052985  
Goodwill 67946 2642.991 134974.9 0 2.48e+07  .0049724  
Data Processing 67254 5054.459 72099.8 0 4482000 .0228452 
Advertising Marketing 67008 6532.368 83678.11 0 3147001 .0127717  
Director Fees 66578 60.33284 184.3265 0 24879 .0034494 
Printing Stationery 66836 726.5661 18359.98 0 1195000 .0058384  
Postage 66535 1035.279 17132.87 0 995443  .0036994  
FDIC deposits 45518 109.9999 3289.532 0 429941 .0021243  
Accounting Audit 25444 252.958 2542.272 0 175000 .0062782   
Consulting Advisory 25447 7301.448 117321.3 0 5613000 .0077305   
ATMs & int 25430 383.4751 2973.58 0 343292 0.0073766 
Telecommunication 25449 3928.305 59885.7 0 4573000 0.0084702 
Legal Exp 66427 1519.31 28289.14 0 2639000 0.0064727 
1st Highest Oth Exp 61600 27677.97 542624.3 0 3.53e+07 0.374028 
2nd Highest Oth Exp 53861 11322.69 140081.1 0 7406000 0.2858667 
3rd Highest Oth Exp 48793 5968.099 73882.97 0 3892000 0.1938448 
Note: This table reports the variable’s name, mean, standard deviation, minimum- and maximum value of the individual BHC’s time-series averages, and number of 
observations. 
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Table 4-2 - Summary statistics for BHCs involved and not involved in litigation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Litigation=0 Litigation=1 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
Size 75279 8287896 7.17e+07 7071 2.37e+09 341 3.76e+08 7.36e+08 164797 2.46e+09 
Capital 72995 13.38682 13.35549 .03 1581 324 12.71725 6.777708 1.02 62.56 
NPL 73303 8.355874 2.083561 0 18.11211 331 11.51087 3.491519 .6931472 18.12966 
Trading Revenue 74780 10413.03 303899.5 -2.62e+07 2.34e+07 339 1017138 2838635 -9791000 1.98e+07 
Net Operating Revenue 74561 276300.4 2616855 -18912 1.10e+08 336 1.08e+07 2.23e+07 2896 1.00e+08 
Non-interest Expenses 75269 177948.5 1687383 0 8.28e+07 341 7525112 1.59e+07 2041 8.01e+07 
Efficiency ratio 74558 .6823939 .2143139 -8.212121 12.16838 336 .7593116 .4116059 .2337783 6.63896 
Legal Expenses ratio 65400 .0064306 .0170324 -.7149621 1.316802 315 .015206 .0302485 0 .2505489 
Telecommunication Expenses 
ratio 24587 .0084701 .0075394 -.0117451 .1985158 194 .0084888 .0072642 0 .037803 
ATMs Expenses ratio 24568 .0073988 .0115216 -.0061599 .1782112 194 .0045572 .0134489 0 .0755277 
Consulting Advisory ratio 24584 .0076742 .0152673 -.2149621 .6175857 194 .0148592 .018506 0 .0721549 
Accounting Audit ratio 24581 .0062886 .0097963 -.061368 .8739195 194 .004956 .0083302 0 .051311 
FDIC deposits ratio 45227 .0021179 .0087006 -.5975379 .3167956 173 .0037972 .0082395 0 .0437919 
Postage ratio 65507 .0037051 .0058237 -.0030697 .1157148 316 .0025144 .0042393 0 .0185767 
Printing Stationery Expenses 
ratio 65808 .0058477 .0071442 0 .1034483 316 .0038925 .0063412 0 .0443821 
Director Fees ratio 65551 .0034574 .0065218 0 .3597786 315 .0017957 .004389 0 .025018 
Advertising Marketing ratio 65985 .0127467 .0130098 0 .2111835 316 .0179922 .0160383 0 .0851704 
Data Processing Expenses ratio 66224 .0228525 .0292929 -.1714015 4.237705 318 .0213154 .0193271 0 .0950718 
Goodwill I ratio 66913 .0047906 .0885366 0 6.116233 317 .0433404 .367834 0 6.06672 
Amortization Expenses ratio 66954 .0052831 .0169311 -.0121455 2.838158 317 .0085507 .010162 0 .0612818 
Premises Fixed Assets ratio 74544 .0933528 .0367087 -.5767046 2.315182 336 .0890758 .0376916 .0187872 .2381724 
Compensation Expenses ratio 74559 .3642402 .0908435 -2.033144 6.036655 336 .3465381 .0978769 .1200493 .7290925 
Non-interest Expense ratio 74558 .6823939 .2143139 -8.212121 12.16838 336 .7593116 .4116059 .2337783 6.63896 
1st Highest Oth Exp ratio 40241 .3759505 .5693862 -3.872159 13.24824 336 .1437865 .2514334 .0000288 1.944388 
2nd Highest Oth Exp ratio 26242 .287942 .4552278 -4.776515 13.22171 299 .1037187 .1916743 .0000134 1.628918 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Litigation=0 Litigation=1 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
3rd Highest Oth Exp ratio 14755 .195432 .3257018 1.870 10.00693 208 .0812534 .1505938 .0000121 .8956813 
Employees ratio 75279 .0003077 .0003474 0 .0311525 341 .0002451 .0001691 .0000246 .002012 
Trading Income ratio 74061 .0020066 .0228647 -1.422907 .6141494 334 .02578 .0676629 -.149044 .542329 
Investment Banking income 
ratio 28467 .0071592 .0476521 0 1.029981 210 .0250479 .044015 0 .300574 
Other Income ratio 65318 .0065406 .0163351 0 .8001625 315 .0032954 .0061996 0 .0434195 
Total Deposits ratio 72263 .7891008 .1120842 0 .9979186 328 .6787587 .1666667 .0385794 .9124814 
Foreign Loans ratio 74817 .0002949 .0041888 0 .2656964 339 .001889 .003892 0 .0169343 
Litigation settlements ratio      341 572726.3 1533824 47 1.11e+07 
Note: This table reports the variable’s name, mean, standard deviation, minimum- and maximum value of the individual bank time-series averages, and number of 
observations. This is done per observation, grouped by bank which have litigation settlements reported in the 9-YC forms and which do not at any point in time in the 
sample period of 2001Q2 to 2013 Q4. 
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Table 4-3 - Correlation matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Variables Size Efficiency 
Compens
ation 
Premises 
Fixed 
Assets 
Amortiza
tion 
Goodwill 
I 
Data 
Processin
g 
Advertisi
ng 
Marketin
g 
Director 
Fees 
Printing 
Stationer
y 
Postage 
FDIC 
insuranc
e 
Accounti
ng Audit 
Consulti
ng 
Advisory 
ATMs& 
int 
Telecom
municati
on 
Size 1.0000                
Efficiency -0.0133* 1.0000               
Compensatio
n -0.1376* 0.7135* 1.0000              
Premises 
Fixed Assets -0.1055* 0.6110* 0.5281* 1.0000             
Amortization 0.1474* 0.1500* 0.0040 0.0813* 1.0000            
Goodwill I 0.0458* 0.4957* 0.0402* 0.0727* 0.0611* 1.0000           
Data 
Processing -0.0741* 0.1784* 0.1159* 0.0838* 0.0140* 0.0130* 1.0000          
Advertising 
Marketing 0.1122* 0.1333* 0.1264* 0.1154* 0.0137* 0.0099 0.0818* 1.0000         
Director 
Fees -0.2234* 0.0688* 0.0883* 0.0512* -0.0358* 0.0075 0.0713* 0.0506* 1.0000        
Printing 
Stationery -0.2254* 0.1136* 0.1538* 0.1910* -0.0033 0.0090 0.0452* 0.1462* 0.2044* 1.0000       
Postage -0.0224* 0.0653* 0.0671* 0.0687* 0.0178* 0.0049 0.0297* 0.1603* 0.1440* 0.3574* 1.0000      
FDIC 
insurance 0.0240* 0.3250* 0.2141* 0.1949* 0.0109 0.0638* 0.0918* 0.0488* 0.0895* 0.0911* 0.1175* 1.0000     
Accounting 
Audit -0.2758* 0.2833* 0.2634* 0.2722* -0.0412* 0.0257* 0.1231* -0.0439* 0.2327* 0.1097* 0.0202* 0.2542* 1.0000    
Consulting 
Advisory 0.0927* 0.2382* 0.1549* 0.1493* 0.0696* 0.0579* 0.0666* 0.0295* -0.0023 -0.0549* -0.0401* 0.2270* 0.1329* 1.0000   
ATMs & int -0.1492* 0.0108 0.0226* 0.0292* -0.0257* -0.0284* -0.0346* 0.0300* 0.0398* 0.1301* 0.1698* -0.0058 0.0201* -0.0123 1.0000  
Telecommun
ication -0.0892* 0.2609* 0.3057* 0.3811* 0.0522* 0.0461* -0.0309* 0.0641* 0.0654* 0.2360* 0.1978* 0.0567* 0.1912* 0.0517* 0.1449* 1.0000 
Note: The table reports pairwise correlations between the main regression variables. * indicates significance at 1%. For the definition and construction of the variables see 
Appendix 1.  
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Table 4-4 - BHCs’ expenses and size 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Variables Non-Interest Expense Compensation 
Premises 
Fixed Assets Amortization 
Goodwill 
Imp.losses 
Data 
Processing 
Advertising& 
Marketing Director Fees 
Printing & 
Stationery 
Size -0.0806*** -0.0457*** -0.0150*** 0.00590*** 0.0228*** -0.00581*** -0.000826 -0.00975*** -0.0146*** (0.013) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 1.721*** 0.955*** 0.293*** -0.0722*** -0.305*** 0.0967*** 0.0229*** 0.0148*** 0.0258*** (0.175) (0.072) (0.029) (0.008) (0.062) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 71,623 71,625 71,610 65,968 65,926 65,263 65,026 64,599 64,849 
R-squared 0.066 0.074 0.039 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.021 0.050 0.047 
Number of BHCS 3,008 3,008 3,008 2,926 2,926 2,925 2,924 2,925 2,925 
(continued below) 
1 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Variables Postage FDIC deposit ins.ass. Accounting & Audit ATMs Telecommunications Legal Fees 
Size -0.0105*** 0.00323*** -0.00263*** -0.00244** -0.000347 -0.00519*** (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.0169*** -0.0448*** 0.0413*** 0.0357** 0.0111 0.0722*** (0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.016) (0.007) (0.015) 
Observations 64,558 44,515 24,280 24,283 24,287 64,453 
R-squared 0.092 0.239 0.014 0.021 0.007 0.048 
Number of BHCs 2,924 2.659 1,442 1,442 1,442 2,925 
Note: The table presents an analysis of the relationship between size, measured by log of total assets, and efficiency ratio, defined as total non-interest expense normalized 
by net operating revenue. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Revenue composition variables are the rolling average for the absolute value of the income 
share over net operating revenue. See Appendix 1 for further detail on controls included in the models. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and two-way 
clustering by firm and quarter. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are 
reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 4-5 - BHCs’ expenses and size 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Variables Non-Interest Expense Compensation 
Premises & 
Fixed Assets Amortization 
Goodwill Imp. 
losses Data Processing 
Advertising & 
Marketing Director Fees 
Size -0.0860*** -0.0461*** -0.0155*** 0.00651*** 0.0244*** -0.00564*** -0.000514 -0.0124*** (0.011) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.0189*** 0.00322*** 0.225*** 0.135* 0.00113 -0.0015 -0.00465*** 0.00642 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.027) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) 
Profitability -7.204*** -1.512*** -0.639*** -0.0870*** -2.175*** -0.204*** -0.00698 0.00713** (0.808) (0.168) (0.078) (0.013) (0.569) (0.060) (0.011) (0.003) 
Capital -5.140 5.880 -1.770 -5.760* 2.560 3.130 1.770 -1.990 (4.740) (0.199) (1.130) (3.430) (2.250) (5.810) (1.620) (1.760) 
Constant 1.668*** 0.938*** 0.285*** -0.0799*** -0.321*** 0.0965*** 0.0223*** 0.0176*** (0.136) (0.052) (0.022) (0.008) (0.066) (0.016) (0.008) (0.003) 
Observations 67863 67865 67851 62726 62731 62063 61875 61481 
R-squared 0.175 0.124 0.105 0.012 0.034 0.017 0.024 0.052 
Number of BHCs 2817 2817 2817 2733 2732 2734 2731 2732 
(continued on the next page) 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Variables Printing & Stationery Postage 
FDIC 
depositinsass Accounting & Audit Consulting & Advisory ATMs Telecom 
Size -0.0163*** -0.0103*** 0.00198*** -0.00310*** -0.00320*** -0.00236*** -0.000215 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.0122 -9.900* 0.0106*** 0.292*** 0.00555*** 0.00203 -0.291 
(0.472) (0.527) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.818) 
Profitability -0.00194 0.00527 -0.222*** -0.0238** -0.0886*** -0.00608 -0.0152** (0.005) (0.005) (0.067) (0.010) (0.024) (0.005) (0.007) 
Capital -0.471 -0.773 -0.585 -0.708 0.131 0.345 -0.310 (0.938) (0.943) (0.131) (0.257) (0.114) (0.232) (0.282) 
Constant 0.0278*** 0.0169*** -0.0343*** 0.0453*** 0.0428** 0.0321*** 0.00836 (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) 
Observations 61702 61441 42543 23125 23128 23116 23132 
R-squared 0.05 0.096 0.283 0.018 0.032 0.044 0.009 
Number of BHCs 2731 2731 2589 1309 1309 1309 1309 
Note: The table presents an analysis of the relationship between size, measured by log of total assets, and efficiency ratio, defined as total non-interest expense normalized 
by net operating revenue. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Revenue composition variables are the rolling average for the absolute value of the income 
share over net operating revenue. See Appendix 1 for further detail on controls included in the models. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and two-way 
clustering by firm and quarter. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are 
reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 4-6 - BHCs’ expenses and size 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Variables Efficiency Ratio ATMs Telecom. Consulting & Advisory 
Accounting & 
Audit FDIC insurance Postage 
Size -0.0616** -0.00274*** -0.000158 -0.00393*** -0.00329*** -0.00340 0.00334 (0.026) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Non-performing loans 0.0207*** 0.00172 -1.990 0.00604*** 0.00265** 0.00829*** -2.700 (0.003) (0.001) (8.200) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (4.980) 
Profitability -6.761*** -0.00197 -0.0112 -0.0879*** -0.0238** -0.422*** 0.00442 (0.835) (0.005) (0.007) (0.025) (0.012) (0.118) (0.003) 
Capital -0.00129 3.280 -3.180 1.140 -1.750 -9.300 6.880 (0.002) (2.340) (2.790) (0.975) (2.830) (1.310) (1.420) 
Total Deposits ratio 0.0652 0.00311 0.000609 -0.00238 0.00161 0.0250** -0.00587** (0.088) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) 
Trading Assets ratio -0.0856 -0.00303 -0.000370 0.0286 -0.000896 -0.00379 0.00240 (0.176) (0.007) (0.011) (0.021) (0.005) (0.017) (0.004) 
Investments Real Estate 
Vent. 
0.627*** -0.0109 -0.00490 0.0112 0.0171*** -2.869*** 0.000940 
(0.220) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.771) (0.004) 
Total Loans ratio -0.290*** -0.00267 -0.00116 -0.00642** -0.00504*** -0.0321** 0.00117 (0.051) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.001) 
Trading Income ratio -0.0843 0.00212 -0.00732 0.00140 0.000188 0.0145 -0.00498** (0.171) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) 
Fiduciary Income ratio 0.491*** -0.00235 0.00897** 0.00380 -0.000292 0.00319 0.000381 (0.098) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.013) (0.003) 
lnvestment Banking 
Income ratio 
0.374** 0.00178 0.0130 0.0237 0.000420 0.00393 -0.0118*** 
(0.183) (0.008) (0.013) (0.019) (0.006) (0.022) (0.003) 
Other Income ratio 1.455*** 0.0798*** 0.0387*** 0.0109 0.0433*** 0.0420 0.0432*** (0.301) (0.031) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.036) (0.008) 
Employees ratio 322.1*** -7.816** -0.395 -5.612 -2.871 -4.361 1.949 (100.2) (3.736) (2.308) (7.265) (3.120) (9.373) (3.973) 
Constant 1.404*** 0.0390*** 0.00728 0.0604*** 0.0512*** -0.0248 0.00283 (0.402) (0.012) (0.009) (0.023) (0.012) (0.046) (0.006) 
Observations 24,341 21,501 21,516 21,512 21,509 7,471 24,341 
R-squared 0.115 0.056 0.016 0.035 0.026 0.371 0.139 
Number of BHCs 1,337 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,046 1,337 
(continued on next page) 
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Note: The table presents an analysis of the relationship between size, measured by log of total assets, and efficiency ratio, defined as total non-interest expense normalized by net operating 
revenue. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Revenue composition variables are the rolling average for the absolute value of the income share over net operating revenue. 
See Appendix 1 for further detail on controls included in the models. Models are estimated with robust standard errors and two-way clustering by firm and quarter. Coefficients with 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Variables Printing & Stationery Director Fees 
Advertising & 
Marketing Data Processing 
Goodwill 
Imp.losses Amortization 
Premises & 
Fixed Assets Legal Fees 
Size 0.0158*** -0.00221 0.00550*** -0.00430** 0.0617*** 0.00612*** -0.0151*** -0.00948*** (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.019) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Non-performing 
loans 
-1.000* -6.340 -0.00453*** 0.00660*** 0.00236 0.00222** 0.0241*** 0.0160*** 
(0.568) (5.370) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Profitability 0.00970* 0.00498 0.000936 -0.0771*** -2.943*** -0.0557*** -0.392*** -0.128*** (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.018) (0.815) (0.014) (0.069) (0.024) 
Capital 2.480 2.060 9.160** -3.910 5.720 -4.410 -7.890 -9.680 (1.900) (1.790) (4.510) (4.450) (4.770) (4.807) (2.530) (7.500) 
Total Deposits 
ratio 
-0.00617*** -0.00297** -0.0100** 0.0152*** -0.153** -0.00303 0.0344*** 0.0142** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.075) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) 
Trading Assets 
ratio 
0.00632 0.00153 0.00821 -0.0345** 0.0252 0.000488 -0.00142 -0.00657 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015) (0.070) (0.010) (0.026) (0.025) 
Investments Real 
Estate Vent. 
0.00460 -0.00293 0.0141 -0.0369*** 0.180 0.00571 0.0730*** -0.0824*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.014) (0.009) (0.192) (0.008) (0.020) (0.018) 
Total Loans ratio 0.00281*** 0.00203** 0.00197 -0.0131*** 0.0919*** -0.00166 -0.0379*** -0.0206*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) 
Trading Income 
ratio 
-0.00713*** 0.00141 -0.0129* 0.00584 -0.0103 -0.000419 -0.0238* 0.0152 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.034) (0.006) (0.014) (0.021) 
Fiduciary Income 
ratio 
0.00730** -0.000513 0.0117** 0.0419*** 0.00975 0.0204*** 0.0776*** -0.00300 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.072) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) 
Investment 
Banking Income 
ratio 
-0.00442 -0.00886** 0.00121 0.0319* 0.0123 0.00596 0.0502* 0.0254 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.013) (0.018) (0.094) (0.018) (0.027) (0.031) 
Other Income ratio 0.0445*** 0.0198*** 0.0191 0.0397 0.226 0.00552 0.288*** 0.0663*** (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.029) (0.167) (0.017) (0.053) (0.019) 
Employees ratio 0.360 -1.459* 25.87*** -3.140 103.0 8.413** -14.46 -10.24 (1.535) (0.813) (7.106) (5.561) (77.030) (3.475) (11.790) (12.630) 
Constant -0.0122* 0.00716 -0.0583*** 0.0693*** -0.818*** -0.0736*** 0.286*** 0.125*** (0.007) (0.005) (0.016) (0.025) (0.283) (0.020) (0.058) (0.030) 
Observations 24,341 24,340 24,341 24,340 24,341 24,318 24,341 24,341 
R-squared 0.120 0.046 0.064 0.062 0.038 0.059 0.105 0.068 
Number of BHCs 1,337 1.337 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 
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Table 4-7 - BHCs’ size, systemic risk and litigation 
Note: This table presents results from probit, logit and OLS regressions of litigation on BHCs’ 
size and systemic risk. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Coefficients with 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** 
respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
  
1 2 3 4 
 Logit Probit OLS 
Variables Litigation Litigation Litigation amount 
MES 8.329 0.793*** -0.00462 (6.384) (0.307) (0.697) 
Size 5.960** 1.430*** 1.740*** (5.55)** (0) (0) 
Non-performing 0.645** 0.00472 0.00997 (0.267) (0.005) (0.013) 
Capital -0.171 0.000720 0.000141 (0.118) (0.001) (0.002) 
Profitability -21.02 -0.637 -0.929 (22.420) (0.563) (0.626) 
Constant 
-11.71*** -0.0742 (0.073) 
(3.538) (0.065) -0.143 
  (0.173) 
Observations 961 961 961 
Number of 31 31 31 
R-squared  0.07 0.139 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.306 0.209  
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Table 4-8 - BHCs’ size, opacity and litigation 
1 2 3 4 
Variables Litigation (logit) Litigation (probit) Litigation amount (OLS) 
Size 1.960*** 0.0087*** 7.025*** (0.376) (0.003) (0.09) 
Non-performing loans 0.0933*** 25.050 8.88*** (0.036) (50.616) (1.82) 
ROLROE 5.661 1.338 6.588 (4.075) (10.74) (13.55) 
Capital 0.00103 -11,721 34.21 (0.003) (28.718) (29.76) 
Legal Fees ratio 181.2*** 3.080 -4.538* (59.150) (3.133) (2.522) 
Employees ratio 45.82 -2.287  (503.30) (19.26)  
Trading Income ratio 0.798 7.687***  (1.185) (2.770)  
Investment Banking 
Income ratio 
4.108* 1.189e+07**  
(2.489) (0.522)  
Foreign Loans ratio  9.745e+07**   (3.916e+07)  
Opacity  4.222   (24.891)  
Compensation   -4.802   (2.397) 
Constant -5.037*** -2.811 -1.183 (0.457) (8.630) (0.153) 
Observations 26,915 1,070 2,880 
Number of BHCs 1,373 34 96 
Fixed effect   Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared   0.601 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.306  0.209  
Note: This table presents results from probit, logit and fixed effect regressions of litigation on 
BHCs’ size, opacity and other variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. 
Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, 
and *** respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 4-9 - Litigation probit and logit 
1 2 3 4 5 
Variables Litigation (logit) Litigation (probit) Litigation (logit) 
Litigation 
(probit) 
Size 4.680*** 1.960*** 0.503*** 4.030*** (0.940) (0.376) (0.077) (0.990) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.194** 0.0933*** -0.0474 -0.0747 
(0.094) (0.031) (0.043) (0.123) 
Profitability 10.84 5.661 -0.0152 24.56 (8.993) (4.075) (4.061) (16.880) 
Capital 0.00274 0.00103 0.00140 -0.0186 (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.049) 
Legal Fees ratio 437.6*** 181.2***  603.7 (146.300) (59.150)  (384.7) 
Employees ratio 76.60 45.82 438.1 -5.786* (1.382) (503.3) (453.6) (3,373) 
Fiduciary Income 
ratio 
  -2.433**  
  (1.159)  
Trading Income 
ratio 
0.318 0.798 1.013 -2.372 
(2.545) (1.185) (1.246) (3.650) 
Investment 
Banking Income 
ratio 
12.67** 4.108* -5.082** -14.47 
(6.153) (2.489) (2.554) (9.858) 
Opacity    0.00597    (0.024) 
Foreign Loans 
ratio 
  22.23** 325.2*** 
  (9.426) (61.320) 
Constant 11.98*** -5.037*** -10.962*** -6.399*** (1.056) (0.457) (1.005) (1.669) 
Observations 26,915 26,915 26,586 7,490 
Number of BHCs 1,373 1,373 1,371 411 
Note: The table presents results from probit and logit regressions of litigation on BHCs’ size, 
opacity and other variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Coefficients 
with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** 
respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 4-10 - Advertising & marketing expenses and BHC stock returns 
1 2 
Variables Returns 
Adverting & marketing 0.147*** (0.005) 
Size 0.0260*** (0.002) 
Capital 3.450 (4.830) 
Non-performing loans -0.007*** (0.003) 
Constant -0.380*** (0.021) 
Observations 14,816 
Number of BHCs 531 
R-squared 0.033 
Note: The table presents results fixed effect regressions of marketing and advertising expenses 
on BHCs’ returns. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Coefficients with 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** 
respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 4-11 - Advertising and marketing expenses and banks’ total deposits 
1 2 
Variables Total Deposits 
Advertising & marketing 58.70** (26.090) 
Size 0.218* (0.113) 
Non-performing loans -0.790 (0.586) 
Capital 12,131 (11,511) 
ROE -0.196* (0.002) 
Trading Revenue 7.892** (4.011) 
Investment Banking Income 0.0101 (7.792) 
Net Operating Revenue -1.540 (1.958) 
Net Interest Income 7.304*** (2.631) 
Constant -0.003* (0.001) 
Observations 7,267 
Number of BHCs 407 
R-squared 0.278 
Note: The table presents results fixed effect regressions of marketing and advertising expenses 
on BHCs’ deposits. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Coefficients with 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** 
respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 4-12 - Marketing and advertising expenses and systemic risk 
1 2 
Variables Advertising & Marketing Expenses 
Trading Income ratio -0.0404** (0.015) 
Investment Banking Income ratio -0.0118 (0.044) 
Other Income ratio 0.381** (0.172) 
Total Deposits ratio 0.00382 (0.020) 
Profitability 0.0163 (0.019) 
Size 0.00247 (0.005) 
Non-performing loans -0.0024 (0.012) 
Capital 5.720 (3.960) 
MES 
-0.0676** 
(0.030) 
(0.004) 
Constant -0.0180 (0.086) 
Observations 352 
Number of BHCs 27 
R-squared 0.470 
Note: This table presents results fixed effect regressions of marketing and advertising expenses 
on BHCs’ systemic risk and other variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
quarter. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated 
with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4-13 - BHCs’ expenses and size 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Variables Non-Interest Expense Compensation 
Premises & 
Fixed Assets Amortization 
Goodwill Imp. 
losses Data Processing 
Advertising & 
Marketing Director Fees 
Size -0.086*** -0.046*** -0.0155*** 0.00651*** 0.0244*** -0.00563*** -0.000514 -0.0124*** (0.011) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.0189*** 0.00322*** 0.0225*** 0.0135* 0.0113 -0.00151 -0.0465*** 6.420 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (4.17) 
Profitability -7.204*** -1.512*** -0.639*** -0.0870*** -2.175*** -0.204*** -0.00698 0.00713** (0.808) (0.168) (0.078) (0.013) (0.569) (0.06) (0.011) (0.003) 
Capital -5.140 5.880 -1.770 -5.760* 2.560 3.130 1.770 -1.990 (4.740) (1.990) (1.130) (3.430) (2.250) (5.810) (1.620) (1.760) 
Constant 1.668*** 0.938*** 0.285*** -0.0799*** -0.321*** 0.0965*** 0.0223*** 0.0176*** (0.136) (0.052) (0.022) (0.008) (0.066) (0.016) (0.008) (0.003) 
Observations 67,796 67,865 67,851 62,726 62,731 61,996 61,875 61,481 
R-squared 0.175 0.124 0.105 0.012 0.034 0.016 0.024 0.052 
Number of BHCs 2,817 2,817 2,817 2,733 2,732 2,734 2,731 2,732 
(continued on next page) 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Variables Printing & Stationery Postage FDIC depositinsass 
Accounting & 
Audit 
Consulting & 
Advisory ATMs Telecom 
Size -0.0163*** -0.0103*** 0.0198*** -0.0310*** -0.0320*** -0.0236*** -0.00215 (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Non-performing 
loans 
1.220 -9.900* 0.0106*** 0.00292*** 0.00555*** 0.00203 -2.910 
(0.472) (5.270) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (8.180) 
Profitability -0.00194 0.00527 -0.222*** -0.0238** -0.0886*** -0.00608 -0.0152** (0.005) (0.005) (0.067) (0.010) (0.024) (0.005) (0.007) 
Capital -4.710 -7.730 -5.850 -7.080 1.310 3.450 -3.100 (9.380) (9.430) (1.310) (2.570) (1.140) (2.320) (2.820) 
Constant 0.0278*** 0.0169*** -0.0343*** 0.0453*** 0.0428** 0.0321*** 0.00836 (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) 
Observations 61,702 61,441 42,543 23,125 23,128 23,116 23,132 
R-squared 0.050 0.096 0.283 0.018 0.032 0.044 0.009 
Number of BHCs 2,731 2,731 2,589 1,309 1,309 1,309 1,309 
Note: The table presents an analysis of the relationship between size, measured by log of total assets, and efficiency ratio, defined as total non-interest expense normalized 
by capital. All explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter. Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** 
respectively, and standard errors are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
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Table 4-14 - BHCs’ expenses and size 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Variables Efficiency Ratio ATMs Telecom. Consulting & Advisory 
Accounting & 
Audit FDIC insurance Postage 
Size -0.0615** -0.00274*** -0.000158 -0.00393*** -0.00329*** -0.00340 0.00334 (0.027) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Non-performing 
loans 
0.0207*** 0.00172 -1.990 0.00604*** 0.00265** 0.00829*** -2.700 
(0.003) (0.001) (8.200) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (4.98) 
Profitability -6.761*** -0.00197 -0.0112 -0.0879*** -0.0238** -0.422*** 0.00442 (0.835) (0.005) (0.007) (0.025) (0.012) (0.118) (0.003) 
Capital -0.0129 3.280 -3.180 1.140 -1.750 -9.300 6.880 (0.001) (2.34) (2.790) (0.975) (2.830) (13.100) (14.200) 
Total Deposits ratio 0.0652 0.00311 0.000609 -0.00238 0.00161 0.0250** -0.00587** (0.088) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) 
Trading Assets ratio -0.0856 -0.00303 -0.000370 0.0286 -0.000896 -0.00379 0.00240 (0.176) (0.007) (0.011) (0.021) (0.005) (0.017) (0.004) 
Investments Real 
Estate Vent. 
0.627*** -0.0109 -0.00490 0.0112 0.0171*** -2.869*** 0.000940 
(0.220) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.771) (0.004) 
Total Loans ratio -0.290*** -0.00267 -0.00116 -0.00642** -0.00504*** -0.0321** 0.00117 (0.051) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.001) 
Trading Income 
ratio 
-0.0843 0.00212 -0.00732 0.00140 0.000188 0.0145 -0.00498** 
(0.171) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.002) 
Fiduciary Income 
ratio 
0.491*** -0.00235 0.00897** 0.00380 -0.000292 0.00319 0.000381 
(0.098) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.013) (0.003) 
lnvestment Banking 
Income ratio 
0.374** 0.00178 0.0130 0.0237 0.000420 0.00393 -0.0118*** 
(0.183) (0.008) (0.013) (0.019) (0.006) (0.022) (0.003) 
Other Income ratio 1.455*** 0.0798*** 0.0387*** 0.0109 0.0433*** 0.0420 0.0432*** (0.301) (0.031) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.036) (0.008) 
Employees ratio 322.1*** -7.816** -0.395 -5.612 -2.871 -4.361 1.949 (100.200) (3.736) (2.308) (7.265) (3.12) (9.373) (3.973) 
Constant 1.404*** 0.0390*** 0.00728 0.0604*** 0.0512*** -0.0248 0.00283 (0.402) (0.012) (0.009) (0.023) (0.013) (0.046) (0.006) 
Observations 24,274 21,501 21,516 21,512 21,509 7,471 24,341 
R-squared 0.115 0.056 0.016 0.035 0.026 0.371 0.139 
Number of BHCs 1,337 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,046 1,337 
(continued on next page) 
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Coefficients with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are indicated with *, **, and *** respectively, and standard errors are reported below the 
coefficients in parentheses. 
1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Variables Printing & Stationery Director Fees 
Advertising & 
Marketing Data Processing 
Goodwill 
Imp.losses Amortization 
Premises & 
Fixed Assets Legal Fees 
Size 0.00158*** -0.000221 0.00550*** -0.00430** 0.06171*** 0.00612*** -0.0151*** -0.00948*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.019) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Non-performing 
loans 
-1.000* -6.340 -0.00453*** 0.00660*** 0.00236 0.00222** 0.0241*** 0.0160*** 
(0.568) (5.370) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) 
Profitability 0.00970* 0.00498 0.000936 -0.0771*** -2.943*** -0.0557*** -0.392*** -0.128*** (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.018) (0.815) (0.014) (0.070) (0.024) 
Capital 2.480 2.060 9.160** -3.910 5.720 -4.410 -7.890 -9.680 (1.900) (1.790) (4.510) (4.450) (4.770) (4.870) (2.530) (7.500) 
Total Deposits 
ratio 
-0.00617*** -0.00297** -0.0100** 0.0152*** -0.153** -0.00303 0.0344*** 0.0142** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.075) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) 
Trading Assets 
ratio 
0.00632 0.00153 0.00821 -0.0345** 0.0252 0.000488 -0.00142 -0.00657 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015) (0.070) (0.010) (0.026) (0.025) 
Investments Real 
Estate Vent. 
0.00460 -0.00293 0.0141 -0.0369*** 0.180 0.00571 0.0730*** -0.0824*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.014) (0.009) (0.192) (0.008) (0.020) (0.018) 
Total Loans ratio 0.00281*** 0.00203** 0.00197 -0.0131*** 0.0919*** -0.00166 -0.0379*** -0.0206*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) 
Trading Income 
ratio 
-0.00713*** 0.00141 -0.0129* 0.00584 -0.0103 -0.000419 -0.0238* 0.0152 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.034) (0.006) (0.014) (0.021) 
Fiduciary Income 
ratio 
0.00730** -0.000513 0.0117** 0.0419*** 0.00975 0.0204*** 0.0776*** -0.00300 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.072) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) 
lnvestment 
Banking Income 
ratio 
-0.00442 -0.00886** 0.00121 0.0319* 0.0123 0.00596 0.0502* 0.0254 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.013) (0.018) (0.094) (0.018) (0.027) (0.031) 
Other Income 
ratio 
0.0445*** 0.0198*** 0.0191 0.0397 0.226 0.00552 0.288*** 0.0663*** 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.029) (0.167) (0.017) (0.053) (0.019) 
Employees ratio 0.360 -1.459* 25.87*** -3.140 103.0 8.413** -14.46 -10.24 (1.535) (0.813) (7.106) (5.561) (77.03) (3.475) (11.79) (12.63) 
Constant -0.0122* 0.00716 -0.0583*** 0.0693*** -0.818*** -0.0736*** 0.286*** 0.125*** (0.007) (0.005) (0.016) (0.025) (0.283) (0.020) (0.058) (0.030) 
Observations 24.341 24.34 24.341 24.34 24.274 24.318 24.341 24.341 
R-squared 0.120 0.046 0.064 0.062 0.038 0.059 0.105 0.068 
Number of BHCs 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 1,337 
 201 
References 
Acerbi, C. and D. Tasche, (2002) “On the Coherence of Expected Shortfall”, Journal of 
Banking and Finance 26(7), 1487–1503. 
Acharya, Viral V. and Richardson, M. (2009) “Causes of the Financial Crisis”, Critical 
Review 21(2–3), 195–210. 
Acharya, Viral V. and Schnabl, P. (2009a) “How Banks Played the Leverage‘Game’”, in 
Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson (eds.) Restoring Financial Stability: How to 
Repair a Failed System. New York: Stern School of Business, Ch. 2. 
Acharya, V. V. and Schnabl, P. (2009b) “Do Global Banks spread Global Imbalances? The 
Case of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007-09”, 
Working Paper, New York University. 
Acharya, V. V. and Yorulmazer, T. (2007) "Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time- 
inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies”, Journal of Financial Intermediation 16(1), 
1–31. 
Acharya, V. V., Saunders, A., & Hasan, I. (2002) “Should Banks Be Diversified? Evidence 
from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios”, BIS Working Papers No. 118. 
Acharya, V. V., Philipp Schnabl and Gustavo Suarez (2013) “Securitization without Risk 
Transfer”, Working Paper, New York University Stern School of Business. 
Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L., Philippon, T., and Richardson, M. P. (2010) “Measuring 
Systemic Risk”, in Acharya, V. V., Cooley, T., Richardson, M, and Walter, I. (eds.) 
Regulating Wall Street: The Dodd!Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global 
Finance. John Wiley & Sons. 
Acharya, V. V., Schnabl, P. and Suarez, G. (2012) "Securitization without Risk Transfer", 
CEPR Working Paper No. DP8769. 
Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L., Philippon, T., and Richardson, M. (2013) “Taxing Systemic 
Risk,” Managing and Measuring Risk: Emerging Global Standards and Regulations 
after the Financial Crisis, 5, 99. 
Acharya, V. V., Pedersen, L., Philippon, T., and Richardson, M. (2013) “Taxing Systemic 
Risk,” Managing and Measuring Risk: Emerging Global Standards and Regulations 
after the Financial Crisis, 5, 99. 
 202 
Acharya, Viral V., Anginer D., Warburton A. J., et al. (2014a) “The End of Market 
Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees”, Working 
Paper.  
Acharya, Viral V., Afonso G., and Kovner, A. (2014b) "How do Global Banks Scramble for 
Liquidity? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Freeze of 2007", July 
2012, revised for resubmission, Journal of Financial Intermediation, December 
2014. 
Adams, R.B. and Ragunathan, V. (2013). Lehman sisters. Working paper. 
Adams, R.B., Hermalin, B.E. and Weisbach, M.S. (2010). “The Role Of Boards Of Directors 
In Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework And Survey,” Journal of 
Economic Literature 48, 58–107. 
Adrian, T. and Ashcraft, Adam B. (2001) “Shadow Banking: A Review of the Literature,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 580.  
Adrian, Tobias and Brunnermeier, M. (2008) “CoVaR”, Working Paper, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. 
Adrian, T. and Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009) “CoVaR”, Technical report, FRB of New 
York. Staff Report No. 348. 
Adrian, Tobias and Brunnermeier, M. K. (2011) "CoVaR," Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Staff Report No. 348. 
Adrian, T. and Hyun, S.S. (2010a). “Liquidity and Leverage,” Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 19(3), 418–437. 
Adrian, T. and Hyun, S.S. (2010b). “The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and 
the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009,” Annual Review of Economics 2, 603–618. 
Affinito, M. and Tagliaferri, E. (2010). “Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? 
Evidence from Italy, Bank of Italy ‘Temi di Discussione’, working paper 741. 
Affleck-Graves, J., Jennings, R., and Mendenhall, R. (1995). “Evidence of Informed Trading 
Prior to Earnings Announcements”. NYU Working Paper No. FIN-94-001. 
Retrieved on 16 September 2012 from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1298804. 
 203 
Aggarwal, Raj, and Jacques, K. T. (2001) “The Impact of FDICIA and Prompt Corrective 
Action on Bank Capital and Risk: Estimates Using a Simultaneous Equations 
Model.” Journal of Banking and Finance 25, 1139–1160. 
Aghion, P., Angeletos, G., Banerjee, A., and Manova, K. (2005). “Volatility and Growth: 
Credit Constraints and Productivity-Enhancing Investment”, NBER Working 
Papers, 11349. 
Agostino, M. and Mazzuca, M. (2008). “Why do Banks Securitize: Evidence from Italy,” 
XVI Spanish Finance Forum, working paper. 
Agrawal, A. and Chadha, S. (2005). “Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals,” 
Journal of Law and Economics 48(2): 371–406.  
Agostino, M. and Mazzuca, M. (2010). “Empirical Investigation of Securitization Drivers: 
The Case Of Italian Banks,” European Journal of Finance 17, 623–648. 
Agrawal, V., Kothare, M., Ramesh, K.S.R., and Wadhwa, P. (2004). “Bid-ask Spreads, 
Informed Investors, and the Firm’s Financial Condition,” Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance 44(1), 58–76. 
Albertazzi, Ugo, Eramo, G., Gambacorta, L., and Salleo, C. (2011) "Securitization Is Not 
That Evil after All," BIS Working Paper No. 341. 
Allen, F. and Carletti, E. (2006). “Credit Risk Transfer and Contagion,” Journal of 
MonetaryEconomics 53, 89–111. 
Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2007) Understanding Financial Crises. Oxford University Press. 
Allen, F. and Satomero, A.M. (1999).” What Do Financial Intermediaries Do?” Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center Working Paper Series #99-30-B, retrieved on 21 
September 2012 from fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/99/9930.pdf. 
Allen F., Babus, A., and Carletti, E. (2009) “Financial Crises: Theory and Evidence,” Annual 
Review of Financial Economics 1, 97-116. 
Altunbas, Y., Gambacorta, L., and Marqués-Ibáñez, D. (2009). “Securitization and the 
Bank Lending Channel,” European Economic Review 53(8), 996–1009. 
Ambrose, Brent W., LaCour-Little, M., and Sanders, A. B. (2004) “Does Regulatory Capital 
Arbitrage or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?”, Working Paper. 
 204 
Ambrose, B.W., LaCour-Little, M., and Sanders, A.B. (2005). “Does Regulatory Capital 
Arbitrage, Reputation, or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?” Journal 
of Financial Services Research 28(1/2/3), 113–133. 
American International Group Inc. (AIG) (2007). AIG 2007 Annual Report, retrieved May 
2011 from http://www.aigcorporate.com/investors/annualreports_proxy.html. 
Amiram, D, Landsman, W., Peasnell, K., and Shakespeare, C. (2011). “Market Reaction to 
Securitization Retained Interest Impairments during the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008: Are Implicit Guarantees Worth the Paper They’re Not Written On?”, 
Working paper. 
Anderson, R., Duru, A., and Reeb, D. (2009). “Founders, Heirs, and Corporate Opacity in 
the United States,” Journal of Financial Economics 92: 205-222.  
Anginer, D. and Demirguc-Kunt, A. (2014). “Bank Capital And Systemic Stability,” Policy 
Research Working Paper Series 6948, World Bank.  
Arteta, Carlos, Carey, M., Corrrea, R., and Kotter, J. (2008), “Revenge of the Steamroller: 
ABCP as a Window on Risk Choices”, Working Paper, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve. 
Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J.-M., and Heath, D. (1999) “Coherent Measures of Risk,” 
Mathematical Finance 9(3): 203–228. 
Ashcraft, Adam B. and Schuermann, T. (2008) "Understanding the Securitization of 
Subprime Mortgage Credit," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 
318. 
Baele, L., De Bruyckere, V., De Jonghe, O.G., and Vander Vennet, R. (2011). “Do Stock 
Markets Discipline US Bank Holding Companies: Just Monitoring, or also 
Influencing?”, working paper. 
Bagehot, W. (1971). “The Only Game in Town,” Financial Analysts Journal 27, 12-22. 
Bain, J. S. (1954). “Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in 
Twenty Manufacturing Industries,” American Economic Review 44: 15-39. 
Ball, R. and Brown, P. (1968). “An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Number,” 
Journal of Accounting Research 6(2), 159–178. 
 205 
Baltagi, B. (2008). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. 4th ed. John Wiley & Sons. 
Barry, C.and Brown, S. (1984) “Differential Information and the Small Firm Effect,” 
Journal of Financial Economics 13, 283-294. 
Barth, James R., Prabha, A. P., and Swagel, P. (2012). "Just How Big Is The Too-Big-To-
Fail Problem & Quest," Journal of Banking Regulation 13(4), 265-299. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (1998) Enhancing Bank Transparency: 
Public Disclosure and Supervisory Information That Promotes Safety and Soundness 
in Banking Systems. BIS. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2008). Credit Risk Transfer: 
Developments from 2005-2007. The Joint Forum, Basel, retrieved on 16 September 
2012 from http://www.bis.org/publ/joint18.pdf. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2002) “Second Working Paper on the 
Treatment of Asset Securitizations,” BCBS Working Paper No. 11. 
Battaglia, F., and Gallo, A., (2013) “Securitization and Systemic Risk: An Empirical 
Investigation on Italian Banks Over the Financial Crisis,” International Review of 
Financial Analysis. 
Batty D. L. (2011). “Dodd-Frank’s Requirement of ‘Skin in the game’ for Asset-backed 
Securities May Scalp Corporate Loan Liquidity. North Carolina Banking Institute 
Journal 15, 13-45. 
Beasley, M.S. (1996). “An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board Of 
Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud,” Accounting Review 71: 443–
465. 
Behn, B.K., Choi. C. H., and Kang, T. (2008). “Audit Quality and Properties Of Analyst 
Earnings Forecasts,” The Accounting Review 83, 327-349.  
Behr, P., Bannier, C. E., and Güttler, A. (2010). “Rating Opaque Borrowers: Why Are 
Unsolicited Ratings Lower?” Review of Finance 14(2), 263–94. 
Beltratti, A. and Stulz, R.M. (2012). “The Credit Crisis Around The Globe: Why Did Some 
Banks Perform Better?” Journal of Financial Economics 105(1): 1–17. 
Benston, G. J. 1972. “Economies of Scale of Financial Institutions,” Journal of Money, 
 206 
Credit and Banking 4, 312-341.  
Benston, G.J. and Kaufman, G.G. (1988). Risk and Solvency Regulation of Depository 
Institutions: Past Policies and Current Options. Salomon Brothers Center 
Monograph Series in Finance and Economics #1988-1. 
Benston, G. J., Hanweck, G. A., and Humphrey, D. B. 1982. “Scale Economies in Banking: 
A Restructuring and Reassessment,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 14, 
435-456.  
Berger, Allen N. and Bouwman, C. H. S. (2013). "How Does Capital Affect Bank 
Performance During Financial Crises?" Journal of Financial Economics 109(1), 
146-176.  
Berger, A.N. and Humphrey, D. B. (1991) “The Dominance of Inefficiencies over Scale and 
Product Mix Economies in Banking,” Journal of Monetary Economics 28: 117-48.  
Berger, A.N. and Humphrey, D. B. (1992) “Megamergers in Banking and the Use of Cost 
Efficiency as an Antitrust Defense,” Antitrust Bulletin 37, 541-600.  
Berger, A.N., Herring, R.J., and Szegö, G.P. (1995). “The Role of Capital In Financial 
Institutions,” Journal of Banking and Finance 19(3–4), 393–430. 
Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell (1990) "Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk," 
Journal of Monetary Economics 25, 21–42. 
Berkman, H. and Truong, C. (2009). “Event Day 0? After-hours Earnings Announcements,” 
Journal of Accounting Research 47(1), 71–103. 
Berlin, M. and Loeys, J.G. (1988). “Bond Covenants and Delegated Monitoring,” Journal 
of Finance 43, 397–412. 
Besanko, David and Thakor, A. V. (1987) "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in 
Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review 28, 
671–689. 
Bethel J. E., Ferrell A., and Hu, G. (2008) Law & Economic Issues in Subprime Litigation. 
Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper 
No. 612. 
Bhat, G. and Jayaraman, J. (2009). “Information Asymmetry around Earnings 
 207 
Announcements during the Financial Crisis,” retrieved on 19 September 2012 from 
http://www.isb.edu/AccountingResearchConference/File/InformationAsymmetry.p
df.  
Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Thakor, Anjan V. (1993) “Contemporary Banking Theory,” 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 3(1), 2-50 
Bischof, J., Brüggemann, U., and Daske, H. (2012). “Fair Value Reclassifications of 
Financial Assets during the Financial Crisis,” SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2012-010, 
retrieved on 21 September 2012 from http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2012-010.pdf. 
Bisias, D., Flood, M., Lo, A. W., and Valavanis, S. (2012) “A Survey of Systemic Risk 
Analytics,” Working Paper, Office of Financial Research.  
BlackRock Report (2013) “Understanding ABCP”, retrieved on October 15 2013 from 
https://www.blackrock.com/cash/literature/whitepaper/understanding-abcp-a-
primer.pdf. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2010). “Report to Congress on Risk Retention,” 
retrieved on December 12, 2012 from 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/securitization/riskretention.p
df. 
Boyd, J.H. and Gertler, M. (1993). “U.S. Commercial Banking: Trends, Cycles, and Policy,” 
NBER Working Paper No. 4404. 
Brunnermeier, M.K. (2009). “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(1), 77–100. 
Brunnermeier, Markus and Pedersen, L. H. (2009) “Market Liquidity and Funding 
Liquidity,” Review of Financial Studies 22, 2201–2238. 
Brunnermeier, M. K., Crocket, A., Goodhart C., Avi P., and Hyun, S. (2009) Fundamental 
Principles of Financial Regulation. 11th Geneva Report on the World Economy.  
Boyson et al. (2014) “Why Do Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from 
Usage of Trust Preferred Securities,” retrieved from 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/14/14-03.pdf. 
 208 
Brownlees, C. and Engle, R. (2012) “Volatility, Correlation and Tails for Systemic Risk 
Measurement,” Working Paper, New York University. 
Bushman, R. M. and Williams, C. D. (2012). “Accounting Discretion, Loan Loss 
Provisioning, and Discipline Of Banks’ Risk-taking,” Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 54, 1-18.  
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J., and Smith, A. (2004). “What Determines Corporate 
Transparency?” Journal of Accounting Research 42, 207-52.  
Caballero, Ricardo J. and Simsek, A. (2010) “Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity,” working 
paper. 
Calmès, C. and Liu, Y. (2009). “Financial Structure Change And Banking Income: A 
Canada–US Comparison,” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions 
and Money 19(1), 128-139. 
Calmès, C. and Théoret, R. (2010). “The Impact of Off-Balance-Sheet Activities on Banks 
Returns: An Application of the ARCH-M to Canadian Data,” Journal of Banking & 
Finance 34(7), 1719-1728. 
Calomiris, Charles W. and Mason, J. R. (2004) "Credit Card Securitization and Regulatory 
Arbitrage," Journal of Financial Services Research 26, 5–27. 
Calomiris, C.W. (2008). “The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, and What’s 
Next,” 9th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, retrieved on 16 September 
2012 from http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2008/arc/pdf/cwc.pdf. 
Calomiris, C.W. (2009). “Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game,” NBER Working 
Papers 15403, National Bureau of Economic Research Inc., retrieved on 16 
September 2012 from http://www.nber.org/papers/w15403.pdf. 
Calomiris, C.W. (2010). “Banking Crises Yesterday and Today,” Financial History Review 
17, 3–12.  
Campbell, T. and Kracaw, W. (1980). “Information Production, Market Signaling, and the 
Theory of Intermediation,” Journal of Finance 35, 863–882. 
Caprio, Gerard and Klingebiel, D. (1996) “Bank Insolvencies: Cross Country Experience”, 
World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1620. 
 209 
Cardone-Riportella, C., Samaniego-Medina, R., and Trujillo-Ponce, A. (2010). “What 
Drives Bank Securitization? The Spanish Experience,” Journal of Banking and 
Finance 34(11), 2639–2651. 
Casu, Barbara and Sarkisyan, Anna (2013). "Retained Interests in Securitizations and 
Implications for Bank Solvency," Working Paper Series 1538, European Central 
Bank. 
Casu, Barbara, Clare, A., Sarkisyan, A., and Thomas, S. (2011) "Does Securitization 
Reduce Credit Risk Taking? Empirical Evidence from US Bank Holding 
Companies." European Journal of Finance 17, 769–788. 
Casu, Barbara, Clare, A., Sarkisyan, A., and Thomas, S. (2013) “Securitization and Bank 
Performance,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 45(8), 1617-1658. 
Cebenoyan, A. Sinan and Strahan, P. E. (2004) "Risk Management, Capital Structure and 
Lending at Banks," Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 19–43. 
Cerrato, Mario, Choudhry, Moorad, Crosby, John, and Olukuru, John L. (2012) “Why Do 
UK Banks Securitize?”, retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2051379. 
Chen, Weitzu, Liu, C.-C., and Ryan, S.G. (2008) "Characteristics of Securitizations That 
Determine Issuers' Retention of the Risks of the Securitized Assets," Accounting 
Review 83, 1181–1215. 
Chen, Y. and Hasan, I. (2006) “The Transparency of the Banking System and the Efficiency 
of Information-Based Bank Runs,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 15, 308–
332.  
Cheng, M., Dhaliwal, D., and Neamtiu, M. (2008). “Banks' Asset Securitization and 
Information Opacity,” Working paper, University of Arizona, retrieved on 25 
September 2012 from 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/seminars/papers/ARF_5-2-
08_NEAMTIU.pdf.  
Chidambaran, N.K., Kedia, S. and Prabhala, N.R. (2012). “CEO-director Connections and 
Corporate Fraud,” Working paper. 
Chiesa, Gabriella (2008) “Monitoring-Enhancing Credit Risk Transfer: The Incentives for 
Banks," Working paper. 
 210 
Čihák, Martin, Maechler, A., Schaeck, K., and Stolz, S. (2012) "Who Disciplines Bank 
Managers?" Review of Finance 16, 197–243. 
Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, S., and Klingebiel, D. (1999) “Financial Restructuring in East 
Asia: Halfway There?”, World Bank, Financial Sector Discussion Paper No. 3. 
Clark, J. A. (1996). “Economic Cost, Scale Efficiency, and Competitive Viability in 
Banking,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28(3), 342-364. 
Clearing House (2011) Understanding the Economics of Large Banks, New York: The 
Clearing House.  
Cohen, H.C. (2013). “How Have Banks Adjusted to Higher Capital Requirements?” BIS 
Quarterly Review, September.  
Coles, J. and Loewenstein, U. (1988). “Equilibrium Pricing and Portfolio Composition in 
the Presence of Uncertain Parameters,” Journal of Financial Economics 22, 279-
303. 
Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D., and Naveen, L. (2012). “Board Advising,” Working paper. 
Copeland, A. (2012). “Evolution and Heterogeneity among Bank Holding Companies: 1994 
to 2010,” Economic Policy Review 18(2), 83. 
Copeland, Thomas and Galai, Dan (1983) “Information Effects on the Bid-ask Spread,” 
Journal of Finance 38, 1457-1469.  
Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J., Strahan, P. E., and Tehranian, H. (2011) “Liquidity Risk 
Management and Credit Supply in the Financial Crisis," Journal of Financial 
Economics 101(2011), 297-312. 
Cousseran, Olivier and Rahmouni, I. (2005) “The CDO Market: Functioning and 
Implications in Terms of Financial Stability,” in Financial Stability Review (Paris: 
Banque de France). 
Coval, Joshua, Jakub Jurek and Erik Stafford, 2009, “Economic Catastrophe Bonds,” 
forthcoming American Economic Review. 
Covitz, Daniel, Liang, N., and Suarez, G. (2009) “The Anatomy of a Financial Crisis: The 
Evolution of Panic-Driven Runs in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market,” 
Working Paper, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 
Crockett, A. (2000) “Marrying the Micro- and Macro-prudential Dimensions of Financial 
 211 
Stability,” BIS Speeches, 21 September. 
Cumming, C. (1987) “The Economics of Securitization,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Quarterly Review 12(3), 11-23. 
Cummins, J.D., Lewis, C.M., and Wei, R. (2006) “The Market Value Impact of Operational 
Risk Events For US Banks and Insurers,” Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2605-
2634. 
Dahl, D., O'Keefe, J. P., and Hanweck, G. A. (1998) "The Influence of Examiners and 
Auditors on Loan-Loss Recognition," FDIC Banking Review 11(4), 10-25. 
Dang, Tri V., Gorton, G., and Holmström, B. (2012) Ignorance and the Optimality of Debt 
for Liquidity Provision. Mimeo. 
Dang, T.V., Gorton, G., Holmström, B., and Ordoñez, G. (2014) “Banks as Secret Keepers,” 
NBER Working Paper . 
de Fontnouvelle, P. and Perry, J. (2005) “Measuring Reputational Risk: The Market 
Reaction to Operational Loss Announcements,” Working Paper, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston. 
de Jonghe, O. (2010). “Back to the Basics in Banking? A Micro-analysis of Banking System 
Stability,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 19(3), 387-417. 
de Vries Robbé, J. J. (2008). Securitization Law and Practice: In the Face of the Credit 
Crunch (Vol. 8). Kluwer Law International. 
Dechow, Patricia M. and Shakespear, C. (2009) “Do Managers Time Securitization 
Transactions to Obtain Accounting Benefits?”, The Accounting Review 84(1), 99-
132. 
Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, Igan, D., and Laeven, L. A. (2009) “Credit Booms and Lending 
Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market,” European Banking 
Center Discussion Paper No. 2009-14S. 
Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, Igan, D., and Laeven, L. (2012) "Credit Booms and Lending 
Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 44, 367–384. 
Demarzo, P. (2005) “The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model Of Informed 
Intermediation,” Review of Financial Studies 18, 351-361. 
 212 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E. (2002). “Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking 
System Instability? An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Monetary Economics 
49, 1373–1406. 
Demiroglu, Cem and James, C. (2012) "How Important Is Having Skin in the Game? 
Originator-Sponsor Affiliation and Losses on Mortgage-Backed Securities," 
Review of Financial Studies 25, 3217–3258. 
Demsetz, R. S. and Strahan, P.E. (1997) “Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding 
Companies,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 29(3), 300–313. 
Desai, A. S., Nimalendran, M., and Venkataraman, S. (1998) “Changes in Trading Activity 
Following Stock Splits and Their Effect On Volatility and the Adverse-Information 
Component Of The Bid-Ask Spread,” Journal of Financial Research 21, 159-183. 
DeYoung, Robert. "How Big Should a Bank Be?" American Banker, April 17, 2012. 
WWW.americanbanker.com/bankthink/how-big-should-a-bank-be-community-
scale-1048454-1.html 
DeYoung, R., and Rice, T. (2004). Non-interest Income and Financial Performance at US 
Commercial Banks. The Financial Review 39(1), 101–127. 
Di Cesare, Antonio, 2009. "Securitization and Bank Stability," MPRA Paper 16831, 
University Library of Munich, Germany. 
Diamond, D.W. (1984) “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,” Review of 
Economic Studies 51(3), 393–414. 
Diamond, D.W. (1989) “Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets,” Journal of Political 
Economy 97, 828–862. 
Diamond, D.W. (1991) “Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and 
Directly Placed Debt,” Journal of Political Economy 99, 689–721. 
Diamond, D. and Dybvig, P. (1983) "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal 
of Political Economy 91(3), 401–419. 
Diamond, Douglas W. and Rajan, R. G. (2000) "A Theory Of Bank Capital," Journal of 
Finance 55(6), 2431-2465. 
Dionne, Georges and Harchaoui, T. M. (2003) "Banks' Capital, Securitization and Credit 
Risk: An Empirical Evidence for Canada," HEC Working Paper No. 03-01. 
 213 
Doherty, Neil A. and Harrington, Scott (1997) “Managing Corporate Risk with Reverse 
Convertible Debt,” Working Paper, Wharton. 
Downing, Chris, Jaffee, D. M., and Wallace, N. (2009) "Is the Market for Mortgage-
Backed Securities a Market for Lemons?" Review of Financial Studies 22, 2257–
2294. 
Duffee, G.R. and Zhou, C. (2001). “Credit Derivatives in Banking: Useful Tools For 
Managing Risk?” Journal of Monetary Economics 48(1), 25–54. 
Duffie, Darrell (2008) “Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial 
Stability,” BIS Working Paper No. 255, July 1. 
Dugan, J. C. (2010). Securitization, ‘skin-in-the-game’ proposals, and minimum mortgage 
underwriting standards. Remarks before the American Securitization Forum, 
retrieved February 2, 2010 from http://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/speeches/2010/pub-speech-2010-13.pdf. 
Dyck, A., Morse, A., and Zingales, L. (2010) “Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?” 
Journal of Finance 65(6), 2213–2253. 
Ellul, A. and Yerramilli, V. (2013). “Strong Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from US 
Bank Holding Companies,” Journal of Finance 68(5), 1757–1803. 
Elyasiani, E. and Wang, Y. (2008) “Non-Interest Income Diversification and Information 
Asymmetry of Bank Holding Companies,” Unpublished manuscript, FMA, retrieved 
on 14 December, 2013 from 
http://www.fma.org/Texas/Papers/BHC_Diversification_Asymmetric.pdf. 
Engle, R.F., Jondeau, E., and Rockinger, M. (2012) “Conditional Beta and Systemic Risk 
in Europe,” HEC Lausanne working paper. 
Erel, Isil, Nadauld, T., and Stulz, R. M. (2012) "Why Did U.S. Banks Invest in Highly-
Rated Securitization Tranches?", Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 
2011-03–016. 
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) (2007) “Instructions for Preparation of Consolidated 
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies,” March. 
Fender, Ingo and Mitchell, Janet (2009) "Incentive and Tranche Retention in 
Securitization: A Screening Model," BIS Working Paper No. 289. 
 214 
Feng, Guohua and Serletis, Apostolos (2010) "Efficiency, Technical Change, and Returns 
to Scale in Large U.S. Banks: Panel Data Evidence from an Output Distance 
Function Satisfying Theoretical Regularity," Journal of Banking and Finance 
34(1), 127–38. 
Ferreira, M. A. and Laux, P. A. (2007) “Corporate Governance, Idiosyncratic Risk, and 
Information Flow,” Journal of Finance 62, 951-989.  
Field, L., Lowry, M. and Mkrtchyan, A. (2013). “Are Busy Boards Detrimental?” Journal 
of Financial Economics 109(1), 63–82. 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2010) “Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions: FSB Recommendations and Time Lines,” October. 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2012) “Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of 
Shadow Banking. An Integrated Overview of Policy Recommendations,” 
Consultative Document, November. 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) (2012) Annual Report, 2012, retrieved on 
November 15, 2012 from 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.p
df. 
Fisher, Richard W. "Taming the Too-Big-to-Fails: Will Dodd-Frank Be the Ticket or Is 
Lap-Band Surgery Required?" speech delivered at Columbia University's Politics 
and Business Club, November 15, 2011. 
Flannery, Mark J. (2005) “No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via Reverse 
Convertible Debentures,” in Hal Scott (ed.) Capital Adequacy beyond Basel: 
Banking, Securities, and Insurance. Oxford University Press, ch. 5.  
Flannery, M.J., Simon, H.K., and Nimalendran, M. (2004) “Market Evidence on the 
Opaqueness of Banking Firms’ Assets,” Journal of Financial Economics 71(3), 419–
460. 
Flannery, M.J., Simon, H.K., and Nimalendran, M. (2010) “The 2007–2009 Financial Crisis 
and Bank Opaqueness,” Working Paper 2010-27, FRB San Francisco, retrieved on 
16 September 2012 from 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2010/wp10-27bk.pdf. 
Foley, T. (1999) “The Evolution of Moody’s Views on Securitization,” Moody’s Special 
 215 
report, May. 
Franke, G. and Krahnen, J. P. (2005) “Default Risk Sharing between Banks and Markets: 
The Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations,” NBER working papers, 
11741, retrieved from Stern-NYU.s V-Lab at 
http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk/. 
Franke, G. and Krahnen, J.P. (2006) “Default Risk Sharing between Banks and Markets: 
The Contribution of Collateralized Debt Obligations,” in M. Carey and R. M. Stulz 
(eds.) The Risks of Financial Institutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
603-634. 
Freixas, Xavier (1999) "Optimal Bail-Out, Conditionality and Creative Ambiguity," CEPR 
Discussion Paper 2238. 
Freixas, X. and Rochet, J. C. (2007) Microeconomics of Banking. MIT Press (2nd ed. 2008). 
Froot, Kenneth (2001) “The Market for Catastrophe Risk: A Clinical Examination,” Journal 
of Financial Economics 60(2), 529–571. 
Garleanu, Nicolae and Pedersen, L. H. (2007) “Liquidity and Risk Management,” American 
Economic Review 97(2), 193–197. 
Gersbach, Hans (2001) “Banking with Contingent Contracts, Macroeconomic Risks, and 
Banking Crises”, Working Paper, ETH Zurich. 
Gersbach, Hans (2009) “Private Insurance against Systemic Crises?”, Working Paper, ETH 
Zurich. 
Gilbert, R. A. and Vaughan, M. D. (2000) “Do Depositors Care About Enforcement 
Actions?”, Working Paper 2000-020A. 
Gilbert, R. A. and Vaughan, M. D. (2001) “Do Depositors Care about Enforcement 
Actions?” Journal of Economics and Business 53(2), 283-311. 
Gilliam, Lee (2005) “Accounting Consolidation versus Capital Calculation: The Conflict 
Over Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Programs,” North Carolina Banking 
Institute Journal 9. 
Glosten, Lawrence R. (1987) “Components of the Bid-Ask Spread and the Statistical 
Properties of Transaction Prices,” Journal of Finance 42, 1293-1307. 
 216 
Goldstein, M. A., Hotchkiss, E. S., and Sirri, E. R. (2007) “Transparency and Liquidity: A 
Controlled Experiment on Corporate Bonds,” Review of Financial Studies 20(2), 
235–273. 
Goodhart, C. (2010). “Macro-economic Failures,” in R. Skidelsky and, C. Wigstrom (eds.) 
The Economic Crisis and the State of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, 53-59. 
Gordy, M. (2003) “A Risk-Factor Model Foundation for Ratings-Based Bank Capital 
Rules,”Journal of Financial Intermediation 12(3), 199–232. 
Gorton, Gary (2007) “Banks, Banking, and Crises,” NBER Reporter, No. 4.  
Gorton, Gary (2008) “The Panic of 2007,” Yale University working paper. 
Gorton, Gary and Metrick, A. (2009) “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,” 
Working Paper, Yale University. 
Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2010) "Regulating the Shadow Banking System,” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity. 
Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. (2012) "Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo," Journal of 
Financial Economics 104 (3). 
Gorton, Gary and Guillermo Ordonez, G. (2012) "Collateral Crises," NBER Working Paper 
17771. 
Gorton, G. and Pennacchi, G. (1995) “Bank Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable Assets,” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 389-411. 
Gorton, Gary and Souleles, N. S. (2005) “Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization,” 
NBER Working Paper No. 11190. 
Gorton, Gary B. and Souleles, N. S. (2006) "Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization," 
in René M. Stulz and Mark Carey (eds.) The Risks of Financial Institutions. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Gray, Dale and Jobst, Andreas A. (2009) “Tail Dependence Measures of Systemic Risk 
Using Equity Options Data – Implications for Financial Stability,” Working Paper, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington, DC. 
Gray, Dale F., Merton, R. C., and Zvi Bodie, Z. (2008) “New Framework for Measuring and 
Managing Macrofinancial Risk and Financial Stability,” Working Paper No. 09-015 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, August). 
 217 
Greenbaum, S.I. and Thakor, A.V. (1987) “Bank Funding Modes,” Journal of Banking and 
Finance 11(3), 379–401. 
Greenspan, Alan (1998) “The Role of Capital in Optimal Banking Supervision and 
Regulation,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Policy Review 4, 163Y168. 
Greenspan, A. (2000) “Over-the-counter Derivatives,” Testimony of the US Federal Reserve 
Bank Chairman, before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 
United States Senate, February 10. 
Greenspan, A. (2004) “Economic Flexibility,” speech to HM Treasury Enterprise 
Conference, London, UK. 
Greenspan, Alan (2010) Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on 
April 7, 2010. 
Guo, S.Y. and Fraser, M.W. (2010) Propensity Score Analysis Statistical Methods and 
Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Gyntelberg, J., Ma, G., and Remolona, E. M. (2005). “Corporate Bond Markets in Asia,” 
BIS Quarterly Review December: 83–93. 
Haggard, K.S. and Howe, J.S. (2007) “Are Banks Opaque?”, Working paper, University of 
Southern Mississippi, retrieved on 16 September 2012 from 
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Orlando/Papers/Are_Banks_Opaque.pdf. 
Haldane, Andrew G. "The $100 Billion Question," at the Institute of Regulation and Risk, 
Hong Kong, March 30, 2010. 
Hänsel, Dennis N. and Bannier, Christina E. (2008) "Determinants of European Banks' 
Engagement in Loan Securitization," Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and 
Financial Studies, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. 
Hänsel, Dennis N. and Krahnen, J. P. (2007) Does Credit Securitization Reduce Bank 
Risk? Evidence from the European CDO Market. Mimeo. 
Hegde, S. and Zhou, T. (2014). “Accounting Expertise of Directors and Accounting 
Irregularities,” Working paper. 
Hentschel, L. and Smith, C. (1996) “Derivatives Regulation: Implications for Central 
Banks,” Journal of Monetary Economics 40(2), 305–346. 
 218 
Hesse, Heiko and Čihák, Martin (2007) "Cooperative Banks and Financial Stability," IMF 
Working Paper No. 07/02. 
Higgins, Eric J. and Mason, J. R. (2004) "What Is the Value of Recourse to Asset-Backed 
Securities? A Clinical Study of Credit Card Banks," Journal of Banking and 
Finance 28, 875–899. 
Hirtle, Beverly J. and Stiroh, K. J. (2007) "The Return to Retail and the Performance of US 
Banks," Journal of Banking and Finance 31, 1101–1133. 
Hoggarth, Glenn, Reis, R., and Saporta, V. (2002) “Costs of Banking System Instability: 
Some Empirical Evidence”, Journal of Banking and Finance 26(5), 825–855. 
Honohan, Patrick and Klingebiel, D. (2000) “Controlling Fiscal Costs of Bank Crises”, 
World Bank, Working Paper #2441. 
Hovakimian, Armen and Kane, E. J. (2000) “Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. 
Commercial Banks, 1985-1994," Journal of Finance 55, 451-468. 
Huang, Xin, Zhou, H., and Zhu, H. (2009) “A Framework for Assessing the Systemic Risk 
of Major Financial Institutions,” Journal of Banking & Finance 33(11), 2036–2049. 
Hughes, Joseph P. and Mester, Loretta J. (2011) "Who Said Large Banks Don't Experience 
Scale Economies? Evidence from a Risk-Return-Driven Cost Function," Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 11-27. 
Hughes, Joseph P. and Mester, L. J. (2013) "Measuring the Performance of Banks: Theory, 
Practice, Evidence, and Some Policy Implications," Working Papers 13-31, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
Hughes, Joseph P., Mester, Loretta J., and Moon, Choon-Geol. (2011) "Are Scale 
Economies in Banking Elusive or Illusive? Evidence Obtained by Incorporating 
Capital Structure and Risk Taking into Models of Bank Production," Journal of 
Banking and Finance 25(12) pp. 2169–2208. 
Hyun, J. and Rhee, B. (2011). “Bank Capital Regulation and Credit Supply,” Journal of 
Banking and Finance 35(2), 323–330. 
Iannotta, G. (2006) “Testing for Opaqueness in the European Banking Industry: Evidence 
from Bond Credit Ratings,” Journal of Financial Services Research 30(3), 287–309.
 
 219 
Iannotta, G. and Navone, M.A. (2009) “Crashes and Bank Opaqueness.” CAREFIN 
Research Paper No. 20/09, retrieved on 16 September 2012 from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600190. 
Idier, J., Lamé, G., and Mésonnier, J.-S. (2011) “How Useful is the Marginal Expected 
Shortfall for the Measurement of Systemic Exposure? A Practical Assessment,” 
Working Paper, Banque de France. 
Inderst, Roman and Mueller, H. M. (2007) "A Lender-Based Theory of Collateral," 
Journal of Financial Economics 84, 826–859. 
Instefjord, N. (2005) “Risk and Hedging: Do Credit Derivatives Increase Bank Risk?” 
Journal of Banking and Finance 29(2), pp. 333–345. 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (2012) “Global 
Developments in Securitization Regulation,” November. 
Inui, K. and Kijima, M. (2005) “On the Significance of Expected Shortfall As A Coherent 
Risk Measure,” Journal of Banking and Finance 29, 853–864. 
Irani, Rustom (2011) “Banking Crises and the Provision of Liquidity Insurance,” Working 
Paper, New York University Stern School of Business. 
Ivashina, Victoria and Scharstein, David (2008) “Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis 
of 2008,” Working Paper, Harvard Business School. 
Jacklin, C. and Bhattacharya, S. (1988) “Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank 
Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications,” Journal of Political Economy 96. 
Jaffee, Dwight (2008) “Catastrophe Insurance and Regulatory Reform after the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis,” working paper, U.C. Berkeley. 
James, C. (1987) “Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 19, 217–235. 
James, C. (1988) “The Use of Loan Sales and Standby Letters of Credit by Commercial 
Banks,” Journal of Monetary Economics 22, 399-422. 
Jiangli, W. and Pritsker, M. G. (2008) “The Impacts of Securitization on US Bank Holding 
Companies,” working paper. 
 220 
Jiménez, Gabriel and Saurina, J. (2004) "Collateral, Type of Lender and Relationship 
Banking as Determinants of Credit Risk," Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 
2191-2212. 
Jiménez, Gabriel, Salas, V., and Saurina, J. (2006) "Determinants of Collateral," Journal of 
Financial Economics 81, 255–281. 
Jin, L. and Myers, S.C. (2006) “R2 around the World: New Theory and New Tests,” Journal 
of Financial Economics 79(2), 257–292. 
Johnson, M.F., Kasznik, R., and Nelson, K.K. (2001) “The Impact of the Securities 
Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High 
Technology Firms,” Journal of Accounting Research 39(2), 297–327. 
Johnson, S., and Kwak, J. (2010) 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next 
Financial Meltdown. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Johnson, S.A., Ryan, H.E., and Tian, Y.S. (2009) “Managerial Incentives and Corporate 
Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter,” Review of Finance 13(1), 115–145. 
Jones, D. (2000) “Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital 
Arbitrage and Related Issues,” Journal of Banking and Finance 24(1), 35–58. 
Jones, J. S., Lee, W.Y., and Yeager, T.J. (2008) “Price Discovery in Opaque Markets,” 
retrieved on 24 September 2012 from 
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Turin/Papers/Bank_Opacity_FMA_Turin_2009.pdf. 
Jorion, P. (2007) Value at Risk: The New Benchmark for Managing Financial Risk, 3rd ed., 
McGraw-Hill.  
Kacperczyk, Marcin and Schnabl, P. (2009) “When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper 
during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009,” Working Paper, New York University. 
Karaoglu, N. (2005) “Regulatory Capital and Earnings Management in Banks: The Case of 
Loan Sales and Securitizations,” FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper 
No. 2005-05.  
Karpoff, J. M., Lee, D. S., and Martin, G. S. (2008) “The Cost to Firms of Cooking the 
Books,” Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis 43(3), 581-611. 
Kashyap, Anil, Rajan, Raghuram, and Stein, Jeremy (2008) “Rethinking Capital 
Regulation”, Kansas City Symposium on Financial Stability. 
 221 
Kennedy, P.E. (2003) A Guide to Econometrics, 5th ed., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Keoun, B. (2010) “Trading Eludes Dodd-Frank as Investors See Black Box,” Bloomberg, 
September 13, retrieved on 19 September 2012 from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09- 12/trading-eludes-dodd-frank-as-no-
investors-see-inside-black-box.html. 
Keys, B., Mukherjee, T., Seru, A., and Vig, V. (2007) “Did Securitization Lead To Lax 
Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans,” working paper, University of Chicago 
GSB. 
Keys, Benjamin J., Mukherjee, T., Seru, A., and Vig, V. (2010) "Did Securitization Lead 
to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 125, 307–362. 
Khanna, V.S., Kim, E.H., and Lu, Y. (2015) “CEO Connectedness and Corporate Frauds,” 
Journal of Finance 70(3), 1203-1252. 
Kiff, J. and Kisser, M. (2010) “Asset Securitization and Optimal Retention,” IMF Working 
Paper W/P/10/74. 
Kim, H. Y. (1986) “Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope in Multiproduct Financial 
Institutions: Further Evidence from Credit Unions,” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 18, 220-226.  
Kisin, Roni and Manela, A. (2015) “The Shadow Cost of Bank Capital Requirements,” 
Working paper. 
Krahnen, J. and Wilde, C. (2006) “Risk Transfer with CDOs and Systemic Risk in 
Banking,” Center for Financial Services working paper 04. 
Krishnamurthy, A., Nagel, S., and Orlov, D. (2014) “Sizing Up Repo,” Journal of Finance, 
69(6), 2381-2417. 
Kunreuther, Howard and Michel-Kerjan, E. (2008) “Managing Large-Scale Risks in a New 
Era of Catastrophes”, working paper, Wharton Risk Management and Decision 
Processes Center. 
Kyle, Albert S. (1985) “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading,” Econometrica 53, 1315-
1336.  
 222 
Kyriazidou, E. (2001). “Estimation of Dynamic Panel Data Sample Selection Models,” 
Review of Economic Studies 68(3), 543–572. 
Laeven, L. and Levine, R. (2007) “Is There a Diversification Discount in Financial 
Conglomerates?” Journal of Financial Economics 85, 331-367.  
Laeven, Luc and Ross Levine, R. (2009) "Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk Taking," 
Journal of Financial Economics 93, 259–275. 
Lakhal, F. (2008) “Stock Market Liquidity and Information Asymmetry around Voluntary 
Earnings Disclosures: New Evidence from France,” International Journal of 
Managerial Finance 4(1), 60–75. 
Lambert, R., Leuz, C., and Verrecchia, R. (2007) “Accounting Information, Disclosure, and 
the Cost of Capital,” Journal of Accounting Research 45, 385–420.  
Landsman, Wayne R., Peasnell, K. V., and Shakespeare, C. (2008) "Are Asset 
Securitizations Sales or Loans?" Accounting Review 83, 1251–1272. 
Lang, M. and Lundholm, R. (1996). “Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior,” 
The Accounting Review 71, 467–492. 
Larosière, J. de (2009) “The High-Level Group Report On Financial Supervision in the EU,” 
High Level Group on Supervision Report, Brussels.
Lehar, A. (2005) “Measuring Systemic Risk: A Risk Management Approach,” Journal of 
Banking and Finance 29, 2577–2603. 
Lester, J. and Bovenzi, J. (2010) “The Dodd-Frank Act: What It Does, What It Means, and 
What Happens Next”, retrieved on December 10, 2012 from 
http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-
wyman/global/en/files/archive/2010/OW_EN_FS_Publ_2010_The_Dodd_Frank_A
ct.pdf. 
Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R. (2000) “The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure,” 
Journal of Accounting Research 38, 91-124. 
Levitin, A. J., Pavlov, A. D., and Wachter, S. M. (2012). “Dodd-Frank Act And Housing 
Finance: Can It Restore Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?” Yale 
Journal on Regulation 29, 155. 
Libby, T., Mathieu, R., and Robb, S.W.G. (2002) “Earnings Announcements and 
 223 
Information Asymmetry: An Intra-Day Analysis,” Contemporary Accounting 
Research 19(3), 449–472. 
Lockwood, L. J., Rutherford, R.C., and Herrera, M. J. (1996) “Wealth Effects of Assets 
Securitization,” Journal of Banking and Finance 20, 151-164. 
Loutskina, Elena (2011) "The Role of Securitization in Bank Liquidity and Funding 
Management," Journal of Financial Economics 100, 663–684. 
Loutskina, E. and Strahan, P.E. (2009) “Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank 
Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations,” Journal of 
Finance 64(2), 861-889. 
Lucas, D.J., Goodman, L.S., and Fabozzi, F.J. (2007) “Collateralized Debt Obligations and 
Credit Risk Transfer,” Yale ICF working paper 07-06. 
Mandel, Benjamin H., Morgan, D., and Wei, C. (2012) "The Role of Bank Credit 
Enhancements in Securitization," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic 
Policy Review, 18. 
Manganelli, S., Kim, T.-H., and White, H. (2010) “VAR for VaR: Measuring Systemic 
Risk Using Multivariate Regression Quantiles,” Working Paper, ECB. 
Manove, Michael, Padilla, J. A., and Pagano, M. (2001) "Collateral versus Project 
Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," RAND Journal of Economics 32, 726–744. 
Martín-Oliver, A. and Saurina, J. (2007) “Why Do Banks Securitize Assets?” XV Spanish 
Finance Forum Conference Proceedings. Spanish Finance Association, Palma de 
Mallorca. 
Mercieca, Steve, Schaeck, K., and Wolfe, S. (2007) "Small European Banks: Benefits from 
Diversification?" Journal of Banking and Finance 31, 1975–1998. 
Mester, Loretta J. (2005) "Optimal Industrial Structure in Banking," Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 08-2. 
Mian, Atif R. and Sufi, A. (2009) "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: 
Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," Quarterly Journal of Economics 
124, 1449–1496. 
Michalak, Tobias C. and Uhde, A. (2012) “Credit Risk Securitization and Bank Soundness 
in Europe," Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 52, 272–285. 
 224 
Minton, B.A., Sanders, A.B., and Strahan, P.E. (2004) “Securitization by Banks and 
Finance Companies: Efficient Contracting or Regulatory Arbitrage?”, Ohio State 
University working paper 2004–25. 
Minton, B., Stulz, R., and Williamson, R. (2005). “How Much Do Banks Use Credit 
Derivatives to Reduce Risk?” Mimeo working paper, Ohio State University. 
Minton, B.A., Stulz, R., and Williamson, R. (2009). “How Much Do Banks Use Credit 
Derivatives to Hedge Loans?” Journal of Financial Services Research 35, 1-31, 
retrieved on 16 September 2012 from http://www.cob.ohio- 
state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz/publishedpapers/How%20much%20do%20banks%20use
%20c redit%20derivatives%20to%20hedge%20loans.pdf. 
Minton, B.A., Taillard, J.P., and Williamson, R. (2014). “Financial Expertise of the Board, 
Risk Taking and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies,” Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 49(2), 351–380. 
Mishkin, Frederic S. (1999) “Financial Consolidation: Dangers and Opportunities,” Journal 
of Banking and Finance 23, 675-691. 
Mitchell, K. and Onvural, N. M. 1996 “Economies of Scale and Scope at Large Commercial 
Banks: Evidence from the Fourier Flexible Functional Form,” Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 28, 178-199.  
Mohd, E. (2005) “Accounting for Software Development Costs and Information 
Asymmetry,” The Accounting Review 80(4), 1211-1231. 
Molot, Jonathan T. (2009) “A Market in Litigation Risk,” University of Chicago Law Review 
76, 367; Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 11-133. 
Moody's Investors Service (2003a) “The Fundamentals of Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper,” Structured Finance Special Report (February 3). 
Moody’s Investors Service (2003b) “Global Asset Backed Commercial Paper Market 
Review,” retrieved on October 1, 2013 from 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/moodysabcp.pdf. 
Morgan, D.P. (2002) “Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry,” 
American Economic Review 92(4), 874–888. 
 225 
Morgan, Stephen L. and Winship, Christopher (2007) Counterfactuals and Causal 
Inference: Methods and Principles for Social Research. Analytical Methods for 
Social Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Morris, S. and Shin, H. (2007) “Optimal Communication,” Journal of the European 
Economic Association 5(2-3), 594-602. 
Morrison, A.D. (2005) “Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation and Investment Decisions,” 
Journal of Business 78, 621–647. 
Moyer, S. E. (1990) “Capital Adequacy Ratio Regulations and Accounting Choices in 
Commercial Banks,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 13(2), 123-154. 
Myers, S. and Rajan, R. (1998). “The Paradox of Liquidity,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 113(3), 733–771. 
Nadauld, Taylor D. and Sherlund, Shane M. (2008) “The Role of the Securitization 
Process in the Expansion of Subprime Credit,” Working Paper, Ohio State 
University. 
Nadauld, T.D. and Sherlund, S.M. (2009). “The Role of the Securitization Process in the 
Expansion of Subprime Credit,” Federal Reserve Board: Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series working paper 28. 
Nadauld, Taylor D. and Sherlund, S. M. (2013) "The Impact of Securitization on the 
Expansion of Subprime Credit," Journal of Financial Economics 107(2), 454-476. 
Nawata, K. (1994) “Estimation of Sample Selection Bias Models by the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator and Heckman’s Two-Step Estimator,” Economics Letters 
45(1), 33-40. 
Nguyen, D. D., Hagendorff, J., and Eshraghi, A. (2015a) “Can Bank Boards Prevent 
Misconduct?”Review of Finance (10.1093/rof/rfv011). 
Nguyen, D. D. L., Hagendorff, J., and Eshraghi, A. (2015b) “Which Executive 
Characteristics Create Value in Banking? Evidence from Appointment 
Announcements,” Corporate Governance: An International Review 23(2), pp. 112-
128. (10.1111/corg.12084).  
Nijskens, R. and Wagner, W.B. (2011) “Credit Risk Transfer Activities and Systemic Risk: 
How Banks Became Less Risky Individually but Posed Greater Risks to the 
 226 
Financial System at the Same Time,” Journal of Banking and Finance 35(6), 1391-
1398. 
Niu, Flora F. and Gordon D. Richardson, G. D. (2006) "Are Securitizations in Substance 
Sales or Secured Borrowings? Capital-Market Evidence," Contemporary 
Accounting Research 23, 1105-1133. 
O’Brien, P. and Bhushan, R. (1990). “Analyst Following and Institutional Ownership,” 
Journal of Accounting Research 28, 55–76. 
O'Driscoll, Gerald P. Jr. (2009) "The Problem with ‘Nationalization,'" The Wall Street 
Journal, Feb. 23, retrieved from wsj.com/articles/SB123535183265845013. 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (1997) “Asset Securitization,” 
Comptroller’s Handbook, November. 
O’Neil, C. (2012). “Complexity and Transparency in Finance,” Mathbabe.org., retrieved on 
21 September 2012 from http://mathbabe.org/2012/01/29/2544/. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2011) Report, 
“Outlook for the Securitisation Market,” retrieved on 12 November, 2012 from 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/48620405.pdf. 
Pagano, M. and Volpin, P. (2010) Securitization, Transparency, and Liquidity. Working 
paper, University of Naples Federico II and London Business School 
Pagano, Marco and Volpin, P. (2012) "Securitization, Transparency, and Liquidity," 
Review of Financial Studies 25, 2417–2453. 
Pais, A. and Stork, P. A. (2013) “Bank Size and Systemic Risk,” European Financial 
Management 19(3), 429–451.  
Panetta, F. and Pozzolo, A. F. (2010) Why Do Banks Transfer Credit Risk? Bank-level 
Evidence from Over One Hundred Countries. Mimeo. 
Parlour, C. and Plantin, G. (2008) “Loan Sales and Relationship Banking,” Journal of 
Finance 63, 1291–1314. 
Parlour, C. and Winton, A. (2008) “Laying of Credit Risk: Loan Sales versus Credit Default 
Swaps,” Working Paper. 
 227 
Pavel, Christine and Phillis, David (1987) “Why Commercial Banks Sell Loans: An 
Empirical Analysis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives 14, 
3-14. 
Pedersen, Lasse H. (2009) “When Everyone Runs to the Exit,” The International Journal of 
Central Banking, forthcoming. 
Peltzman, Sam (1976) “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and 
Economics 19, 211–240. 
Pennacchi, G.G. (1988) “Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital,” Journal of Finance 
43(2), 375-396. 
Peristiani, S. (1997) “Do Mergers Improve the X-Efficiency and Scale Efficiency of US 
Banks? Evidence from the 1980s,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 29(3), 
326-337.  
Persons, O.S. (2006) “The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive 
Turnover and Compensation,” Journal of Business Ethics 64(4), 405-419. 
Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A., and Boesky, H. (2010) “Shadow Banking,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 458. 
Prescott, Edward S. 2002 “Can Risk-Based Deposit Insurance Premiums Control Moral 
Hazard?” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 88 (Spring), 87-
100. 
Purnanandam, A. K. (2009) Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis. Mimeo. 
Rajan, N. (2005) “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” National Bureau 
of Economic Research working paper, 11728. 
Ramakrishnan, Ram T.S. and Thakor, A. V. (1984) “Information Reliability and a Theory 
of Financial Intermediation,” Review of Economic Studies 51, 415–432. 
Ramey, G. and Ramey, V. (1995) “Cross-Country Evidence on the Link - Between Volatility 
and Growth,” American Economic Review 85, 1138-1151. 
Reform, F. I. (1989) Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Public Law 
101(173), 103. 
 228 
Reich, Robert B. (2008) "If They're Too Big to Fail, They're Too Big Period,” retrieved 
from http://robertreich.org/post/257309894. 
Roll, R. (1987) “R Squared,” The Journal of Finance 43(3), 541-566.  
Rosenberg, N. (1982) Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Rosenblum, Harvey (2012) "Choosing the Road to Prosperity: Why I Must End Too Big to 
Fail—Now," Annual Report 2011. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
Rountree, B., Weston, J. P., and Allayannis, G. (2008) “Do Investors Value Smooth 
Performance?” Journal of Financial Economics 90(3), 237-251. 
Ryan, S. (2002) Financial Instruments and Institutions: Accounting and Disclosure Rules. 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Saunders, A., Smith, R. C., and Walter, I. (2009) “Enhanced Regulation of Large, Complex 
Financial Institutions,” in Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson (eds.) 
Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System. New York University 
Stern School of Business: John Wiley and Sons, ch. 5. 
Saurina Salas, Jesus, Jiménez, Gabriel, and Lopez, Jose A. (2007) “How Does Competition 
Impact Bank Risk Taking?” EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper; FRB of San 
Francisco Working Paper No. 2007-23; AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper. 
Scaillet, O. (2005) “Nonparametric Estimation of Conditional Expected Shortfall,” 
Insurance and Risk Management Journal 74, 639–660. 
Scatigna, Michela and Tovar, Camilo E. (2007) “Securitisation in Latin America,” BIS 
Quarterly Review September. 
Schaeck, K., Silva Buston, Consuelo, and Wagner, W.B. (2013) “The Two Faces of 
Interbank Correlation,” Discussion Paper 2013-077, Tilburg University. 
Scherer, F. M. (1980) Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd ed. 
Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.  
Schroth, E., Suarez, G. A., and Taylor, L. A. (2014). “Dynamic Debt Runs and Financial 
Fragility: Evidence from the 2007 ABCP Crisis,” Journal of Financial Economics 
112(2), 164-189. 
 229 
Schuermann, Til (2004) “What Do We Know About Loss Given Default?” in David Shimko 
(ed.) Credit Risk: Models and Management, 2nd ed. London: Risk Books, ch.9. 
Schwarcz, S., (2004) “Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm In a World of Complexity,” 
University of Illinois Law Review 2004, 1-38.  
Scott, Hal S. (ed.) (2005) Capital Adequacy beyond Basel: Banking, Securities, and 
Insurance. Oxford University Press. 
Segoviano, Miguel and Goodhart, C. (2009) “Banking Stability Measures,” IMF Working 
Paper 09/04, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Semykina, A. and Wooldridge, J.M. (2010) “Estimating Panel Data Models in the Presence 
of Endogeneity and Selection,” Journal of Econometrics 157(2), 375–380. 
Semykina, A. and Wooldridge, J. M. (2005) Estimating panel data models in the presence 
of endogeneity and selection: Theory and application”. Michigan State University 
Working Paper.  
Shepherd, W. G. (1979) The Economics of Industrial Organization. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall.  
Shin, Hyun Song (2009) "Securitization and Financial Stability," Economic Journal 119, 
309–332. 
Shivdasani, A. and Wang, Y. (2011) “Did Structured Credit Fuel the LBO Boom?” Journal 
of Finance 66, 1291-1328. 
SIFMA US Quarterly Research (2012), retrieved on November 13, 2013 from 
http://www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=8589942158. 
Smith, Clifford W. and Stulz, R. M. (1985) "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies," 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20(4), 391-405. 
Standard & Poors (2003) Retrieved on September 13, 2013 from 
http://blog.creditlime.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/SP_SF_glossary.pdf. 
Stern, Gary H. and Feldman, Ron J. (2009) "Addressing ‘too big to fail’ by Shrinking 
Financial Institutions: An Initial Assessment," Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis, The Region, June 2009, 8–13. 
Stigler, George (1971) “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science 2, 3–21. 
 230 
Stiroh, K.J. (2004a) “Do Community Banks Benefit From Diversification?” Journal of 
Financial Service Research 25(2-3), 135-160.  
Stiroh, K.J. (2004b) “Diversification in Banking: Is Noninterest Income the Answer?” 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36(5), 853-882.  
Stiroh, K.J. (2006) “New Evidence on the Determinants of Bank Risk,” Journal of 
Financial Service Research 30, 237-263. 
Stiroh, Kevin J. and Rumble, A. (2006) "The Dark Side of Diversification: The Case of US 
Financial Holding Companies," Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2131-2161. 
Stulz, René (1990) “Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies,” Journal of 
Financial Economics 26, 3-27. 
Tarashev, Nikola, Borio, C., and Tsatsaronis, K. (2009) “Allocating Systemic Risk to 
Individual Institutions: Methodology and Policy Applications,” Working Paper, 
Bank for International Settlements. 
Thakor, Anjan. (2015) "Lending Booms, Smart Bankers, and Financial Crises," American 
Economic Review 105(5), 305-09. 
Thomas, Hugh, and Wang, Z. (2004) Bank Securitization and Risk Management. Mimeo. 
Udhe, A. and Michalak, T. C. (2010) “Securitization and Systemic Risk in European 
Banking: Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Banking and Finance 34(12), 3061–
3077. 
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations (1988) House Report No. 100-
1088, Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in the Nation’s Financial 
Institutions: Current Federal Efforts Are Inadequate. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
Uzun, H. and Webb, E. (2007) “Securitization and Risk: Empirical Evidence on US Banks,” 
Journal of Risk Finance 8(1), 11-23. 
Vallascas, F. and Keasey, K. (2012) “Systemic Risk Potential, Opacity and Disclosure in 
European Banks,” retrieved on 16 September 2012 from 
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Turin/Papers/SystemicRiskPotential.pdf. 
 231 
Vermilyea, Todd A., Webb, E. R., and Kish, A. A. (2008) "Implicit Recourse and Credit 
Card Securitizations: What Do Fraud Losses Reveal?" Journal of Banking and 
Finance 32, 1198–1208. 
Vickers, J. (2011) Independent Commission on Banking: Final Report. London: House of 
Commons Treasury Committee. 
Wagner, W. (2007) “The Liquidity of Bank Assets and Banking Stability,” Journal of 
Banking and Finance 31, 121—139. 
Wagner, W. and Marsh, I. W. (2006) “Credit Risk Transfer and Financial Sector 
Performance,” Journal of Financial Stability 2, 173–193. 
Wall, Larry (1989) “A Plan for Reducing Future Deposit Insurance Losses: Puttable 
Subordinated Debt”, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review 74(4). 
Walker, George A. (2014) Structured Finance. Oxford University Press. 
Wang, T.Y., Winton, A., and Yu, X. (2010) “Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: 
Evidence from IPOs,” Journal of Finance 65, 2255–2292. 
Welker, M. (1995) “Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity 
Markets,” Contemporary Accounting Research 11(2), 801-82. 
Wheelock, David C. and Wilson, Paul W. (2012) "Do Large Banks Have Lower Costs? 
New Estimates of Returns to Scale for U.S. Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 44(1), 171–99. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
MIT Press. 
Wright, T. P. (1936) “Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes,” Journal of Aeronautical 
Science 3(4), 122-128.  
Wu, H. M. and Guo, G. (2010) “Retention Ratio Regulation of Bank Asset Securitization,” 
Working paper in National School of Development, Peking University. 
Yorulmazer, T. (2013) “Has Financial Innovation Made the World Riskier?” CDS, 
Regulatory Arbitrage and Systemic Risk (April 23, 2013), working paper. 
Zhang, X. F. (2006) “Information Uncertainty and Stock Returns,” The Journal of Finance 
61, 105–137. 
